Robinson v. Planning Board

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Robinson v. Planning Board

372 N.E.2d 279, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 664

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedJanuary 31, 1978

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 372 N.E.2d 279 (Robinson v. Planning Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Robinson v. Planning Board, 372 N.E.2d 279, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 664 (Mass. Ct. App. 1978).

Pincite

Opinion

We need not consider whether the judge was correct in [836]*836ruling that the meeting of the defendant board was an "emergency” meeting as defined by G. L. c. 39, § 23A (as appearing in St. 1976, c. 397, § 5), and as used in § 23B (as appearing in St. 1976, c. 397, §6) because the judge made an alternative ruling, as a matter of discretion, declining to invalidate the questioned action of the board. Section 23B, as so appearing, provides, among other things, that a court "may invalidate any action taken at any meeting at which any provision of this section has been violated____” We decline to accept the plaintiffs’ suggestion that we treat the auxiliary verb "may” as meaning "shall,” as to do so would do violence to the purposes for which § 23B was enacted. See Abbene v. Election Commrs. of Revere, 348 Mass. 247, 250-251 (1964). The judge had discretion to invalidate or not (Nantucket Land Council, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 213 [1977]; Kelley v. Planning Bd of Dennis, ante 24, 26-27 [1978]), and nothing in the record indicates any abuse of that discretion.

Athur E. Nicholson, for the plaintiffs, submitted a brief. Paul R. Schneider (George M. Ford with him) for the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.

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We need not consider whether the judge was correct in [836]*836ruling that the meeting of the defendant board was an "emergency” meeting as defined by G. L. c. 39, § 23A (as appearing in St. 1976, c. 397, § 5), and as used in § 23B (as appearing in St. 1976, c. 397, §6) because the judge made an alternative ruling, as a matter of discretion, declining to invalidate the questioned action of the board. Section 23B, as so appearing, provides, among other things, that a court "may invalidate any action taken at any meeting at which any provision of this section has been violated____” We decline to accept the plaintiffs’ suggestion that we treat the auxiliary verb "may” as meaning "shall,” as to do so would do violence to the purposes for which § 23B was enacted. See Abbene v. Election Commrs. of Revere, 348 Mass. 247, 250-251 (1964). The judge had discretion to invalidate or not (Nantucket Land Council, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 213 [1977]; Kelley v. Planning Bd of Dennis, ante 24, 26-27 [1978]), and nothing in the record indicates any abuse of that discretion.

Athur E. Nicholson, for the plaintiffs, submitted a brief. Paul R. Schneider (George M. Ford with him) for the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

372 N.E.2d 279, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 1978 Mass. App. LEXIS 664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-planning-board-massappct-1978.

Opinion

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