[Cite as Robinson v. Larchmont E. Apts., Inc., 2014-Ohio-3517.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Vicky Robinson Court of Appeals No. L-12-1323
Appellee Trial Court No. CI0201102593
v.
Larchmont East Apartments, Inc. d.b.a. Kingston Court Apartments, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellees Decided: August 15, 2014
* * * * *` Vicky Robinson, pro se.
Thomas S. Mazanec and Frank H. Scialdone, for appellee, Larchmont East Apartments, Inc., d/b/a Kingston Court Apartments.
Alexander M. Andrews and Alyson Terrell, for appellee, SEA, Ltd.
D. John Travis and Colleen A. Mountcastle, for appellee, Chubb Custom Insurance Company.
*****
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas that granted the summary judgment motions of defendants-appellees, Larchmont East Apartments, Inc. d.b.a. Kingston Court Apartments (“Larchmont”), Chubb Custom
Insurance Company (“Chubb”), and SEA, Ltd. (“SEA”), denied the summary judgment
motion of pro se plaintiff-appellant, Vicky Robinson, and dismissed the case.
{¶ 2} The undisputed facts of this case are as follows. On April 22, 2006, there
was a fire in an apartment building that was owned by Larchmont and in which Robinson
resided as a tenant (“Building 3155”). On April 11, 2008, Robinson filed a complaint
against Larchmont regarding injuries she claimed to have sustained as a result of the fire.
Robinson dismissed that case without prejudice, and on April 1, 2011, she refiled her
action against Larchmont and John Doe. Thereafter, on August 12, 2011, Robinson filed
an amended complaint against Larchmont, John Doe, SEA and Chubb, and on August 23,
2011, she filed her second amended complaint against those same defendants. Count
One of the complaint alleged that Larchmont and/or John Doe owed a duty to Robinson
and others pursuant to R.C. 5321.04, to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe and
proper condition and that their breach of those duties, particularly their failure to maintain
the building’s wiring, directly and proximately caused Robinson serious, disabling and
permanent injuries. Count Two alleged that John Doe negligently installed, maintained
or otherwise performed work on the wiring in the building in which Robinson was
injured and was therefore responsible for those injuries. Count Three alleged that Chubb
sold Larchmont property insurance that was in effect on April 22, 2006, that following
the fire, Chubb hired SEA, an engineering company, to investigate its cause, and that in
its investigation of the fire, SEA and its employee deliberately withheld critical
2. information regarding his analysis of critical evidence and withheld or destroyed critical
evidence. Count Three further alleged that Chubb ordered SEA to destroy an electrical
panel box six months after Robinson filed her original complaint against Larchmont, that
Chubb and SEA conspired to destroy the electrical panel box and the analysis reports of
SEA’s employee, (while knowing that they were critical evidence in Robinson’s pending
litigation), that the actions of the defendants were deliberate and willful, and that such
actions damaged Robinson. All three defendants filed answers denying liability.
{¶ 3} During the proceedings below, a discovery dispute arose regarding
subpoenas issued by Robinson to Larry Snyder and Tom Whitby, former employees of
SEA who acted as experts in investigating the origin and cause of the fire. Robinson had
subpoenaed Snyder and Whitby to appear for depositions in Perrysburg, Ohio, on
November 22, 2011. A dispute, however, arose regarding expert witness fees and the
depositions’ location. Accordingly, SEA filed a motion for a protective order and/or to
quash the subpoenas and sought an order from the trial court that Robinson be required to
pay the deponents reasonable compensation of $195 per hour for their expert witness
testimony, including travel time should the depositions be held outside of their respective
counties of residence. The lower court held a hearing on the motion, and on December
20, 2011, issued a judgment entry granting the motion in part. The court ordered that
Robinson could depose Snyder and Whitby with regard to Count Three of her second
amended complaint without paying expert witness fees. The court further ordered,
3. however, that if Robinson sought to inquire of these witnesses their opinions as to the
cause and origin of the fire, she must reimburse them at the rate of $195 per hour.
{¶ 4} On January 23, 2012, Robinson’s counsel deposed Snyder and Whitby in
Toledo, Ohio. Prior to those depositions, however, the parties continued to argue over
Robinson’s obligation to pay for the witnesses’ travel time. During the depositions, and
despite the lower court’s December 20, 2011 order, Robinson’s counsel questioned
Snyder and Whitby extensively as to their opinions regarding the cause and origin of the
fire.
{¶ 5} SEA, Chubb, Larchmont and Robinson all filed motions for summary
judgment in the court below. In addition, SEA filed a motion to compel payment of
expert witness fees pursuant to the court’s December 20, 2011 order, and an order for
sanctions for Robinson’s disregard and contempt of that order.
{¶ 6} On October 12, 2012, the lower court issued an opinion and judgment entry
ruling on all of the summary judgment motions and the motion to compel. The court
granted the summary judgment motions of SEA, Chubb and Larchmont, and denied the
summary judgment motion of Robinson. In addition, the court granted SEA’s motion to
compel the payment of expert witness fees and ordered Robinson to pay SEA the sum of
$2,788.59 within 30 days of the date of the opinion, but denied SEA’s motion for
sanctions. Finally, the court denied 15 other outstanding motions as moot.
{¶ 7} Appellant now challenges the lower court’s judgment on appeal. Acting pro
se, appellant has set forth seven assignments of error in her brief. As articulated by
4. appellant, however, those assignments of error are unintelligible. We will therefore
clarify them here as best we can. Several of the assignments of error have been
combined for purposes of this appeal.
1. The lower court erred in granting appellees summary judgment
[Appellant’s First, Second and Third Assignments of Error.]
2. The lower court erred in failing to rule on the outstanding
motions until after ruling on the summary judgment motions [Appellant’s
Fourth and Sixth Assignments of Error.]
3. The lower court erred in granting SEA’s motion to compel the
payment of expert witness fees [Appellant’s Fifth Assignment of Error.]
4. Appellant was denied her right to the effective assistance of
counsel [Appellant’s Seventh Assignment of Error].
{¶ 8} We further note that appellant has attached to her brief numerous documents
that were not filed in the court below and are not part of the record on appeal. It is well
settled that an appellate court “cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a
part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new
matter.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of
the syllabus. Accordingly, anything that appellant has submitted that goes beyond the
trial court record will be disregarded.
{¶ 9} Appellant first challenges the lower court’s order granting summary
judgment to all three appellees. Appellate review of a trial court’s grant of summary
5. judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d
241 (1996). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
independently and without deference to the trial court’s determination. Brown v. Scioto
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (1993). Summary
judgment will be granted only when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and,
when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable
minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978);
Civ.R. 56(C). The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls
upon the party who moves for summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,
294, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). However, once the movant supports his or her motion with
appropriate evidentiary materials, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶ 10} The lower court granted summary judgment to all three appellees and on all
three counts in the complaint. Count one asserted a claim against Larchmont for
negligence and alleged violation of duties imposed upon landlords by R.C. 5321.04.
{¶ 11} To overcome a properly supported summary judgment motion on a claim
of negligence, a plaintiff must show a duty and that a breach of that duty is the direct and
6. proximate cause of an injury. Chambers v. St. Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 565,
697 N.E.2d 198 (1998). R.C. 5321.04(A) imposes statutory duties on a landlord who is a
party to a rental agreement to, among other things:
(1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building,
housing, health, and safety codes that materially affect health and safety;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put
and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
***
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all
electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
fixtures and appliances, and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied
by the landlord[.]
{¶ 12} A landlord’s violation of the duties set forth in R.C. 5321.04(A) constitutes
negligence per se. Sikora v. Wenzel, 88 Ohio St.3d 493, 727 N.E.2d 1277 (2000),
syllabus; see also Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St.2d 20, 25, 427 N.E.2d 774
(1981). “Negligence per se, however, is not equivalent to ‘a finding of liability per se
because the plaintiff will also have to prove proximate cause and damages.’” Sikora at
496, quoting Chambers, supra at 565. Moreover, a landlord’s lack of notice of the
purported defect in the premises constitutes an excuse from liability for a violation of
R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) and (2). Sikora at 498. That is, “a landlord will be excused from
liability under either section if he neither knew nor should have known of the factual
7. circumstances that caused the violation.” Id. at syllabus. Constructive notice of an
unsafe condition may be demonstrated by showing that the landlord knows or should
have known “‘of any occasion or necessity for action in compliance with the legislation
or regulation.’” Id. at 497.
{¶ 13} In support of its motion for summary judgment, Larchmont submitted
evidence in the form of the expert testimony of Thomas Whitby, an electrical engineer.
Whitby opined that the fire was not electrical in nature and was not caused by a fault in
the building’s electrical system. In contrast, Robinson submitted evidence in the form of
the expert testimony of Larry Stalter, who opined that the fire originated in the utility
room on the second floor of the apartment building and that it was caused by defective
wiring in a panel box that was located behind a wall. The lower court properly
recognized that given the contrasting evidence on the issue of the cause and origin of the
fire, it must be assumed for purposes of summary judgment that the fire was caused by
defective wiring in a panel box that was located behind a wall.
{¶ 14} In her complaint, appellant alleged that Larchmont failed to inspect, repair
and maintain the building’s wiring system so as to keep it in a reasonably safe and proper
condition. Fitness and habitability, the issues raised by claims made pursuant to R.C.
5321.04(A)(2), encompass “such defects as lack of water or heat, faulty wiring, or
vermin infestation.” Parks v. Menyhart Plumbing and Heating Supply Co.,Inc., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 75424, 1999 WL 1129591, *4 (Dec. 9, 1999).
8. {¶ 15} Larchmont asserts that because it had no actual or constructive notice of the
alleged faulty wiring, the lower court properly granted it summary judgment. Appellant
countered Larchmont’s summary judgment motion with evidence regarding a 2003 fire in
an adjacent building, the deposition testimony of Joe Goodell, one of the owners of
Larchmont, and her own affidavit. Appellant asserted that based on this evidence,
Larchmont knew or should have known that the wiring in Building 3155 was faulty.
{¶ 16} In 2003, Building 3153, which is adjacent to and shares a firewall with
Building 3155, sustained a fire. Appellant claims that following that fire, repairs were
made by electricians who were not licensed to work on commercial structures. There is
no evidence in the record, however, that the repairs made to the 3153 building following
the 2003 fire were in any way connected to the fire in the instant case. First, the 2003 fire
was ignited by fireworks, and it was the fire that damaged the electrical system in that
building. The electrical system did not cause the fire. Second, following repairs to the
damaged structure, the 3153 building was thoroughly inspected by the city of Oregon
Building Inspection Department, which then issued an occupancy permit. Appellant did
not submit any evidence counter to these facts to support her claim that Larchmont
violated its duty under R.C. 5321.04(A)(2).
{¶ 17} Appellant’s reliance on the deposition testimony of Joe Goodell, one of the
owners of the Larchmont apartment complex, and on her own affidavit is further
misplaced. Goodell testified that when he purchased the apartment complex in 1993, he
personally inspected the property’s electrical systems to make sure that the fuses were up
9. to date, that there was no aluminum wiring going into the fuse boxes, and that the
property had 100 amp service. Goodell admitted that he is not an electrician, but based
on his inspection, he did not believe that the electrical system needed to be updated to
comply with any electrical codes. Subsequently, when electrical problems were
discovered in Buildings 3049 and 3153, he hired a contractor to make repairs. In her
affidavit, appellant stated that when she moved into the apartment complex in July 2004,
she got electrical shocks from the garbage disposal switch in her apartment. Because of
the shock problem, she always used a dry towel when turning on the disposal. Appellant
stated that she reported the problem to Jackie June, the manager of the complex, but the
problem was not fixed.
{¶ 18} Appellant asserts that given this evidence, Larchmont was on notice that
there were electrical problems in her building and that should have been investigated and
corrected.
{¶ 19} In Abbott v. Haight Properties, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-98-1413, 2000
WL 491731 (Apr. 29, 2000), we were faced with a similar factual scenario. In that case,
a fire was caused by an electrical arc in wiring that was stapled between two-by-fours and
sound barrier sheeting inside a wall that divided an apartment and a utility room. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who managed the rental property, was negligent in
failing to evaluate and repair electrical deficiencies in the building. The plaintiff further
alleged that the defendant had knowledge of electrical problems prior to the fire because
visitors to the building had witnessed exposed electrical wiring sticking out of light
10. fixtures and electrical outlets. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment
after concluding that the staple fault was not one that a landlord could have noticed in the
exercise of reasonable care. Upon review, we agreed and stated:
In order to inspect the electrical wiring in this case, appellee would
have to tear open the wall and the sound board, a requirement that we find
nonsensical in both this and similar cases. Moreover, the evidence offered
establishes that this defect was a condition that existed from the time that
these apartments were constructed. In other words, it was not a defect that
developed due to a lack of preventative action. Thus, we conclude the
defect in this case is a repair defect for the purposes of determining whether
appellee had to have actual or constructive notice in order to have violated
R.C. 5321.04(A). We find that they did not have such notice. Id. at *5.
{¶ 20} Consistent with our holding in Abbott, we find in this case that one cannot
infer a defect in wiring inside the wall of the utility room from the fact that appellant
received a shock from her garbage disposal switch. That is, it did not provide Larchmont
with actual or constructive notice that there may be faulty wiring in the building. This
case is substantially different from cases cited by appellant in the proceedings below. See
McKenzie v. Marlowe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70714, 1996 WL 715502 (Dec. 12, 1996),
Wilhelm v. Heritage Mgt. Co., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA97-07-144, 1998 WL 24342 (Jan.
26, 1998), Blakley v. Riley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 91AP-597, 1992 WL 1163 (Jan. 7,
1992). Finding that appellant has presented no evidence from which reasonable minds
11. could conclude that Larchmont had actual or constructive notice of the electrical defect
that allegedly caused the fire, we must conclude that Larchmont was entitled to summary
judgment on appellant’s claims against it.
{¶ 21} Appellant further challenges the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
to Chubb and SEA on her claims of spoliation and civil conspiracy, the third count of
appellant’s complaint.
{¶ 22} In Ohio, spoliation is recognized as an independent cause of action.
Mitchell v. Norwalk Area Health Serv., 6th Dist. Huron No. H-05-002, 2005-Ohio-5261,
¶ 146. A party establishes a spoliation or destruction of evidence claim where there is:
(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2)
knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable, (3)
willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the
plaintiff’s case, (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s case, and (5) damages
proximately caused by the defendant’s acts[.] Smith v. Howard Johnson
Co., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037 (1993).
{¶ 23} In the proceedings below, appellant asserted that SEA, at the direction of
Chubb, destroyed the electrical panel box that was the source of the fire that injured
appellant, and that those defendants conspired to disrupt appellant’s pending litigation
over the fire.
{¶ 24} It is undisputed that in April 2006, shortly after the fire, Chubb hired SEA
to investigate the fire at issue, and that as part of its investigation, SEA’s fire investigator,
12. Larry Snyder, removed the electrical panel box and associated wiring from the fire scene
for further analysis. On April 11, 2008, appellant filed a complaint against Larchmont in
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. She dismissed that case without prejudice on
May 28, 2012. It is undisputed that Chubb and SEA had no knowledge of this action. It
is noteworthy that the loss description on Chubb’s property loss notice form expressly
states “Fire in 24 unit apartment building with no human injury.” SEA held onto the
electrical panel box and wiring pending further instructions from Chubb. Having
received no further instructions, SEA sent Chubb a form letter in September 2008
requesting instructions as to the disposition of the retained items. Chubb responded on
October 15, 2008, instructing SEA to dispose of the items. Patricia Tyrone, the senior
claims examiner for Chubb at that time testified that once Chubb determined that there
was no third party responsible for the fire, subrogation was not an issue and Chubb no
longer needed to retain the items.
{¶ 25} In support of their summary judgment motions, Chubb and SEA submitted
the affidavit of Glenn Baker, the CEO of SEA, and two affidavits of James Lenz, the vice
president of Chubb. These affidavits establish that SEA and Chubb had no knowledge of
existing or probable litigation involving appellant when the electric panel box and wiring
were destroyed. In response to that evidence, appellant did not submit any evidence from
which reasonable minds could conclude that an issue of fact existed on the claims of
spoliation and conspiracy. Moreover, upon review of appellant’s claims against
Larchmont, the trial court accepted for purposes of summary judgment that the fire was
13. caused by defective wiring in a panel box behind a wall in the utility room. Regardless of
that assumption, appellant’s claim against Larchmont could not be sustained.
Accordingly, appellant could not demonstrate that the loss of the electric panel box and
wiring disrupted her case. The lower court did not err in granting SEA and Chubb
summary judgment on appellant’s claims against them.
{¶ 26} The first, second and third assignments of error are not well-taken.
{¶ 27} In her fifth assignment of error, appellant asserts that the lower court erred
in granting SEA’s motion to compel the payment of expert witness fees.
{¶ 28} In its order on appeal, the lower court, in addition to granting appellees
summary judgment, ordered appellant to pay reasonable compensation to expert
witnesses Larry Snyder and Tom Whitby, pursuant to Civ.R. 26(B) and Civ.R. 45(C)(5).
A trial court’s judgment ordering a party to pay an expert witnesses’ fee will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Vance v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 165 Ohio
App.3d 615, 2006-Ohio-146, 847 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.) An abuse of discretion is
more than an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219,
450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). The term connotes that a trial court’s judgment was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Id.
{¶ 29} Snyder and Whitby are former employees of SEA, who investigated the
fire at issue. Snyder retired from SEA in February 2008 and Whitby left SEA in July
2007. As fire investigators for SEA, both Snyder and Whitby had extensive knowledge
of SEA’s business practices in documenting fire investigations. Accordingly, in its
14. December 20, 2011 judgment, the lower court ordered that appellant could depose the
two men on the issue of the spoliation claim without paying an expert witness fee. The
court was very clear, however, in stressing that if appellant inquired of these witnesses
their opinions as to the cause and origin of the fire, that is, if appellant sought expert
opinions from these witnesses, she would be required to pay the expert witness fees of
$195 per hour.
{¶ 30} The depositions were held on January 23, 2012. At appellant’s insistence,
they were held in Toledo, Ohio, which required both men to incur travel expenses.
During the depositions, both men were questioned extensively as to their opinions of the
cause and origin of the fire.
{¶ 31} Civ.R. 26(B)(5) provides in relevant part:
(a) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (B)(5)(b) of this rule and
Rule 35(B), a party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery is unable without undue hardship to obtain facts and opinions on
the same subject by other means or upon a showing of other exceptional
circumstances indicating that denial of discovery would cause manifest
injustice.
15. (e) The court may require that the party seeking discovery under
division (B)(5)(b) of this rule pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent
in responding to discovery, and, with respect to discovery permitted under
division (B)(5)(a) of this rule, may require a party to pay another party a
fair portion of the fees and expenses incurred by the latter party in
obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
{¶ 32} Civ.R. 26(B)(5)(e) gives courts the power “to control discovery under
unfair circumstances where an expert may be paid by one party and deposed by the other
party, who would garner the benefit of information without paying for it.” Vance, at ¶ 13,
citing Siegel v. Birnbaum, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 69105, 69059, 1997 WL 72143, at
*11 (Feb. 20, 1997). Snyder and Whitby were identified by SEA as its expert witnesses.
Appellant was duly warned that if she inquired of their opinions as to the cause and origin
of the fire she would be required to pay expert witness fees. In addition, appellant
insisted that the two men travel to Toledo to be deposed, thereby adding travel time to
their expenses. We fail to see how the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
appellant to pay the fees under these circumstances. The fifth assignment of error is not
well-taken.
{¶ 33} In her seventh assignment of error, appellant asserts that she was denied her
right to the effective assistance of counsel in the proceedings below.
{¶ 34} In Keenan v. Parker, 23 Fed.Appx. 386-387 (6th Cir.2001), the court aptly
stated:
16. It is well-settled that there is no constitutional or statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel in a civil case. See, e.g., Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328,
333 (9th Cir.1990); Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir.1988). Thus
litigants in a civil proceeding may not attack an adverse judgment on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Friedman, 912 F.2d at 333. Instead, the
appropriate remedy is a malpractice action against the attorney. Glick, 855 F.2d at
541.
{¶ 35} Accordingly, appellant’s seventh assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 36} Finally, in her fourth and sixth assignments of error, appellant asserts that
the lower court erred in failing to rule on 201 outstanding motions until after ruling on the
motions for summary judgment. She further challenges the trial judge’s overall
administration of the case.
{¶ 37} In its judgment on appeal, the lower court denied the following motions
after granting appellees summary judgment and granting SEA’s motion to compel:
1. SEA’s motion for sanctions against Ms. Robinson for failure to
comply with the January 24, 2012 judgment entry, filed March 5, 2012,
2. Ms. Robinson’s motion to quash subpoena to plaintiff’s expert,
filed March 12, 2012,
3. Ms. Robinson’s motion to reconsider this Court’s Order of March
14, 2012, filed on March 19, 2012,
1 Our review of the record reveals that the court ruled on 15, not 20, outstanding motions following its ruling on the summary judgment motions.
17. 4. Ms. Robinson’s motion for continuance to respond to defendants’
motions for summary judgment, filed March 29, 2012,
5. Ms. Robinson’s motion to supplement her motion for summary
judgment against Chubb and SEA, filed April 2, 2012,
6. Ms. Robinson’s motion for sanctions against Chubb, filed April
4, 2012,
7. Chubb’s and SEA’s motion for extension of time to file its brief
in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to supplement her motion for summary
judgment, filed April 16, 2012,
8. SEA’s motion to strike, motion in limine and motion for
sanctions against Michael Portnoy, filed April 26, 2012,
9. Chubb’s motion to strike and motion for sanctions against Ms.
Robinson and Michael Portnoy, filed April 30, 2012,
10. Ms. Robinson’s motion for continuance to respond to
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, filed May 4, 2012,
11. Ms. Robinson’s motion for a hearing on her motion for
sanctions and notice of converting her motion for sanctions against Chubb
to a motion to compel, filed May 4, 2012,
12. Ms. Robinson’s motion for continuance to respond to SEA’s and
Chubb’s motions for summary judgment, filed May 14, 2012,
18. 13. Larchmont’s motion for sanctions against Ms. Robinson, filed
May 25, 2012,
14. Ms. Robinson’s motion to amend expert witness list, filed May
29, 2012, and
15. Larchmont’s motion to strike portions of Ms. Robinson’s
memorandum in opposition to Larchmont’s supplemental motion for
sanctions, filed September 10, 2012.
{¶ 38} Although appellant challenges the lower court’s delay in ruling on these
motions, she does not assert how she was prejudiced by the actual rulings themselves.
Indeed, the lower court ruled in favor of appellant on six of the motions. Similarly, her
challenge to the trial court’s administration of the case is without merit. Other than
general claims that the lower court was biased against her, appellant has not specifically
identified any place in the record that shows such alleged bias. See App.R. 16.
{¶ 39} The fourth and sixth assignments of error are not well-taken.
{¶ 40} On consideration whereof, the court finds that substantial justice has been
done the party complaining and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
24.
Judgment affirmed.
19. L-12-1323 Robinson v. Larchmont East Apartments, Inc. d.b.a. Kingston Court Apartments, et al.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
20.