Robinson v. Gordon, et al.

2010 DNH 066

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 12, 2010
• Docket: 09-CV-083-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Robinson v . Gordon, et a l . 09-CV-083-SM 04/12/10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Christopher Robinson, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 09-cv-083-SM Opinion N o . 2010 DNH 066 Todd Gordon; Jason Riley; and Hillsborough County, Defendant

v.

Dr. Charles L. Ward, Third-Party Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff, Christopher Robinson, is currently an inmate at

the New Hampshire State Prison. At all times relevant to this

suit, however, he was a pre-trial detainee, held at the

Hillsborough County House of Corrections (also known as “Valley

Street Jail”). He brings this action seeking compensatory and

punitive damages, asserting that he was the victim of various

common law torts, and that defendants violated his

constitutionally protected rights by using excessive force

against him.

Because Robinson included in his complaint an allegation

that he “was denied his medicines and access to his [asthma]

inhaler,” defendants think he is also advancing claims relating to the medical care he was provided. Accordingly, they brought a

third-party complaint against Dr. Charles Ward, seeking

indemnification and contribution should plaintiff prevail on any

such medical claims.

Dr. Ward now moves for summary judgment as to both third-

party claims brought against him. Robinson does not object.

And, while defendants do object, they have not submitted any

evidence (e.g., affidavits, deposition testimony, medical

records, etc.) suggesting that there are any genuinely disputed

material facts, nor have they shown that Ward is not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, for the reasons

discussed below, Ward’s motion is granted.

Standard of Review

When ruling on a party’s motion for summary judgment, the

court must “view the entire record in the light most hospitable

to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable

inferences in that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan v . Smith, 904

F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate

when the record reveals “no genuine issue as to any material fact

and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, “a fact is

‘material’ if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and

2 a dispute over it is ‘genuine’ if the parties’ positions on the

issue are supported by conflicting evidence.” Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers v . Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103

F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, if the non-moving party’s “evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative,” no genuine dispute

as to a material fact has been proved, and “summary judgment may

be granted.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-

50 (1986) (citations omitted). The key, then, to defeating a

properly supported motion for summary judgment is the non-

movant’s ability to support his or her claims concerning disputed

material facts with evidence that conflicts with that proffered

by the moving party. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Discussion

Defendants’ decision to sue Dr. Ward represents an unusual

legal strategy. They explain the reasoning behind it as follows:

Christopher Robinson . . . claims that Hillsborough County, through its Department of Corrections, violated his rights by not providing him adequate medical and mental health treatment. Robinson was incarcerated within HCDOC for three (3) days in June, 2006, and from December 1 9 , 2006, until June, 2007. He alleges that during this time he was denied his previously prescribed asthma inhaler, as well as a number of prescribed psychiatric medications.

3 During Robinson’s periods of incarceration, Hillsborough County had entered into a written contract with Dr. Charles Ward to order and maintain any and all inmate health care and prescriptions, including Robinson’s. While the defendants deny the plaintiff’s allegations, if it should be determined that the plaintiff is to prevail and recover damages, any such injuries and damages were caused wholly or in part as a result of the negligence and breach of contract of Dr. Ward.

Third-Party complaint (document n o . 12) at 1-2. The flaw in

defendants’ theory of the case is this: Robinson is not advancing

any claim that he was deprived of adequate medical or mental

health care during his incarceration at Valley Street.

Robinson points out that he was (allegedly) denied access to

medications that he had with him when he arrived at Valley

Street, Writ of Summons (document n o . 1-2) at paras. 42-43, but

he does not advance any legal claim based upon denial of adequate

medical care. Instead, all of his claims - both common law and

constitutional - arise out of an incident during which defendants

Riley and Gordon allegedly slammed Robinson into a wall,

fracturing his sternum, injuring his shoulder, and causing severe

bruising and lacerations. S o , for example, in Count 6 of

Robinson’s complaint he uses words like “excessive force,”

“assault,” and “beating.” Neither that count nor any of the

other counts in his complaint ever mention inadequate medical or

4 mental health care, malpractice, or deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs.

Robinson did not sue Dr. Ward, nor does he object to Dr.

Ward’s motion for summary judgment. See Plaintiff’s Response to

Summary Judgment (document n o . 2 1 ) . In his motion for summary

judgment, Ward asserts that: (1) he was not deliberately

indifferent to any of Robinson’s serious medical needs; (2)

Robinson was not harmed as a result of any action or failure to

act by Ward; and, in fact (3) Ward provided “appropriate

treatment with the specific goal of protecting and improving

Robinson’s health.” Third-Party Defendant’s Memorandum (document

no. 18-1) at 1 1 . Robinson, it would seem, does not disagree.

Finally, on the undisputed record before the court, it is

plain that the medical care and services provided by Dr. Ward to

Robinson hardly constituted professional negligence, medical

malpractice, or deliberate indifference to Robinson’s serious

medical needs. See, e.g., Exhibit 3 to Defendants’ Supplemental

Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Nurse Denise Ryan

(document n o . 23-5) (“During the time he was at the Valley Street

Jail, Robinson regularly received attention and medication for

his asthma and his complaints of headache, but never manifested

distress warranting the need for psychotropic medications.

5 Overall, Robinson’s care was consistent with our policies of

ensuring appropriate medical care for inmates.”).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in Dr.

Ward’s legal memorandum, his motion for summary judgment as to

all third-party claims advanced against him (document n o . 18) is

granted.

SO ORDERED.

April 1 2 , 2010

cc: Michael J. Sheehan, Esq. Jonathan A . Lax, Esq. Elizabeth L. Hurley, Esq. John A . Curran, Esq.