Robinson v. Frankel

3 S.W. 652, 85 Tenn. 475
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 3 S.W. 652 (Robinson v. Frankel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Frankel, 3 S.W. 652, 85 Tenn. 475 (Tenn. 1887).

Opinion

Lurton, J.

Those three causes have been heard together, as the evidence relied upon to establish the fraudulent character of the conveyance attacked is the same in each case. The complainants are creditors of the defendant, M. Frankel, and the several bills have been filed for the purpose of attacking as fraudulent and void a sale made by their debtor of a large stock of merchandise to his brother, the defendant, IT. Frankel. The defendant, M, Frankel, was a merchant doing busi[477]*477ness in Slielbyville, Term., under his own name, and conducting a similar business under the name of Isaac Erankel at Pulaski, Tonn. On the 2d of December, 1884, his indebtedness to persons other than the disputed debt of II. Erankel was about $35,000. On the 2d of December, 1884, the Shclbyville stock of goods was sold and. transferred to II. Erankel upon an agreement, as stated in the answers of the defendants, that II. Erankel. should take the stock “at the amount of the debts as they then existed, he to execute his notes in six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months for the residue of the indebtedness over and above his own indebtedness, and these notes thus executed to be assigned in trust by Marcus Erankel for the benefit of his creditors, share and share alike.” Under this arrangement the defendant, II. Erankel, executed his four notes payable to M. Erankel, each for $8,719.42, and payable respectively in six, twelve, eighteen, and ' twenty-four months after date. Simultaneously with this - transaction, M. Erankel assigned these four notes to - Brown as trustee, for the benefit of all his creditors equally. Complainants refused to accept the benefit of this assignment, and attack the transaction as fraudulent. Within a day or two the stock of goods at Pulaski was sold to the same brother upon an arrangement not definitely appealing, but stated to have been of a similar character. Was this sale of the Slielbyville stock fraudulent as to the creditors of M. Erankel?

[478]*478This stock is clearly shown to have been worth, at the time of this sale, $50,000. In the sale the alleged debt of M. Frankel to the purchaser, II. Frankel, is paid — that is, the agreement of sale was that II. Frankel should take this stock at a sum equal to the whole indebtedness, including the debt claimed to be due to himself, and should execute his notes for a sum equal to the whole indebtedness, less only his own debt. "What was the debt due' really to II. Frankel? The fact that this was a transaction between two brothers, while not a badge of fraud, is one which naturally awakens suspicion; and while not in itself and by itself sufficient to justify a court in setting aside the transaction, yet it is a fact which undoubtedly gives greater weight to other circumstances, if any such shall appear, than might otherwise attach to them. Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, 96; Bumpas v. Dotson, 7 Hum., 317.

It is a fact in itself sufficient to require fuller and more distinct proof of the 'fact of the indebtedness and of the fairness of the transaction than would otherwise be sufficient. The several answers of the defendants are very vague on the matter of this alleged debt. Vagueness and indefiniteness in an answer to a bill of this description is in itself another circumstance arou'sing suspicion. These brothers must have certain data by which this debt, if it ever in fact existed, could have been stated with detail and precision in their answers. In each of the three answers TI. Frankel [479]*479is declared to have been the largest creditor. In the answer to the bill of J. M. Robinson & Co. the only statement as to the amount or character of this debt is as follows: “Respondent’s debt of eighteen thousand dollars was due; he could have proceeded energetically to collect.” In the answer to the bill of J. Herman the answer says that “respondent’s debt of sixteen thousand dollars was due,” etc., while in the answer to the bill of Herman, Loeb & Co. there is no amount stated, the allusion to the debt being “that respondent’s debt was due; he could have proceeded energetically to collect.” While this disagreement in these several answers as to the amount of this debt, and the entire failure to show in what this debt consisted and when and upon what consideration it was contracted, is not of itself enough to satisfy us of its fictitious character, yet it is an added circumstance to the already awakened suspicion.

The deposition of M. Erankel throws no light upon this question. He was not examined by his counsel upon the matter of this debt. II. Erankel, in his deposition taken upon interrogatories, states that his object in buying this stock “was to secure a large claim owing to me from my brother, Marcus Erankel; which I thought I could do by assuming his liabilities. This debt of my brother Marcus was principally for money loaned and indorsements, amounting in all from twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand dollars, all of which was [480]*480tlion owing to me from my brother and no part of which had then been paid.”

Upon cross-examination concerning this debt he states that “M. Frankel was indebted to Frankel & Butler, of which firm I was a member, on account of indorsements to Levy Bros. & Co., to Stich Bros. & Co., and to the City National Bank of Denver, all of which has been paid by me. In addition to this he owed for money loaned by Frankel & Butler, and guaranteed by myself and Louis Butler, and to myself and Louis Butler, in a large amount, aggregating in all about $80,000. As to the amount to be allowed out of the purchase-pi’ice of each of said stores to said Frankel & Butler upon said debts duo I do not now remember, but I refer to the bill of sale wherein the amounts so to be paid are correctly and distinctly set forth. As I now remember the said bill of sale, I gave, to the best of my recollection, for the Pulaski goods my note for $16,800.”

This is as much light as Mr. H. Frankel proposes to give concerning the existence of this large claim. The bill of sale to which he refers us as showing how much he credited this expanding debt by reason of his purchase of the Pulaski stock, and how much by reason of his purchase of the Sholbyville stock, he- does not file. As we understand his deposition, he took the Pulaski stock for $36,800; but whether the whole of 'this or what part of it was paid on this debt to himself, we cannot determine. The whole Pulaski transaction [481]*481is shrouded in darkness. The debt, stated in one answer to be $16,000 and in another at $18,000, has expanded, according to • this deposition, to $25,-000 or $30,000. No evidences as to a dollar of this debt are filed. No statement of the items is given. Ilis counsel, however, seem to mainly rely upon the deposition of Mr. Wallace, the cashier of a bank at Shelbyville and a creditor, for proof to sustain the fact of this indebtedness. Mr. Wallace does prove that while M. Frankel was in business at Shelbyville he drew on TI. Frankel for sums aggregating ¿about $17,000, and that these drafts were passed to the credit of M. Frankel, and were paid by the drawee. Admitting that this is true, yet it by no means shows that M. Frankel was not drawing against his own funds, or that the claims had not been paid. This witness proves that H. Frankel had more than once said to him, about the time of this sale, that all that he had was the debt due to him by M. Frankel. An advance of loan of his whole estate by a brother living in Colorado to one living in Tennessee indicates something more than brotherly affection.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
3 S.W. 652, 85 Tenn. 475, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-frankel-tenn-1887.