Robinson v. Fiske

25 Me. 401
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 15, 1845
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 25 Me. 401 (Robinson v. Fiske) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Fiske, 25 Me. 401 (Me. 1845).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was drawn up by

Whitman C. J.

A contract between the plaintiff and the defendants, was entered into in October, 1841, in which the plaintiff agreed to cut and haul timber for' the defendants, from their land, during the succeeding logging season, at a certain rate per thousand feet, board measure; and this action is brought to recover a balance, alleged by the plaintiff to be due to him for his services under that contract. By the terms of the contract the plaintiff was to employ six good six ox teams in the business; and was to cut and haul sound pine timber, suitable for boards and should there be any hollow butted logs cut, having eight inches of sound timber around the hollow, they were to be scaled; and a reasonable allowance made by the scaler on account of the hollow. Under such contracts it is understood, that a surveyor shall be agreed upon to ascertain the quantity of boards, which logs, so cut and hauled, will make. It is obvious that nothing like absolute certainty can be expected to be the result of such a survey. Surveyors are expected to be men of experience in that line; and, by the use of their scale and judgment together, to be able to approximate, in ascertaining the quantity, sufficiently near the truth for the purpose in view;. In this case three such surveyors were named in the contract; and the defendants were to select either of them, at their pleasure, to ascertain the quantity cut and hauled ; and payment was of course to be made accordingly. The defendants selected one of the individuals named, who surveyed and certified his doings to [405]*405the amount of 171,890 feet. Ho not being able to survey the rest, the defendants selected another of those individuals, who surveyed, or certified that he surveyed, to the amount of 2,657,330 feet of pine, and 26,856 feet of spruce timber. The plaintiff’s claim is predicated upon these certificates, made under his contract.

The defence set up, was, that over six hundred thousand feet of the timber was unsound, and unfit for boards; and proof was offered to be made that the whole, with the exception of some ten or twenty of the logs, were run to the defendants’ mills; and, in manufacturing them into boards, such appeared to be the case. This proof was considered by the Court at the trial as inadmissible; and the question, whether it was so or not, is now for the consideration of the Court. If it was admissible, the default, which was entered, under the ruling of the Court, is to be taken off, and the action to stand for trial; otherwise judgment is to be entered thereon.

It is insisted, on the part of the defendants, that the surveyors were agreed upon between the parties merely to ascertain, by admeasurement, the precise quantity, that, according to such measurement, each log would make, and that they were not to exercise their judgments, except in one event, viz: when a log was found with a hollow at the butt, having eight inches in thickness of sound timber around the hollow. 1T the defendants were right in this position the proof proposed may have been admissible. On the other hand, it is urged, that the object of agreeing on the surveyors was to settle conclusively the amount of the timber cut, and so to what, according to the rate agreed upon, the plaintiff should be entitled to receive for his services.

Every contract must have an interpretation, governed in some measure by the subject matter to which it relates; and, at the same time, with reference to any known usage connected therewith. If a surveyor be hired to survey a lot of boards it is expected he will do something more than merely ascertain the number of feet each board may contain. He would be ex[406]*406pected to ascertain whether they were of one class or another; whether they were clear, refuse or merchantable; and if a board were split or rotten, for some small space on one side, to make an allowance, such as would bring it within one of the known classes; or, if it were so badly defective as to be useless as a board, to reject it altogether. This results from the nature of the employment; and is in accordance with a well known usage.

The business of getting lumber, or logging, as it is more familiarly called, is a business somewhat peculiar in its nature, especially when carried on remote from settlements, and in large operations, as was the case in this instance. It is to be carried on in the winter time, when snow is accumulating which oftentimes becomes of great depth. The owner of the timber is seldom expected to be present. He may have permitted it to be cut upon shares, or at so much per M. or he may, as in this instance, have hired it cut and hauled. In every such case a surveyor or scaler, as he is sometimes called, from his using a scale, must be selected to ascertain the quantity cut and hauled out to a landing, where, in the spring, when freshets arise, it is to be turned in, and be set afloat to go'to its place of destination. In cutting the timber mistakes are inevitable in reference to its quality. It may, till felled, have the appearance of being sound, and in cutting it may prove to be very defective. The surveyors cannot be expected to be present during the whole operation ; even at the landing places. In this instance the surveyor, who surveyed the great bulk of the timber, was not sent on by the defendants, as appears by their letter of instructions which is filed in the case, till the operations of cutting and hauling must have about closed. The logs in such cases must be expected to be piled one upon another, to a considerable height, and be often imbedded in a great depth of snow. Yet a survey is to be made of them. This is done sometimes to enable the proprietor to make sale of them by the survey bill; at others, to enable the proprietor to know how much has been cut and [407]*407hauled, for the double purpose of knowing what he must pay for the labor; and for selling it by the survey bills. This is the well known course of such business.

Under the contract the plaintiff' was to cut and haul sound timber, suitable for boards ; and it was to be surveyed by one of three individuals, to be appointed by the defendants; who did not want the timber in order to sell it at the landings; they wanted it for their own use; it was to be eut from their own land. What must they have understood ? They must have known the course of such business; they must have known that, to cut timber utterly free from defects, situated as this was, would be impracticable. Suppose a tree were felled, and thereupon found to be defective to some extent, yet not so as not to be of some considerable value for board logs, did the defendants mean, that it should be left to rot upon the ground ? or did they mean that it should be hauled, and, by the survey- or, be estimated according to what it would make of sound timber ? That they must have intended the latter is certainly the most rational conclusion, if they regarded their own interest, as we may reasonably suppose they did.

Besides, the plaintiff was to cut and haul sound timber, suitable for boards. What would lumbermen understand by sound timber suitable for boards? Would it be that it was to be timber entirely free from defects ? Or would they take it to mean so sound as to be profitable to work into boards ? It would seem that whatever of it was sound, if enough of it were so, to make it profitable for boards, that it would be deemed to be sound timber, suitable for such purpose, and this we think must bo a fair interpretation of the contract.

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Related

Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Stone
212 F. 713 (Second Circuit, 1914)
Berry v. Harris
43 N.H. 376 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1861)

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Bluebook (online)
25 Me. 401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-fiske-me-1845.