Robinson v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 15, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00138
StatusUnknown

This text of Robinson v. Doe (Robinson v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Doe, (E.D. Ark. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS DELTA DIVISION

DONALD ROBINSON PLAINTIFF ADC #92239

v. No: 2:23-cv-00138-DPM-PSH

TYRONE D. ALLISON, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. DISPOSITION Plaintiff Donald Robinson filed a pro se complaint on June 22, 2023, while incarcerated at the Arkansas Division of Correction’s (ADC) East Arkansas Regional Unit (Doc. No. 1). The Court subsequently granted Robinson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and directed him to file an amended complaint (Doc. No. 5). In his amended complaint, Robinson alleged that he was raped by another inmate on June 12, 2023, and defendants Tyrone D. Allison, Lieutenant Leavy Watson III, Lieutenant M. Kelly, and Lieutenant King (the “Defendants”) knew he

had been raped but failed to obtain medical treatment for him, delaying his treatment for six to seven days. Id. at 5-6. After screening Robinson’s amended complaint, the Court allowed Robinson’s Eighth Amendment medical treatment claims against

the Defendants in their individual capacities to proceed. See Doc. Nos. 9 & 11. His remaining claims were dismissed. See Doc. No. 11. Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and a statement of facts (Doc. Nos. 20-22) filed by the Defendants, claiming that Robinson

did not exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to his claims against him before he filed this lawsuit. The Court notified Robinson of his opportunity to file a response and separate statement of disputed facts, but he did not do so. See

Doc. No. 23. Because Robinson failed to controvert the facts set forth in the Defendants’ statement of facts, Doc. No. 22, those facts are deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(c). For the reasons described below, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted.

II. Legal Standard Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must

be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is

genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes

that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).

III. Analysis The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Robinson’s claims because he failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies

before he filed this lawsuit. See Doc. No. 21. In support of their motion, the Defendants submitted: the ADC’s grievance policy (Doc. No. 22-1) and the declaration of Terri Grigsby Brown, the ADC’s Inmate Grievance Coordinator (Doc. No. 22-2).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate to exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007); Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014). Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 211; Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2012). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The PLRA does not prescribe the manner in which exhaustion occurs. See Jones v.

Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. It merely requires compliance with prison grievance procedures to properly exhaust. See id. Thus, the question as to whether an inmate has properly exhausted administrative remedies will depend on the specifics of that

particular prison’s grievance policy. See id. Pursuant to the ADC’s grievance policy, Administrative Directive 19-34, inmates are provided Unit Level Grievance Forms as part of the Inmate Grievance

Procedure. See Doc. No. 22-1 at 5. To resolve a problem, an inmate must first seek informal resolution by submitting a Step One Unit Level Grievance Form (Attachment I) within 15 days after the occurrence of the incident. Id. at 6. Inmates are to “specifically name each individual involved for a proper investigation and

response to be completed by the ADC.” Id. at 5. Only one problem or issue may be grieved per grievance form. Id. An inmate must be “specific as to the substance of the issue or complaint to include the date, place, personnel involved or witnesses,

and how the policy or incident affected the inmate submitting the form.” Id. at 6.

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Related

Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Sitzes v. City of West Memphis Arkansas
606 F.3d 461 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Nidal Othman v. City of Country Club Hills
671 F.3d 672 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Miller v. Norris
247 F.3d 736 (Eighth Circuit, 2001)
Gibson v. Weber
431 F.3d 339 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Mark Hammett v. J. Cofield
681 F.3d 945 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Mann v. Yarnell
497 F.3d 822 (Eighth Circuit, 2007)
Roy Burns v. Edward Eaton
752 F.3d 1136 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Ross v. Blake
578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Donald East v. Minnehaha County
986 F.3d 816 (Eighth Circuit, 2021)

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Robinson v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-doe-ared-2024.