UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JAVONTE ROBINSON, Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-2961 (JDB)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Javonte Robinson alleges that he was unlawfully cast out of a Washington, D.C., homeless
shelter in April 2021 and forced to sleep on the streets throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. He
sued the shelter operator and the District of Columbia, as well as employees of each, in D.C.
Superior Court, asserting two federal claims (for discrimination and for due process violations)
and seven state law claims. Defendants removed the case to this Court. Now before the Court is
Robinson’s motion to amend his complaint, filed in response to defendants’ motions to dismiss.
While full briefing on defendants’ motions to dismiss has been stayed pending resolution of the
motion to amend, the parties have addressed the merits of these motions through the prism of their
motion to amend arguments. Specifically, defendants contend that any amendment would be futile
because Robinson’s proposed amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that amendment would be futile as to
Robinson’s federal discrimination claim and as to at least part of his federal due process claim.
The question then becomes whether this case should proceed in federal court. The answer is no.
Accordingly, the Court will exercise its authority to sua sponte (1) dismiss the discrimination count
and the due process count insofar as it relates to Robinson’s denial of access to the shelter and (2)
remand the case—i.e., the remaining claims—to D.C. Superior Court for further proceedings.
1 Background
I. Factual Background
Robinson is an “African-American man in his 20’s” who resided at Kia’s Place IV, a
homeless shelter in Washington, D.C., starting in July 2020. 1 Compl. & Jury Demand [ECF No.
15-1] (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 9, 15. At the time of the incidents at issue, Kia’s Place IV was operated
by Echelon Community Services (“ECS”) as a “long-term transitional housing program
specifically for youth ages 18-24[,] . . . [providing] housing and intensive support services for
participating youth for up to six years with the goal of stabilizing the youth and preparing them for
independence as they transition to adulthood.” Id. ¶¶ 10–11. This program was funded by the
District of Columbia (the “District”), and Robinson alleges that ECS acted as the District’s “agent”
in administering it. Id. ¶ 12.
Robinson claims that ECS/Kia’s Place IV “failed [him] with the exact support the program
was designed to administer to him.” Id. ¶ 11. Specifically, on April 15, 2021, “Kia’s Place IV
employees called the Metropolitan Police Department on Mr. Robinson and falsely accused him
of things that he did not do.” Id. ¶ 15. His placement at the long-term shelter was then “illegally
terminated” and defendants “told him that he could not return.” Id. ¶ 16. He went to jail and, upon
release, was told he could not return to retrieve his belongings, including “clothes, shoes, mail,
toiletries, food, etc.,” but “was told . . . he would have to call [the police].” Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
ECS informed the District of Robinson’s termination on April 16, 2021. Am. Compl., Ex.
A [ECF No. 15-1] (“Admin. Rev. Decision”) at 1. Pursuant to protections provided by D.C.’s
Homeless Services Reform Act, D.C. Code § 4-751.01 et seq. (“HSRA”), Robinson requested
review from the District’s Office of Administrative Hearings, which also triggered an
1 The factual background is drawn from the allegations in Robinson’s proposed amended complaint and the exhibits attached thereto. On consideration of a motion to amend, the Court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true.
2 administrative review within the District’s Department of Human Services (“DHS”). Id. at 2. A
DHS administrative review officer held a telephonic administrative review hearing with Robinson
and a representative of ECS on May 24, 2021, and concluded that DHS had violated a procedural
requirement of the HSRA by failing to issue a “compliance finding” upholding ECS’s decision
until six days after Robinson was terminated from the shelter. Id. at 4; see id. at 2. Accordingly,
because of the “procedural flaw in the executing of this emergency action,” the administrative
review officer determined that Robinson should be “reinstated.” Id. at 4.
Robinson engaged legal counsel, who helped him reach an agreement with defendants that
he could return to Kia’s Place IV on August 13, 2021. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Shortly before this
return, however, ECS employees sought and obtained a temporary protective / anti-stalking order
against him. See id. ¶¶ 26–27. So when Robinson returned to the shelter, he was denied entry and
staff called the police to serve him with this order. Id. ¶ 26. The anti-stalking petition—which an
ECS employee filed in support of the order—alleged two supporting incidents from April 15 and
17, 2021. Am. Compl., Ex. E [ECF No. 15-1] at 1. In the first incident, Robinson, who “ap[p]eared
to be under the inf[l]u[e]nce,” allegedly shoved an ECS staff member and “busted th[r]oug[h] the
door” of an office where she went to hide, “turned off the cameras and bega[]n to make threat[]s
to [her] life,” as well as “hit[] [her]” and “[k]nock[ed] the phone out of [her] hand.” Id. In the
second incident, Robinson allegedly “entered the building asking where [she] was and was making
threat[]s to [her] life saying he was going to kill [her].” Id. Robinson asserts that the order was
obtained as part of a “conspiracy” among the defendants to prevent him from returning to the
shelter. Am. Compl. ¶ 29. He further claims that the “employee lied” and that the petition was an
improper vehicle premised on untimely allegations. Id. ¶ 28.
“At some point thereafter, the Anti-Stalking order was lifted and a permanent one was
denied” but “Kia’s Place IV . . . didn’t contact [Mr. Robinson] to tell [him] that he could return.”
3 Id. ¶¶ 30–31. Robinson’s counsel informed ECS/Kia’s Place IV that Robinson would be filing
suit. Id. ¶ 32. Finally, the shelter “attempted to arrange for Mr. Robinson’s return,” but Robinson
was “fearful for his safety to return” after “being falsely accused, harassed, illegally kicked out,
and more.” Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Communications concerning placement at another shelter were
unsuccessful. Id. ¶ 34.
Robinson alleges that this chain of events caused him “severe emotional distress[;] [he]
was humiliated, homeless, arrested, had to go to court for a frivolous anti-stalking petition,
deprived of his property, and more from all the Defendants’ malicious, negligent, and intentional
acts and omissions.” Id. ¶ 36. Further, Robinson alleges that he has been “left to sleep outside,
homeless, and then hang out with people in order to ‘survive,’” which has caused his mental health
to decline, and that he has “ended up going to jail from criminal charges.” Id. ¶ 37.
II. Procedural Background
Robinson filed the present lawsuit in D.C. Superior Court on May 26, 2023, naming as
defendants the District, ECS – Kia’s Place IV, Roxanne Murray (“an employee for [ECS]”),
Latarsha Cheeks-Lucas (same), the District’s DHS, and Tamara Mooney (an “employee for
[DHS]”). Compl. & Jury Demand [ECF No. 1-2] (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 2–7. Robinson’s complaint
asserts that defendants (I) violated his right to shelter in “severe or frigid weather” under the
HSRA; (II) discriminated against him “based on his mental disability, source of income, and
appearance” in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01
et seq. (“DCHRA”); (III) conspired to abuse process to prevent him from returning to the shelter;
(IV) engaged in various negligent acts; (V) discriminated against him under federal law based on
his disabilities; (VI) converted his personal belongings; (VII) engaged in intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (VIII) terminated his residence and kept his personal property without due
4 process; and (IX) breached an agreement with Robinson to provide mental health services, job
placement, and future housing. Id. ¶¶ 32–88.
On the basis of the federal discrimination and due process claims, the District removed the
case to this Court on October 4, 2023. Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 3, 6. Defendants then
moved to dismiss. See Def. D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 7]; Defs.’ ECS – Kia’s Place IV’s
& Roxanne Murray’s Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 8] (“ECS MTD”). Robinson responded by filing
a motion to stay the opposition deadline and a motion to amend the complaint. Opposed Pl.’s Mot.
for Leave to File First Am. Compl. [ECF No. 15] (“Mot. to Amend”); Pl.’s Mot. for Stay of
Dispositions for Mots. to Dismiss [ECF No. 16]. The proposed amended complaint added claims
for gross negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as additional factual
allegations and exhibits responsive to some of defendants’ motion to dismiss arguments. See, e.g.,
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106–10, 144–48.
The Court granted the motion to stay the motion to dismiss opposition deadline. Oct. 30,
2023 Min. Order. Defendants then filed oppositions to Robinson’s motion to amend, largely
repeating arguments made in their motions to dismiss and asserting that amendment would be
futile because the amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss. Def. D.C.’s Opp’n
to Mot. to Amend [ECF No. 18] (“D.C. Opp’n”); Defs. ECS – Kia’s Place IV’s & Roxanne
Murray’s Opp’n to Mot. to Amend [ECF No. 19] (“ECS Opp’n”). Robinson submitted a reply
brief to each opposition, arguing that his claims would withstand a motion to dismiss and that
amendment should be permitted. Pl.’s Reply to D.C. Opp’n [ECF No. 20]; Pl.’s Reply to ECS
Opp’n [ECF No. 21]. The motion to amend is now fully briefed and ripe for resolution.
Legal Standard
Leave to amend a complaint should be “freely give[n]” when “justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But “[l]eave may properly be denied if the proposed amendment is ‘futil[e],’
5 such that it would not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287,
295 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). When a defendant opposes amendment on futility grounds, a court’s analysis is “for
practical purposes, identical to [the analysis of] a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on the allegations
in the amended complaint.” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 215–16 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint will “survive a motion to dismiss if it
contains ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 295 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A
claim is facially plausible when ‘the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). As would be appropriate on a motion to dismiss, the court relies
exclusively on the facts alleged in “the proposed complaint, documents attached to or incorporated
by reference in that complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” Id. at 293
n.1.
Analysis
This case comes before the Court having been removed from D.C. Superior Court on the
basis of a federal discrimination claim and a federal due process claim. The Court will begin by
analyzing the federal claims, then turn to the question whether supplemental jurisdiction should
continue to be exercised, or if instead the case should be remanded to D.C. Superior Court.
I. Fair Housing Act Claim (Count V)
Robinson alleges that defendants discriminated against him under the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., by failing to make reasonable accommodations necessary to afford him
an equal opportunity to live at Kia’s Place IV. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 111–21. Specifically, Robinson
alleges that he “suffered with emotional and mental[] disabilities such as ADHD, PTSD, and
6 Depressive disorder.” Id. ¶ 114. He claims that defendants were aware of these conditions because
they had his medical records. Id. But “[r]ather than provide accommodation for Mr. Robinson,
so that he could remain with housing, Defendants instead refused and made no attempts.” Id.
¶ 117.
The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with such dwelling, because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Discrimination includes “a
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). In order to plead a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff
must allege “(1) the existence of a handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); (2) that defendants
knew or reasonably should have known of the handicap; (3) that the accommodation ‘may be
necessary’ to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and
(4) that defendants refused to make the requested accommodation.” United States v. District of
Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217–18 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P.,
814 F.3d 1213, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2016).
Defendants argue that Robinson’s claim would not survive a motion to dismiss because he
has not alleged what reasonable accommodation he requested, why such accommodation would
be needed, or why his alleged disabilities qualify as “handicaps” under the statute. See D.C. Opp’n
at 6–7; ECS Opp’n at 6. The Court agrees.
A “handicap” is defined in the Fair Housing Act to include “(1) a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of [a] person’s major life activities, (2) a record
of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3602(h). “Whether a plaintiff has an impairment and whether it substantially limits a major life
7 activity is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831,
837 (7th Cir. 2001). While Robinson has pleaded that he has “emotional and mental[] disabilities
such as ADHD, PTSD, and Depressive disorder,” Am. Compl. ¶ 114, his proposed amended
complaint has not alleged that those diagnoses “substantially limit[] one or more of [his] major life
activities” or resulted in defendants regarding him as mentally impaired. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); see
Smith v. AMH 2014-1 Borrower, LLC, No. 23-13273, 2024 WL 1460309, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 4,
2024) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff failed to “allege any further
facts [beyond his Crohn’s Disease diagnosis and brief hospital stay] about his health or how his []
disease affects his major life activities”); see also Thomas v. The Salvation Army S. Territory, 841
F.3d 632, 639 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff merely alleged a
“mood disorder”).
Even assuming that Robinson has sufficiently pleaded a “handicap,” he has not sufficiently
alleged that defendants refused to make a requested accommodation. Under the Fair Housing Act,
a housing provider is “only obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation . . . if a request for
the accommodation has been made.” Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C.
2005) (quoting Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act (“Joint 2 Statement”) 11 (May 17, 2004) ,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/14/joint_statement_ra.pdf); see
Parham v. CIH Properties, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 5, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that the
“underlying assumption of any reasonable accommodation claim is that the plaintiff . . . has
2 Many courts have relied on the Joint Statement as persuasive interpretation of the requirements of the Fair Housing Act. See, e.g., Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1286 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Though the Joint Statement is a policy statement, rather than an authoritative interpretation of [the Act] and therefore does not warrant Chevron-style deference, it is nonetheless entitled to respect [under Skidmore] to the extent it has the power to persuade.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
8 requested an accommodation which the defendant . . . has denied” (omissions in original) (quoting
Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1999))). However, the Act “does not
require that a request be made in a particular manner.” Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122 (quoting Joint
Statement at 10).
Robinson seems to argue that he requested a reasonable accommodation when he asked to
return to the shelter following the disputed April 2021 incident and the DHS administrative review
officer’s determination that his housing should be reinstated. See Pl.’s Reply to D.C. Opp’n at 9
(contending that defendants violated the Fair Housing Act by “never ma[king] a good faith effort
for accommodations for him after he requested to reenter the facility” despite being aware of his
mental impairments). This argument suggests, in essence, that defendants should have “‘open[ed]
a dialogue’ with [him], eliciting more information as needed, to determine what specifics [he had]
in mind and whether such accommodation would, in fact, be reasonable under the circumstances.”
Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122.
There is authority to support the argument that a request to remain in housing after the
resident allegedly makes threats or otherwise impairs the health and safety of others can be a
request for a reasonable accommodation. For example, in Hunt, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that a mother adequately pleaded a reasonable accommodation claim when she requested to remain
in housing while she sought day care for an adult son with Down Syndrome, who had allegedly
threatened building staff. 814 F.3d at 1226. In this request, she essentially asked for “an
accommodation in the form of an exception to [the landlord’s] apparent policy or practice of not
renewing the leases of tenants who make threats.” Id. The Joint Statement, a guidance document
written by the two agencies charged with administering the Fair Housing Act, also suggests that a
request for a “second chance” may suffice as a request for a reasonable accommodation, at least
when the resident has received intervening treatment or medication that would eliminate the threat.
9 See Joint Statement at 4–6; Sinisgallo v. Town of Islip Hous. Auth., 865 F. Supp. 2d 307, 341–42
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (concluding that a tenant who committed an act of violence requested a
reasonable accommodation by seeking a probationary period from the housing authority to show
that his medication and treatment prevented him from continuing to be a threat).
But Robinson’s proposed amended complaint does not articulate this kind of request. In
that pleading, Robinson alleges that his counsel “attempted to arrange for [his] return” to Kia’s
Place or for placement in another shelter. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–34. These allegations, combined
with defendants’ alleged knowledge of his disabilities, id. ¶ 114, might together suggest that
negotiations involved a request for a reasonable accommodation that would facilitate his return to
housing. However, the complaint does not specify that Robinson asked for anything beyond
returning to housing. Plaintiff has not alleged, for example, that he sought a probationary return,
or a return conditioned on treatment, or any alternative arrangements. The complaint does not
offer even a hint of what Robinson requested to facilitate his return to Kia’s Place IV in light of
his disabilities. Without allegations as to what was requested, the Court is unable to assess whether
any such requested accommodations might be necessary to afford Robinson equal use and
enjoyment of a shelter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Robinson’s amended complaint
does not sufficiently plead a request for a reasonable accommodation. 3 Cf. Ravenell v. Mayorkas,
Civ. A. No. 22-3548 (JDB), 2024 WL 1344460, at *15 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2024) (dismissing
3 In addition to his reasonable accommodation claim, Robinson’s allegations also point to a disparate treatment claim. See Am. Compl. ¶ 115 (asserting that defendants treated Robinson “worse than other residents,” “discriminated against him,” and “conspired to have him kicked out of the residence illegally”); see id. ¶¶ 114–119. Robinson makes no legal argument in support of this theory and relies exclusively on case law supporting a “reasonable accommodation” theory of discrimination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112–13; Pl.’s Reply to D.C. Opp’n at 8– 9. Robinson also fails to plead facts sufficient to permit an inference of disparate treatment. See Boykin v. Gray, 895 F. Supp. 2d 199, 208 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing disparate treatment claim under the FHA because plaintiffs “made no allegations that, accepted as true, could serve as ‘direct evidence of discriminatory intent,’ nor that could ‘permit an inference of discrimination’” (quoting Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1999))). Robinson has offered only conclusory allegations that defendants denied him housing or otherwise discriminated against him based on his “mental impairments.” Accordingly, to the extent Robinson is making this claim, it also would not withstand dismissal.
10 employee’s reasonable accommodation claim for failure to allege that he “actually requested an
accommodation”). Hence, Robinson’s federal discrimination claim, as alleged in the proposed
amended complaint, would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the proposed
amendment would be futile. 4
II. Due Process Claim (Count VII)
Robinson also alleges that defendants “kicked him out of his living residence and kept his
personal property without due process.” Am. Compl. ¶ 139. Specifically, Robinson claims that
defendants terminated his residence in Kia’s Place IV without notice and failed to “go through the
proper protocol and hearings that were required by law.” Id. ¶¶ 139–140. Further, he asserts that
his due process rights were violated when defendants did not allow him to retrieve his personal
property from the shelter. Id. ¶ 142.
Although Robinson does not specify, the Court understands him (as do defendants) to be
alleging a violation of procedural rather than substantive due process. Defendants argue that
Robinson’s amended complaint does not state a procedural due process claim because Robinson
does not have a constitutionally protected interest in shelter and, even if he did, he was afforded
more process than the Constitution requires. See D.C. Opp’n at 9; ECS Opp’n at 8–9.
“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the District of Columbia from
depriving persons of ‘property, without due process of law.’” Washington Legal Clinic for the
Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). To survive
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he had a protected property interest and
that he was deprived of the interest without due process of law. Badgett v. District of Columbia,
925 F. Supp. 2d 23, 30 (D.D.C. 2013). A protected property interest may arise from the
4 The Court also reviewed the claim as alleged in the original complaint and concluded it would not survive a motion to dismiss for the same reasons.
11 Constitution or another independent source of law, i.e. a statute or regulation. Washington Legal
Clinic, 107 F.3d at 36.
Robinson concedes that, in general, “[a] homeless person or client who receives medical
or other services in the District from a provider does not have a protected property right or interest
in those services grounded either in the U.S. Constitution or any District of Columbia statute.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 40 (citing Baltimore v. District of Columbia, 10 A.3d 1141, 1144 (D.C. 2011));
Boykin v. Gray, 895 F. Supp. 2d 199, 220 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that homeless plaintiffs’ due
process claim failed for lack of a protected interest in shelter). However, such individuals have a
“statutory entitlement [under the HSRA] to shelter in severe or frigid weather.” Baltimore, 10
A.3d at 1143; see id. at 1154; D.C. Code § 4-755.01(a) (“No provision of [HSRA] shall be
construed to create an entitlement (either direct or implied) on the part of any individual or family
to any services within the Continuum of Care, other than shelter in severe weather conditions.”
(emphasis added)). Hence, whether Robinson was deprived of a protected property interest turns
on whether he was deprived of shelter in severe weather. See Pl.’s Reply to D.C. Opp’n at 11;
Am. Compl. ¶ 40.
HSRA defines severe weather as “[w]henever the actual or forecasted temperature,
including the wind chill factor, falls below 32 degrees Fahrenheit, or whenever the actual or
forecasted temperature or heat index rises above 95 degrees Fahrenheit.” D.C. Code § 4-
753.01(c)(1). Under such circumstances, “the District shall make available appropriate space in
District of Columbia public or private buildings and facilities for any resident of the District who
is homeless and cannot access other housing arrangements.” Id. The statute permits individuals
“to sue in severe weather for the full measure of the statutory protections afforded them.” District
of Columbia v. Reid, 104 A.3d 859, 863 (D.C. 2014).
12 Robinson alleges that he was terminated from Kia’s Place IV in April 2021 and remained
homeless despite “attempt[ing] to return several times.” Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Attached to his
complaint are news articles indicating that the temperature rose above 95 degrees from June 27–
30, 2021, and from July 6–7, 2021. Am. Compl., Ex. B [ECF No. 15-1]. He argues that these
allegations together state a plausible claim. Pl.’s Reply to D.C. Opp’n at 5; see Am. Compl. ¶¶
22, 44. Defendants respond that Robinson has not sufficiently pleaded that he was denied housing
during severe weather because he does not allege “what days [he] attempted to return and whether
or not on those ‘several times,’ the temperature was 95 degrees or above.” ECS Opp’n at 3; see
D.C. Opp’n at 2 (“Plaintiff makes no allegations that he attempted to secure shelter and was refused
on those particular days.”). 5 The Court is skeptical that Robinson has sufficiently alleged
deprivation of an entitlement to shelter in severe weather. Robinson has demonstrated at most that
he was not able to return to Kia’s Place IV on the severe weather days in the summer of 2021; he
has not alleged that the District generally denied him access to suitable housing. Cf. Boykin, 895
F. Supp. 2d at 220 (dismissing claims of plaintiffs who did not allege they were among those
denied shelter during an extremely cold night).
But even if Robinson were deprived of shelter during severe weather, he has not plausibly
alleged “that the process available [to him] was inadequate nor that [he] w[as] denied such
process.” Badgett, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 30. When a plaintiff will be deprived of a protected property
interest, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976)). Robinson’s residence at Kia’s Place IV was terminated pursuant to the emergency
5 The parties primarily make these arguments in the context of Robinson’s direct HSRA claim, but the Court addresses them here because they are relevant to whether Robinson has plausibly alleged a property interest in shelter during severe weather.
13 termination provision of HSRA. That provision states that “[w]henever a client presents an
imminent threat to the health or safety of the client or any other person on a provider’s premises”
the provider is authorized to terminate the client within 24 hours without providing written notice.
D.C. Code § 4-754.38(a). The provider must, however, immediately notify DHS of the termination
and “endeavor to provide written notice” to the client within 15 days. Id. § 4-754.38(b), (e). DHS,
then, must within 24 hours “issue a written finding of whether the emergency . . . termination order
complies with the requirements of [the statute].” Id. § 4-754.38(e). Upon termination, the client
is entitled to a “fair hearing” review by the District’s Office of Administrative Hearings, see id. §§
4-754.38(e), 4-754.41, as well as “administrative review” by DHS, id. § 4-754.41(e), § 4-754.42.
Robinson’s complaint contains no allegation that these procedures were inadequate. See
Yates v. District of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003). At most, he argues that his
emergency termination violated due process because it was issued without prior notice. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 139–140. But it does not. While due process generally requires a pre-deprivation
hearing, “summary administrative action may be justified in emergency situations,” such as when
“swift action is necessary to protect the public health and safety.” Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 300–01 (1981). That Robinson disputes whether he actually
endangered the safety of staff members at Kia’s Place IV does not render the process of emergency
termination followed by timely post-deprivation hearings unlawful. “The relevant inquiry is not
whether [an] order should have been issued in a particular case, but whether the statutory procedure
itself is incapable of affording due process.” Id. at 302. He has not challenged the process here.
Moreover, Robinson’s complaint, the documents attached thereto, and administrative
records of which the Court may take judicial notice together demonstrate that Robinson received
due process after he was terminated on an emergency basis from Kia’s Place IV. ECS notified
DHS of the termination on April 16, 2021. See Admin. Rev. Decision at 1. DHS reviewed that
14 termination decision and issued a compliance finding on April 22, 2021. Id. Robinson requested
a fair hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings on April 26, 2021. Id. at 2. DHS’s
Office of Administrative Review received notice of Robinson’s request on May 11, 2021, and
scheduled a telephonic hearing with Robinson for May 24, 2021. Id. The administrative review
officer concluded that DHS failed to issue a compliance finding within 24 hours, as required by
statute, and reinstated Robinson to Kia’s Place IV. Id. at 4. Robinson then also received a hearing
before the Office of Administrative Hearings. ECS MTD, Ex. F [ECF No. 8-6] at 2. That
administrative case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice on January 10, 2022, with
Robinson retaining a right to seek reconsideration or to appeal the decision to the D.C. Court of
Appeals. Id. at 3–4. 6 Against this backdrop, Robinson only offers a conclusory allegation that
defendants failed to “go through the proper protocol and hearings that were required by law.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 139. That is not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.
Indeed, Robinson received a favorable outcome here through the review process when the
DHS administrative review officer ordered his placement reinstated. That defendants did not
ultimately restore his housing does not establish a due process violation. While such conduct “may
well give rise to [liability] under D.C. law[, . . .] it did not deprive [Robinson] of the only process
due—namely, timely notice and a hearing.” Tate, 627 F.3d at 908. 7 Hence, amendment of the
due process claim based on his termination from the shelter without notice would be futile. 8
6 The Court takes judicial notice of the occurrence and outcome of this proceeding, which occurred before the Office of Administrative Hearings. See Mehle v. Am. Mgmt. Sys., Inc., No. 01-7197, 2002 WL 31778773, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2002) (per curiam). 7 Robinson’s reply briefs also contend that defendants violated his due process rights by conspiring to use an anti-stalking order to prevent him from returning to the shelter and making it impossible for him to find housing at another facility. Pl.’s Reply to D.C. Opp’n at 10–11. None of these arguments states a procedural due process violation. 8 The Court has also reviewed the claim as alleged in the original complaint and concluded that it would not survive a motion to dismiss for the same reason.
15 Defendants do not address Robinson’s apparently separate contention that he was deprived
of his property without due process when he was not allowed to retrieve his belongings from Kia’s
Place IV. Considering Robinson’s admission that ECS told him that he could retrieve his
belongings with police assistance, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18, the Court is doubtful that this claim
is viable. But absent briefing from the parties, the Court declines to rule on the question. 9
III. Supplemental Jurisdiction
At this point, the Court has concluded that the proposed amendment to Robinson’s federal
housing discrimination claim would be futile, as would the proposed amendment to Robinson’s
due process claim as it concerns the denial of shelter. The Court has also concluded that the
corresponding claims in Robinson’s original complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for
the same reasons. The Court will accordingly dismiss Robinson’s Fair Housing Act claim and his
federal due process claim with respect to the deprivation of shelter. The Court acknowledges that
defendants’ motions to dismiss were not fully briefed but considers dismissal of the claims to be
warranted because plaintiff cannot prevail based on the facts alleged in the complaint or the
proposed amended complaint. Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (quoting Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Further,
dismissal is appropriate as the parties have fully addressed the question whether these claims could
survive a motion to dismiss in the context of defendants’ oppositions to Robinson’s motion to
amend and Robinson’s reply briefs thereto.
The remaining issues in the proposed amended complaint would then be (1) the due process
claim relating to Robinson’s deprivation of his personal belongings and (2) nine distinct D.C.
statutory and common law claims. Given the substantial number of state law claims, and the
9 The Court notes that this procedural due process claim is also closely related to Robinson’s claim that defendants tortiously converted his personal belongings under D.C. law. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122–31.
16 dubious merits of the remaining federal claim, the Court must consider whether the continued
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is warranted. See Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
775 F.3d 409, 413–14 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Deppner v. Spectrum Health Care Res., Inc., 325 F. Supp.
3d 176, 190 (D.D.C. 2018).
Federal courts have “supplemental jurisdiction” over state law claims “that are so related
to claims in the action within [the court’s] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). When exercising supplemental
jurisdiction, the district court has a continuing “obligation to employ its discretion to determine
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the ancillary state-law claims.” Araya, 775 F.3d
at 414; see id. at 416. Courts may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over a state law
claim if
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C § 1367(c). When weighing whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, the concerns of
“judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity [are] relevant.” Edmondson & Gallagher v.
Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d 1165,
1174 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 n.7 (1988)).
17 Here, the § 1367 factors, together with the Gibbs considerations, weigh strongly in favor
of remand to D.C. Superior Court. To begin, the state law claims in this case “substantially
predominate.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Even if part of Robinson’s due process claim would
survive a motion to dismiss, the Court has serious doubts about its viability. See Diven v.
Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l & Loc. 689, 38 F.3d 598, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he apparent
weakness of [a] claim—even before discovery—is . . . a factor to be weighed in determining
whether the state claim ‘substantially predominates.’”). 10 Meanwhile, nine separate D.C. statutory
and common law claims alleged in the proposed amended complaint remain to be considered.
Although defendants’ oppositions to Robinson’s motion to amend suggest they view this as a
simple case that could be resolved on Robinson’s failure to allege sufficient facts, the D.C. Circuit
has recognized that “the process of discerning, interpreting, and deciding a half-dozen state-law
claims could be described as undertaking to resolve a ‘complex issue of State law.’” Araya, 775
F.3d at 418 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)); see id. (concluding that district court abused its
discretion by considering “a substantial number of arguable local statutory and common law
claims” raised by a pro se plaintiff). And, indeed, the briefing here suggests that this case “raises
issues that have not been directly confronted by D.C. courts,” id., such as what factual allegations
are required to plead a violation of the “severe weather” provisions of D.C’s HSRA, who can be
sued under HSRA, and what accommodations Robinson might be entitled to during severe
weather.
Meanwhile, “judicial economy and convenience[] provide no serious counterweight.”
Edmondson & Gallagher, 48 F.3d at 1266. This case is still at the earliest stages, and relatively
few judicial resources have been expended on its disposition. Further, “under the circumstances,
10 Robinson’s Fair Housing Act claim may also be amenable to repleading. However, even if that claim (pleaded again) could survive a motion to dismiss, the Court would still hold that remand was appropriate.
18 there seems little difference in convenience for the parties whether they litigate in D.C. or federal
court.” Id. at 1267. Accordingly, “retaining jurisdiction . . . would be inappropriate,” and remand
to D.C. Superior Court is warranted. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 357.
Conclusion
Having concluded that Robinson’s federal discrimination claim and federal due process
claim as it pertains to the denial of shelter must be dismissed, the Court no longer finds it
appropriate to retain jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Fair
Housing Act claim and the part of the due process claim pertaining to the alleged deprivation of
shelter and remand the remainder of the case to D.C. Superior Court for further proceedings. An
Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will issue on this date.
/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Dated: May 20, 2024