Robinson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court

2016 Ohio 497

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 8, 2016
• Docket: 103589
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Robinson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2016-Ohio-497.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 103589

JODY ROBINSON

RELATOR

vs.

CUYAHOGA COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED

Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 489959 Order No. 492559

RELEASE DATE: February 8, 2016 FOR RELATOR

Jody E. Robinson, pro se Inmate No. 0191006 Cuyahoga County Jail P.O. Box 5600 Cleveland, Ohio 44113

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: James E. Moss Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113

By: Willie Mitchell Assistant County Prosecutor 4261 Fulton Parkway Cleveland, Ohio 44114 MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

{¶1} Jody E. Robinson has filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in order to

compel the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to issue rulings on 12 pro se

motions that were filed in State v. Robinson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-598539. We

decline to issue a writ of mandamus on behalf of Robinson.

{¶2} Initially, we find that Robinson’s complaint for a writ of mandamus is

defective for the following reasons:

1) Failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A), which mandates that any inmate that

commences a civil action against a government entity or employee must file an affidavit

that contains a description of each civil action or appeal of a civil action that an inmate

has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court. Clarke v. McFaul, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89447, 2007-Ohio-2520.

2) Failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C), which provides that any inmate that

files a complaint against a government entity or employee must include a statement that

sets forth the balance in his inmate account for the preceding six months, as certified by

the institutional cashier. State ex rel. White v. Bechtel, 99 Ohio St.3d 11,

2003-Ohio-2262, 788 N.E.2d 634. It must also be noted that the subsequent filing of the

statement does not cure the defect. Fuqua v. Williams, 100 Ohio St.3d 211,

2003-Ohio-5533, 797 N.E.2d 982.

3) Failure to comply with R.C. 2731.04, which provides that a party filing an

original action for mandamus must bring the action in the name of the state on relation of the person applying. Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 139,

2005-Ohio-5795, 841 N.E.2d 766.

4) Failure to comply with Civ.R. 10(A), which requires that the addresses of all

parties be listed in the caption of the original action. State ex rel. Tate v. Callahan, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85615, 2005-Ohio-1202.

{¶3} Finally, Robinson has failed to establish that he is entitled to a writ of

mandamus in order to compel the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to render

rulings on 12 motions that were filed between September 9, 2015, and September 22,

2015. An extraordinary writ of mandamus, to compel rulings on motions that have been

pending less than 120 days, is premature. See Sup.R. 40(A)(3); Majid v. Sutula, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97019, 2011-Ohio-3993; State ex rel. Huffman v. Ambrose, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 95546, 2010-Ohio-5376.

{¶4} It must also be noted that even if more than 120 days had lapsed since the

filing of Robinson’s pro se motions, this court is not required to issue a writ of mandamus

to compel rulings on the motions.

Moreover, even the passing of one hundred twenty days may still not compel a mandamus to issue. The rule may impose upon the trial court the duty to rule upon motions within one hundred twenty days for purposes of efficient court administration. That, however, does not necessarily mean that a corresponding right is created for litigants to force a trial judge to rule upon any motion within one hundred twenty days, regardless of the posture of the litigation. The need for discovery, the issues presented, the possibility of settlement, other motions pending in the case, and even other matters pending before the court could all, inter alia, be sufficient reason for the trial court within its proper discretion not to rule upon a motion within one hundred twenty days. Furthermore, allowing litigants to enforce such a rigid rule risks depriving other litigants of due process, invites gamesmanship in litigation, and could frustrate the policy of deciding cases on their merits and not on procedural technicalities. State ex rel. Richard v. Gorman (Aug. 19, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 63333, unreported.

Moreover, a court has inherent power “to regulate procedure that justice may be the result.” Aluminum Indus., Inc. v. Egan (1938), 61 Ohio App. 111, 115, 14 O.O. 174, 176, 22 N.E.2d 459, 462. Recognizing a litigant’s “right” to compel a judge to rule on any motion after the lapse of one hundred twenty days could undermine the court’s power. This is not to say that a trial court may leave a motion unresolved indefinitely. Given the proper circumstances, mandamus will lie to compel the exercise of discretion. However, mandamus does not lie to control that discretion, State ex rel. Butler v. Demis (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 123, 20 O.O.3d 121, 420 N.E.2d 116, and in certain instances prematurely compelling a court to rule on a matter would be to usurp a judge’s discretion.

State ex rel. Rodgers v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 83 Ohio App.3d 684,

685, 615 N.E.2d 689 (8th Dist.1992).

{¶5} Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss filed by the Cuyahoga County

Court of Common Pleas. Costs to Robinson. The court directs the clerk of courts to

serve all parties with notice of this judgment and the date of entry upon the journal as

required by Civ.R. 58(B).

{¶6} Complaint dismissed.

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

TIM McCORMACK, P.J., and PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR