Robinson v. Commonwealth

52 S.E. 690, 104 Va. 888, 1906 Va. LEXIS 97
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedFebruary 2, 1906
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 52 S.E. 690 (Robinson v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 52 S.E. 690, 104 Va. 888, 1906 Va. LEXIS 97 (Va. 1906).

Opinion

Kbits, P.,

delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

[890]*890An indictment was found in tbe Circuit Court of Warwick county against Charles H. Robinson, wbicb charges that he, being a justice of the peace of Newport Magisterial District in said county, by virtue of his office aforesaid, had the custody of a certain sum of money, public funds of the State of Virginia, to-wit, the sum of five dollars, which he was required by law to pay to the clerk of the Circuit Court of the county, aforesaid, and which he “feloniously and knowingly did misuse and misappropriate . . . and did then and there feloniously and knowingly dispose of the said money and public funds otherwise than by paying the same to the clerk of the Circuit Court of Warwick county, Virginia, in accordance with law, and so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say that the said Charles H. Robinson then and there, in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously and knowingly did steal, take, embezzle, and carry away, the said money and public funds aforesaid, to-wit, the sum of five dollars, currency of the United States, of the value of five dollars, the money and public funds of the State of Virginia. Against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia.”

There was a motion to quash, and a demurrer interposed to this indictment. We deem it necessary to consider only the demurrer.

The plaintiff in error contends that the indictment is based upon section 723 of the Code, which provides:

“If any fine is received by the justice imposing it, he shall pay the same, with the cost, within thirty days thereafter, to the clerk of the Circuit Court of his county or Corporation Court of his city. Dor failure to make such payment within said time, without good cause, he shall forfeit twenty dollars, which, together with the money so received, may be recovered bv motion.”

[891]*891This statute fixes tbe duty of tbe justice. Wbeu be imposes and collects the fine, be must, by its terms, pay tbe same, together with tbe costs, within thirty days to tbe clerk of tbe court of bis county or corporation; and for failure to make such payment be forfeits twenty dollars, which may be recovered from him by motion, together with tbe money so received. But that is not the offence with which plaintiff in error was charged. He was prosecuted under section 3117, which is as follows:

“If any officer, agent, or employee of the State or of any city, town or county, or the deputy of any such officer, having custody of public funds, knowingly misuse or misappropriate the same, or knowingly dispose thereof otherwise than in accordance with law, he shall he confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than ten years, and if any default of such officer, agent, employee, or deputy in paying over said funds to the proper authorities when required by law to do so shall be deemed prima facie evidence of his guilt.”

The two sections are wholly dissimilar. The first refers to the failure to pay over; the second to the knowing misuse or misappropriation of the funds of the State. It is true that the detention of the money is one of the elements constituting the offense punished under section 3111, but it does not constitute the offense itself; for money may be detained without being-misappropriated, which is the evil for which section 123 was designed as a remedy. But ■ it may also be detained with fraudulent and felonious intent to misuse and misappropriate, which brings the case within the terms of section 3111.

We are of opinion that the indictment is sufficient, and that the demurrer was properly overruled.

While the jury were being selected for the trial of this case, plaintiff in error challenged one of the veniremen who had been [892]*892sworn upon bis voir dire, and asked bim if be bad not at a time and place named in tbe question, said “Charley Robinson don’t want me to sit on any jury tbat tries bim, and would know tbat be is a goner if I sit on any jury tbat tries bim.” To wbicb tbe juror replied tbat be bad made snob a statement, and meant tbat if tbe evidence was as strong in this case as it was in tbe one before tbe grand jury on wbicb be sat wben Robinson was indicted on a former occasion be would convict bim. Tbe grand jury bere alluded to was not connected at all with this prosecution. Tbe court then asked tbe juror if there was any impression on bis mind made by wbat be bad beard about tbe accused, or by wbat be bad beard on tbe grand jury in tbe case referred to tbat would require evidence to remove it; to wbicb be replied tbat there was not, but tbat be could give tbe accused a fair and impartial trial without reference to wbat he bad beard about tbe accused either on tbe grand jury or otherwise. Thereupon tbe juror was received by tbe court, and tbe plaintiff in error excepted.

This subject was recently considered by this court in tbe case of McCue v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 870, 49 S. E. 623, and tbe conclusions reached are thus stated in tbe syllabus: “Tbe trend of recent decisions is in tbe direction of limiting rather than extending tbe disqualification of jurors by reason of mere opinion, hence tbe courts enquire into tbe character of tbat opinion. If it is a decided or substantial opinion as to tbe guilt or innocence of tbe accused, no matter upon wbat ground it was formed, tbe" juror is incompetent, but if tbe opinion is merely hypothetical, and tbe court is satisfied from an examination of tbe juror on bis vior dire, or otherwise, tbat be is not biased or prejudiced, and tbat be can give tbe prisoner a fair and impartial trial according to tbe law and tbe evidence, be should be accepted. No fixed and invariable rule can be laid [893]*893down whereby to test the competency of jurors, hut each case should be determined by its own facts and circumstances, and great weight should he attached hy an appellate court to the opinion of the trial judge.”

Applying this principle to the case before us, we are of opinion that there was no error in the ruling of the Circuit Court.

The third assignment of error is to the exclusion of certain evidence offered by the accused.

The bill of exception is as follows: “That at the trial of this cause, after the accused had been arraigned and the jury impaneled to try the issue, and while the accused was testifyng in his hehalf, relative to the reasons why he had not paid the fine and the costs, shown in the evidence, to the clerk of the court, he started to state that it was his practice and that of other magistrates and police officers down there. To further testimony along this line the Commonwealth here objected, by counsel, which objection the court sustained, to which ruling and opinion of the court in sustaining the said objection the accused by his counsel excepted, and tenders this bill of exception which he prays may he signed,” etc.

If the prisoner’s conduct was in accordance with the law, it did not need to be supported by the practice of others; if it was not in accordance with the law, the fact that others violated the law would furnish no justification or excuse to him. We see no merit in this assignment of error.

After the evidence was introduced, the court, at the instance of the Commonwealth, gave the jury two instructions. The first instruction is as follows:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 S.E. 690, 104 Va. 888, 1906 Va. LEXIS 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-commonwealth-va-1906.