Robinson v. CIGNA

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Robinson v. CIGNA

216 A.D.2d 375, 628 N.Y.S.2d 169, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6271

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 12, 1995

StatusPublished

This text of 216 A.D.2d 375 (Robinson v. CIGNA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Robinson v. CIGNA, 216 A.D.2d 375, 628 N.Y.S.2d 169, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6271 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), dated March 2, 1994, as denied its motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint.

[376]*376Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and the motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint is granted.

We agree with the defendant that the respondents raised no triable issues of fact with regard to their contention that they are entitled to annual cost-of-living increases pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Even assuming, arguendo, that the respondents were covered under that act, in order to qualify for the relief they seek thereunder a beneficiary must be determined to have sustained a "permanent total disability” (33 USC § 910 [f]). In this case, the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that each respondent had sustained only a "partial permanent disability”. Balletta, J. P., Thompson, Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), dated March 2, 1994, as denied its motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint.

[376]*376Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and the motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth causes of action asserted in the complaint is granted.

We agree with the defendant that the respondents raised no triable issues of fact with regard to their contention that they are entitled to annual cost-of-living increases pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Even assuming, arguendo, that the respondents were covered under that act, in order to qualify for the relief they seek thereunder a beneficiary must be determined to have sustained a "permanent total disability” (33 USC § 910 [f]). In this case, the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that each respondent had sustained only a "partial permanent disability”. Balletta, J. P., Thompson, Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

216 A.D.2d 375, 628 N.Y.S.2d 169, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-cigna-nyappdiv-1995.

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