Mr. Justice Todd-
delivered the opinion of the-court, and-after stating the facts,^proceeded as follows;
The,first question is, whether -the'circuit court were right in rejecting the- evidence, offered by the defendant establish a title in himself under the grant of Joseph? that grant being'posterior in date to the grant-under which the plaintiff claimed; and this depends up- .... . , . , on the consideration, whether a prior settlement right, would, in equity, give the party á title to the*anc^ 03n be asserted also, as-a sufficient title in an actjan of ejectment. '
_ , By the compact settling the boundary line Between' and Tennessee, and the- laws- made in par-suance thereof, it is declared, that all claims and titles*to lands derived from the governments of Virginia, or North-Carolina, or Tennessee, -which have fallen into- * % * respective states; shall remaní as secure to he owners thereof, as if derived from the government ^thin whose line they have fallen; and shall not be? in any wise prejudiced or affectéd in consequence of the establishment of the said line. The titles, both of the plaintiff and defendant in this case, were derived under grants- from Virginia ; and'the argument is, that as in Virginia no equitable claims-or rights ante-; cedent to the grants, could be asserted, kva court-o£ [219]*219law in an 1 ejectment, but were matters cognizable-in equity only, that the. rule must, under the compact between the two states, apply to all the suits inihecburts in Tennessee, respecting the lands included an those grants.
Remedies, in respect to real are according*11 to the lex loci jd sitos. ■ ■
The general rule is, that remedies m respect to real , , , estates are t® be pursued according to the law of place where the estate is situate.
The doctrine of the state courts of Tennessee,permitting an equitable title to be assented in an action at law, only applies to cases within the express purview of the Matutes of ’ Tennessee.
The question- then is, .whether in the circuit, courts of the United States^ a merely equitable title can be set up ás a defence in an action of ejectment. It is understood that the state courts of Tennessee have [221]*221decided that under their statutes, declaring an elder grant founded on a younger entry, to be void, tné priority of entries is examinable at law; and that a junior patent founded on a prior entry, shall prevail in an ac-¿ion of ejectment against a senior patent founded on a junior entry. But this doctrine has never been extended beyond the cases which have been construed to be within the express purview of the statutés of Tennessee. The present case stands upon grants of Virginia, and is not within the'purview of the statutes of Tennessee; the titles have all their validity firom the laws of Virginia', and are confirmed by the stipulations of the compact: Assuming, therefore, that in the case of entries under the laws of Tennessee, the priority of such entries is examinable at. law, this court do not think that the doctrine applies to merely equitable rights derived from other sources. •
™ourts °f the United States at com* mon law and to be” not act00j-h® ^ut^Lcwding to the principlesof common lawande^uity England!Thhi conciled’ with decisions of the courts of Tennessee, equUab!eStUl« inanacUon'at
There is a more general view of this subject, which deserves consideration. • By the laws of the United 1 f J • Slates, the circuit courts have cognizanoe of all suits of a civil nature at common law, and in equity, incases which fall within the limits prescribed by those laws. By the 24th section of the judiciary act of 1789, it is pro•vided, that the laws of the several States, except where , . . tt • , the constitution, treaties, or statutes ot the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be r.egarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the.United States, in cases where they . J * ply. The act of May, 1792, confirms the modes of proceeding then used in suits at common law in the courts of the United States, and declares that the modes [222]*222tit proceeding in suits of equity, shall be “according to the pñnciples,: rules, and usages which belong to courts Of equity, as contra-distinguished frorp courts of cbiaampn laW)” except so far as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, It is material to consider whether it was the intention of Congress, by these provisions, to. confine the courts of the United States in their mode of administering relief to the same remedies, and those only, with all their incidents, which existed in the courts of the respective states. In other words, whether it was their intention to give the party relief at law, where the practice of the .state courts would give it, and relief tre equity only, when according to such practice, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not he had at law. In some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognise and enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would recognise and enforce; in others, all relief is denied and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would adopt the state practice in a its extent, would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equitablé jurisdiction. The acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The court, therefore think, that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature,the remedies in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of [223]*223state courts, but according to the principles of common laW and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive pur knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this construction, it may be admitted, tbát where by the statutes of a state, a title, which would otherwise be deemed merely equitable, is recognised as a legal title, or a title which would be good;at law, is under circumstances of an equitable nature declared by such statutes to be void, the rights of the parties, in such case, may be as fully considered in a suit at law in the courts of the United States, as they ryould be in any stare court.
In either view of this first point, the court is of opinion that the circuit court decided right in rejecting the evidence offered by the original defendant. It was matter proper for. the cognisance of a court of equity* and not admissible in a suit at law.
The next question is, whether the circuit court decided correctly in rejecting the deed of conveyance from the plaintiff’s lessor to Arthur L. Campbell, for the land in .controversy, made during the pendency of the suit.
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Mr. Justice Todd-
delivered the opinion of the-court, and-after stating the facts,^proceeded as follows;
The,first question is, whether -the'circuit court were right in rejecting the- evidence, offered by the defendant establish a title in himself under the grant of Joseph? that grant being'posterior in date to the grant-under which the plaintiff claimed; and this depends up- .... . , . , on the consideration, whether a prior settlement right, would, in equity, give the party á title to the*anc^ 03n be asserted also, as-a sufficient title in an actjan of ejectment. '
_ , By the compact settling the boundary line Between' and Tennessee, and the- laws- made in par-suance thereof, it is declared, that all claims and titles*to lands derived from the governments of Virginia, or North-Carolina, or Tennessee, -which have fallen into- * % * respective states; shall remaní as secure to he owners thereof, as if derived from the government ^thin whose line they have fallen; and shall not be? in any wise prejudiced or affectéd in consequence of the establishment of the said line. The titles, both of the plaintiff and defendant in this case, were derived under grants- from Virginia ; and'the argument is, that as in Virginia no equitable claims-or rights ante-; cedent to the grants, could be asserted, kva court-o£ [219]*219law in an 1 ejectment, but were matters cognizable-in equity only, that the. rule must, under the compact between the two states, apply to all the suits inihecburts in Tennessee, respecting the lands included an those grants.
Remedies, in respect to real are according*11 to the lex loci jd sitos. ■ ■
The general rule is, that remedies m respect to real , , , estates are t® be pursued according to the law of place where the estate is situate.
The doctrine of the state courts of Tennessee,permitting an equitable title to be assented in an action at law, only applies to cases within the express purview of the Matutes of ’ Tennessee.
The question- then is, .whether in the circuit, courts of the United States^ a merely equitable title can be set up ás a defence in an action of ejectment. It is understood that the state courts of Tennessee have [221]*221decided that under their statutes, declaring an elder grant founded on a younger entry, to be void, tné priority of entries is examinable at law; and that a junior patent founded on a prior entry, shall prevail in an ac-¿ion of ejectment against a senior patent founded on a junior entry. But this doctrine has never been extended beyond the cases which have been construed to be within the express purview of the statutés of Tennessee. The present case stands upon grants of Virginia, and is not within the'purview of the statutes of Tennessee; the titles have all their validity firom the laws of Virginia', and are confirmed by the stipulations of the compact: Assuming, therefore, that in the case of entries under the laws of Tennessee, the priority of such entries is examinable at. law, this court do not think that the doctrine applies to merely equitable rights derived from other sources. •
™ourts °f the United States at com* mon law and to be” not act00j-h® ^ut^Lcwding to the principlesof common lawande^uity England!Thhi conciled’ with decisions of the courts of Tennessee, equUab!eStUl« inanacUon'at
There is a more general view of this subject, which deserves consideration. • By the laws of the United 1 f J • Slates, the circuit courts have cognizanoe of all suits of a civil nature at common law, and in equity, incases which fall within the limits prescribed by those laws. By the 24th section of the judiciary act of 1789, it is pro•vided, that the laws of the several States, except where , . . tt • , the constitution, treaties, or statutes ot the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be r.egarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the.United States, in cases where they . J * ply. The act of May, 1792, confirms the modes of proceeding then used in suits at common law in the courts of the United States, and declares that the modes [222]*222tit proceeding in suits of equity, shall be “according to the pñnciples,: rules, and usages which belong to courts Of equity, as contra-distinguished frorp courts of cbiaampn laW)” except so far as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, It is material to consider whether it was the intention of Congress, by these provisions, to. confine the courts of the United States in their mode of administering relief to the same remedies, and those only, with all their incidents, which existed in the courts of the respective states. In other words, whether it was their intention to give the party relief at law, where the practice of the .state courts would give it, and relief tre equity only, when according to such practice, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not he had at law. In some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognise and enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would recognise and enforce; in others, all relief is denied and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would adopt the state practice in a its extent, would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equitablé jurisdiction. The acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The court, therefore think, that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature,the remedies in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of [223]*223state courts, but according to the principles of common laW and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive pur knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this construction, it may be admitted, tbát where by the statutes of a state, a title, which would otherwise be deemed merely equitable, is recognised as a legal title, or a title which would be good;at law, is under circumstances of an equitable nature declared by such statutes to be void, the rights of the parties, in such case, may be as fully considered in a suit at law in the courts of the United States, as they ryould be in any stare court.
In either view of this first point, the court is of opinion that the circuit court decided right in rejecting the evidence offered by the original defendant. It was matter proper for. the cognisance of a court of equity* and not admissible in a suit at law.
The next question is, whether the circuit court decided correctly in rejecting the deed of conveyance from the plaintiff’s lessor to Arthur L. Campbell, for the land in .controversy, made during the pendency of the suit. The answér that was given at the bar is deemed decisive; although an action of ejectment is founded in fictions, yet to certain purposes it is considered in the same manner as if the whole proceedings were real; for all the purposes ot the suit the lease is to be deemed a real possessory title. Jf.it expire during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff cannot recover his term at law, without procuring it to be enlarged by the court, and can»proceed only for antecedent damages. In the present case the lease is to be deemed as a good subsisting [224]*224lease, and the conveyance by the plaintiff’s lessor during the pendency of the suit could not operate upon his reversionary interest, and, consequently, could not ex" tinguish the prior lease- The existence of such a leape is a fiction; but. it is upheld-for the purposes of justice, und there is no pretencethat it works any injustice m this case.
tetío”s*offTen nessee phcable to this ease.
^ast question is, whether the statute of limifaof Tennessee was a good bar to the action. It is .. , , , , admitted, that it would be.a good bar only upon the supposition that the . lands in controversy were always within the original limits of Tennessee; but there is no such proof in the cause. The compact of the states does not affirm it, and the present boundary was an amr ic.able adjustment by that compact. It cannot, the; e-fore, be affirmed by any court 'of law, that the land was within the' reach of the statute of limitations of Tennessee until after the compact of 1802. The statute could not begin to run until it was ascertained that the land waá within the jurisdictional limits of the state of Tennessee.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.a
The foundations of this doctrine, and of all the other ’principles concerning the lex foci, are laid down by Hubecus, in hi* Pmlectiofies, with that admirable force and pre<ci*ion which distinguish the ■ wprks of the writers who have been formed indie school of the Roman jurisconsults, and which justify the eulogium pronounced upon that school by Leibnitz. ‘‘Fundamentum universas hujus doctrinas diximus esse, et tenemus, subjectionem homium infra leges cujusquc territorii, quandiu 9lic agunt, quae fecit, ut actas id) initio validus aut .nuilus,. alibi queque valere aut non valere non nequeat Sed base ratio non convenitrebus immobilibus, quandp iile spectantur, non ut dependentes a libera dispositione cujusquc patrisfasniiias, verum quatenus certas «ote lega cuj usque Reip. ubi sita sun t, illis impress® reperiuntur; has no tag manent indelibiles in ista iteppbl. quioquifi aliarum CivitatUm leges aUt prwatorum dispositiones,secu* aut contra'-statuant; nec enim sine magna confusiene prasjudicioqu* Reipubl. Ubi sitsesurtt res soli, Leges de illis Iatae,dispositionibusistismutaripossent Hiñe Frisius habens agros et domos in provincia Groningen* si, non potest de illis.testan, quia Lege prohibitum est ibi de bonis immobilibus téstari, non ralente Jure Ffisico adfi* cere bona, quae partes alieni territorii integrantes constituunt. Sed an hoc non obstatei, quod antea diximus, si factum sit Testamentum jure loci vali. dum, id effectum habere etiam in bonis alibi sitis, ubi de illis testari licet T Non obstat; quia legum diversitas in ilia specie non afficit res soli, ñeque de illis loquitur, aed ordinal actum [220]*220testandi; quo rccte celebrato, Lex Reipubl, non vetat illum actum valere in immobilibus, quatenus niillus character illis ip?is a lege loci impressus laeditur aut imminuitur.* IIme observado locum etiam in con fraedbus habet; quibus in Hollandia vonditas res soli Frisici, modo in Frisia prohibito, twiet, ubi 'gestas-est, valido, recte venditse intelliguntur; idemque in rebus non quidem immobilibus, at solo cohaerentibus; uti si. frumenturn soli Frisici in Hollandia Secundum lastas, ita dictas, sit v'enditum, non valet yenditio, nee quidem in Hollandia secundum earn jus dicetur, etsi tale frumentum ibi non sit vendí prohibitum ; quia in Frisia interdictum est; et solo cohseret ejusquo pars est. . Nec áliud juris evit in succesionibus ab intestak); si defunctus sit Paterfamilias. cujus bona in diversi locis imperii sita sunt, quantum attinet ad immobilia, servatur jus loqi, in quo situs eorum est; quoad mobiiia, servatur jus, quod illic loer est,ubi testator habuitdomicilium, qua de ré, vide Sandium, lib. 4. decis. lit. VIII. def. 7.” Huberus, Proelectiones, tom. 2 lib. I tit. 3. De Conflicto Legum. See Erkine’s Institutes of the Law of Scotland, 10th ed. 309. Pothier, de la Presciption 207. Code Napoleon, art. 3.