Robinson v. Atkinson

3 So. 2d 600
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 4, 1941
DocketNo. 6308.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 3 So. 2d 600 (Robinson v. Atkinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Atkinson, 3 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

Joe Robinson, the plaintiff herein, was injured on September 23, 1939, while engaged as an employee of defendant in the operation of a motor powered agricultural implement on the latter's farm; and he sues to recover compensation under the provisions of the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act, Act No. 20 of 1914, § 1 et seq. In the alternative, through a demand in tort, he asks damages for his injuries.

A compensation award was granted plaintiff, and defendant appealed from the judgment. By way of an answer to the appeal, plaintiff requests an increase in the award. He further prays therein that his alternative demand for damages be recognized and sustained in the event of a denial of compensation to him.

The primary question presented by the appeal is whether or not the provisions of our compensation statute are applicable to the employment being followed by plaintiff when injured.

Defendant, besides being a lawyer by profession and engaged in the practice of law, owns and operates a farm of about 1,700 acres of land located in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, less than 300 acres of which are in cultivation. On this farm he raises cotton, and also some feed stuff such as hay and sorghum. The feed crops are planted and cultivated solely for the purpose of consumption by his livestock; none of it has ever been sold.

During the 1939 farming season defendant produced about ten and one-half acres of sorghum; and in July thereof he caused it to be cut down with cane knives, tied in bundles and shocked in the field. The work was performed by his regular farm laborers without the aid of machinery. As suitable storage space for the lengthy sorghum stalks was not available he arranged to borrow from P.J. Bass, the owner of another farm in that vicinity, a portable farm implement designed for cutting them into small pieces. It is known as a Smalley Hay Chopper, the motive power for which is furnished by a tractor. Defendant possessed no equipment of that kind, and there was no one on his place experienced in the operation of it; so Mr. Bass was requested to furnish an operator.

Pursuant to instructions from Mr. Bass, the plaintiff, who had previously tended the tractor and chopper on the Bass farm, transported the desired equipment a distance of about five miles to defendant's place on Saturday afternoon, September 16, 1939; and he returned to his home the same evening. Early the following Monday morning, after his arrival at defendant's farm and after his being shown the crib to be first filled with the chopped feed, *Page 602 he proceeded to place in position and connect up the chopper and tractor. Less than an hour was required for this purpose.

The Smalley Hay Chopper consists of four knives that are bolted to a cylinder, a trough containing a chain conveyer, a fan approximately 34 inches in diameter, and an apron or table; and it is mounted on wheels. The fan is enclosed in a metal housing, in the side of which is an opening six and one-fourth inches in diameter. This opening permits inspection of the enclosed mechanism, and it is usually closed during operations, by means of a suitable door with attached handle, to prevent the feed from spilling on to the ground. Motive power provided by the tractor reaches the implement through a belt that runs on pulleys.

As soon as the equipment was made ready and the tractor engine started on the mentioned Monday morning, the chopping of defendant's sorghum commenced. It had been brought from the fields on wagons drawn by mules. The stalks were laid on the table, pushed into the trough and onto the chain conveyer which carried them to the knives. There they were chopped; and the resulting particles were then blown by the fan through a pipe into the selected storage space, to be used later in feeding defendant's stock as occasion demanded. Plaintiff was in charge of the operations, and usually it was he who fed the stalks to the cutter; however, some of defendant's regular farm laborers assisted him.

The work continued, with plaintiff in charge, throughout each day from that Monday morning through the following Friday afternoon. During such period the equipment was moved five times in order to permit the filling of various cribs or buildings on defendant's farm. On Saturday morning, after the greasing and starting of the equipment but before actual cutting operations had begun, plaintiff extended his right hand through the above described small opening in the metal housing and contacted the whirling fan. This resulted in the complete loss of the first and second fingers and the breaking of the thumb of that hand. Medical attention was given as soon as possible, and he was then taken to a hospital.

After the accident, chopping operations were undertaken and continued by the other laborers until Saturday afternoon. The equipment was then moved across the road to another location, where it was operated for several days during the following week, filling an old house used for storage purposes by defendant.

Section 1 of Act 20 of 1914, the Louisiana Employers' Liability statute recites that "this act shall apply only to the following * * *." Subsection 1 of that section refers to persons in public service, and, of course, is not appropriate to this discussion. Subsection 2 thereof, which is to be considered in connection with the mentioned recital regarding the applicability of the Act, relates in part:

"Every person performing services arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his employer's trade, business or occupation in the following hazardous trades, businesses and occupations:

"(a) The operation, construction, repair, removal, maintenance and demolition * * *."

Then follows the specific naming of numerous undertakings; and after that there are general provisions relating to various business activities and also definitions concerning several of the specifically named engagements.

A study of the language of the referred to Section 1, particularly subsection 2 thereof, can lead only to the conclusion that the nature of the employer's trade, business or occupation, that is whether it is hazardous or not, is determinative of the matter of the statute's applicability; and that the particular duties being per-formed by the employee when injured are of no importance in that respect. This view has been long entertained and often expressed by our appellate courts. Shipp v. Bordelon, 152 La. 795, 94 So. 399; Dartez v. Sterling Sugars, Inc., 7 La.App. 414; Tregre v. Kratzer, La.App., 148 So. 271; Stockstill v. Sears-Roebuck Co., La.App., 151 So. 822; DeLony v. Lane, La.App., 155 So. 476.

It is appropriate to observe here that the business of farming, such as defendant pursues and in connection with which plaintiff was working at the time of the accident, is not specifically named as being affected by the provisions of the statute. Moreover, the courts of Louisiana have on numerous occasions declared it to be a nonhazardous occupation. Thompson v. Levert Land Company, Inc., 2 La.App. *Page 603 159; DeLony v. Lane, supra; Robichaux v. Realty Operators, Inc.,195 La. 70, 196 So. 23.

It sometimes happens, however, that an employer carries on farming operations and also another distinct and separate occupation of the hazardous type. In a situation of this kind, if the employee is injured while performing duties required by and in connection with the hazardous business, the resulting disability is compensable under the statute. Robichaux v. Realty Operators, Inc., supra.

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Related

Williams v. Westdale Corporation
3 So. 2d 684 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1941)

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Bluebook (online)
3 So. 2d 600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-atkinson-lactapp-1941.