UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______
MICHAEL ROBINSON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:21-cv-63
v. Honorable Janet T. Neff
HEIDI WASHINGTON et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants Washington, Taskila, Hamel, Majurin, Stromer, and Wilson for failure to state a claim. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, all claims filed against Defendant Unknown Kytola, except for Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Kytola used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights on July 8 or 9, 2020, and related state law claims. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants Washington, Taskila, Hamel, Majurin, Stromer, and Wilson without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to bring those claims in the state courts. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi Washington, AMF Warden Kris Taskila, AMF Grievance Coordinator T. Hamel, AMF prison guard Unknown Kytola, AMF LPN Amber Majurin, AMF Prison Counselor Eric Stromer, and AMF Acting RUM Timothy Wilson. Plaintiff’s handwriting fills the page from edge to edge and each line of text touches the one above and below it so that the words, though generally legible, are difficult to decipher. Each page is awash with ink, offering the eye no place to rest. Careful focus permits one to discern the words on the page; but even when the words are understandable, Plaintiff’s pleading style lacks clarity.
Plaintiff attaches to his complaint a grievance. The grievance provides a clearer explanation of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff alleges that, on July 8, 2020, Defendant Kytola assaulted Plaintiff. (Grievance Appeal Form, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.21.) The warden’s second step grievance response indicates the nature of the assault: Kytola intentionally slammed the food slot cover on Plaintiff’s arm. (Id., PageID.22.) Apparently, Defendant Majurin “react[ed]” to the alleged assault (or the resulting injuries). (Id.) Although the word “assault” appears in proximity to the name “Kytola” a few times in Plaintiffs handwritten complaint, Plaintiffs single paragraph description of the event in the grievance is far more informative than Plaintiff's 18-page handwritten complaint. There are a few other “facts” that can be drawn out of Plaintiff’s complaint, including the following: e The AMF grievance procedures deny due process. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) e Defendant T. Hamel delayed processing Plaintiff's grievance. (d., PagelD.6.) e Defendant Washington is responsible for Plaintiff's safety and for training officers. U/d., PageID.7.) e Defendant Taskila is responsible for traming officers. (/d.) e Defendants Kytola, Stromer, and Wilson were inadequately trained. (/d.) e Defendant Majurin was present during the assault. (/d., PageID.8.) Plaintiff contends that all of the Defendants have violated state laws and duties and the MDOC’s own policy directives. Plaintiff seeks hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages. Il. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Be// Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. /d.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). III. Discussion Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kytola assaulted him. Plaintiff suggests that Defendants Washington and Taskila are responsible for that assault because they failed to adequately train Kytola. Plaintiff also suggests, apparently, that Stromer and Wilson are responsible for the assault because they are Kytola’s superiors or, perhaps, because they covered it up after the fact. Plaintiff indicates that Hamel is responsible because his unfair and due-process-violating coordination of the grievance process prevented Plaintiff from vindication through that process. Plaintiff indicates that Defendant Majurin was present during the assault and, therefore, apparently failed to stop it. These claims are addressed below. A. Defendant Kytola The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id. But not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (holding that “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”) (internal quotations omitted). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that
inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011). There is an objective component and a subjective component to an Eighth Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily
excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The objective component requires a “contextual” investigation, one that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). While the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “Otherwise, the
Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to state a claim that Defendant Kytola used excessive force against Plaintiff. B. Defendants Washington and Taskila Plaintiff faults Defendants Washington and Taskila for the wrong he suffered at the hands of Kytola because Washington and Taskila failed to properly train Kytola. Plaintiff fails to allege that either of these Defendants took any specific action against him. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881,
888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300) (citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants Washington or Taskila encouraged or condoned the conduct of Kytola, or authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts at all about the conduct of Washington or Taskila, other than the conclusory allegation that they failed to adequately train Kytola. His vague and conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility or a general failure to train are insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants were personally involved in the events surrounding Plaintiff’s assault. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
C. Defendant Majurin Plaintiff also fails to explain why Defendant Majurin might be responsible for the assault. At most he alleges that Majurin was present. A defendant is liable for another individual’s use of excessive force where the defendant “‘observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used’ and ‘had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.’” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997)); accord Alexander v. Carter for Byrd, 733 F. App’x 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2018); Partin v. Parris, No. 17-6172, 2018 WL 1631663, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018). The inquiry requires that the defendant “both perceive[d] what was going on” and had the ability to “intercede to stop it.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 475 (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s
allegations do not permit the inference that Majurin knew Kytola would use excessive force or that Majurin had the opportunity to stop it. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that Majurin, as a member of the healthcare staff, has the authority to stop a corrections officer in that context. Put simply, Plaintiff does not allege that Majurin played any role in violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. D. Defendants Stromer and Wilson Other than indicating that Defendants Stromer and Wilson were also inadequately trained, Plaintiff makes no allegations against them. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286
F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in
law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Stromer and Wilson fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). E. Defendant Hamel To the extent that Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hamel is liable for the assault because Hamel prevented the grievance process from correcting the problem, Plaintiff’s claim necessarily fails. As noted above, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff contends he has some constitutional right to the grievance remedy, that claim also fails. Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The courts repeatedly have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective
prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, Defendant Hamel’s alleged conduct that frustrated Plaintiff’s
pursuit of the grievance process did not deprive Plaintiff of due process. F. State law claims Plaintiff makes several references to Defendants’ failure to live up to their obligations under state law or MDOC rules and policies. Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Any assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against dismissed Defendants, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514,
521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims.” (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182; see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, at least with respect to Defendants Washington, Taskila, Hamel, Majurin, Stromer, and Wilson, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims against those Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice. State law claims against Defendant Kytola, however, remain in the case. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s federal law claims against Defendants Washington, Taskila, Hamel, Majurin, Stromer, and Wilson will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s state law claims against them will be dismissed
without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to bring those claims in the state courts. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, all claims filed against Defendant Unknown Kytola, except for Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Kytola used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights on July 8 or 9, 2020, and related state law claims. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: March 3, 2022 /s/ Janet T. Neff Janet T. Neff United States District Judge