Robins v. Cooke

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 20, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00155
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 DAMIAN ROBINS, Case No. 3:24-cv-00155-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 TASHEENA COOKE, 9 Defendant. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Damian Robins brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 14 at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 8.) On November 27, 2024, the Court ordered Robins to file 15 an amended complaint by December 27, 2024. (ECF No. 13.) The Court warned Robins 16 that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that 17 deadline. (Id. at 7.) 18 In response, Plaintiff filed an exhibit that he referred to as an amendment. (ECF 19 No. 14.) The Court explained that Plaintiff needed to file a complete amended complaint 20 and extended the deadline for Plaintiff to do so until February 10, 2025. (ECF No. 16.) 21 The Court reiterated that this case would be subject to dismissal if Robins failed to file an 22 amended complaint by the new deadline. (Id. at 2.) Robins did not file an amended 23 complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 26 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 27 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 28 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 2 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 3 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 4 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 5 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 6 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 7 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 8 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 9 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 10 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 11 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 12 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Robins’ 13 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 14 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 15 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 16 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor, the public policy favoring disposition of 17 cases on their merits, is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 19 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 20 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 21 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 22 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 23 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 24 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 25 order as satisfying this element[,]” like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with 26 the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts 27 “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but 28 must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1 |} 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 2 || unless Robins files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a third order 3 || setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 4 || delays the inevitable and squanders the Court's finite resources. The circumstances here 5 || do not indicate that this case will be an exception: There is no hint that Robins needs 6 || additional time, or evidence that he did not receive the Court's screening order or the 7 || Court’s subsequent order extending the pleading deadline. Setting another deadline is 8 || not a meaningful alternative in light of these circumstances. The fifth factor thus favors 9 || dismissal. 10 In sum, having thoroughly considered the dismissal factors, the Court finds that 11 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. 12 || Ill. CONCLUSION 13 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 14 || Robins’ failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s November 27, 15 || 2024, and January 13, 2025, orders. 16 It is further ordered that Robins’ application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 17 || 7) is denied as moot. 18 The Clerk of Court is further directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 19 || case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Robins wishes to 20 || pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 21 DATED THIS 20" Day of February 2025.

23 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28