ROBINHOOD PLAZA, INC. VS. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY(L-5825-10, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJune 9, 2017
DocketA-1070-15T2
StatusUnpublished

This text of ROBINHOOD PLAZA, INC. VS. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY(L-5825-10, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (ROBINHOOD PLAZA, INC. VS. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY(L-5825-10, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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ROBINHOOD PLAZA, INC. VS. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY(L-5825-10, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0170-15T1

SCHULTZ FURRIERS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TRAVELERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________________

Argued April 25, 2017 – Decided May 3, 2017

Before Judges Yannotti, Fasciale and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-2281- 13.

Mauro C. Casci argued the cause for appellant (Law Offices of Mauro C. Casci, attorneys; Mr. Casci, on the brief).

Christopher S. Finazzo argued the cause for respondent (Finazzo, Cossolini, O'Leary, Meola & Hager, L.L.C., attorneys; Rachel R. Hager, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this insurance declaratory judgment lawsuit, Schultz

Furriers, Inc. (plaintiff) appeals from two July 24, 2015 orders: one granting Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America's

(defendant) motion for summary judgment; and the other denying

plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiff leased the premises and operated a business selling

luxury outerwear and fur garments, in addition to garment cleaning,

storage, and repair services. Plaintiff obtained a commercial

insurance policy from defendant covering certain losses pertaining

to that business. The effective date of the insurance policy was

from October 31, 2011 to October 31, 2012.

In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy knocked down certain

electrical transformers, which disrupted the power supply, and

caused plaintiff to close its business. Plaintiff filed an

insurance claim with defendant seeking coverage associated with

its business interruption. Defendant disclaimed coverage, and

plaintiff filed this complaint.

In pre-trial discovery, plaintiff produced documents

establishing that its business was closed due to the power outage

from October 29, 2012 through November 5, 2012. Defendant, relying

on a "Power Pac Endorsement" in the insurance policy, tendered

plaintiff $2500 for the business loss. Although plaintiff sought

coverage for more than $2500, defendant concluded that this payment

constituted the maximum amount of insurance coverage for the

business interruption. In issuing the orders under review, the

2 A-0170-15T1 judge agreed with defendant's interpretation of the insurance

policy and rendered a comprehensive written decision in which he

analyzed the pertinent policy language.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the language of the insurance

policy is ambiguous; the insurance policy is an "all risk" policy

and the burden of proving an exclusion rests with defendant;

plaintiff is entitled to insurance coverage under the civil

authority section of the policy; and defendant breached its

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Summary judgment may be granted when, considering the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c); see

also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540

(1995). When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this

court applies "the same standard governing the trial court." Oyola

v. Liu, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 497 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 216

N.J. 86 (2013).

The interpretation of insurance contracts is a matter of law

and subject to de novo review. Sealed Air Corp. v. Royal Indem.

Co., 404 N.J. Super. 363, 375 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 196

N.J. 601 (2008). This court owes no deference to the motion

judge's conclusions on issues of law. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.

3 A-0170-15T1 Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Here, the

question on appeal is a legal issue pertaining to the insurance

policy language.

"Insurance policies are construed in accordance with

principles that govern the interpretation of contracts; the

parties' agreement 'will be enforced as written when its terms are

clear in order that the expectations of the parties will be

fulfilled.'" Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J.

512, 525 (2012) (quoting Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432,

441 (2010)). "The terms of insurance contracts are given their

'plain and ordinary meaning,' with ambiguities resolved in favor

of the insured." Ibid. (quoting Flomerfelt, supra, 202 N.J. at

441). Therefore, insurance policies "should be construed

liberally in [the insured's] favor to the end that coverage is

afforded to the full extent that any fair interpretation will

allow." Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 121 N.J. 530, 537 (1990)

(alteration in original) (quoting Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life

Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 482 (1961)).

"Although courts should construe insurance policies in favor

of the insured, they 'should not write for the insured a better

policy of insurance than the one purchased.'" Ibid. (quoting

Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 116 N.J. 517, 529

(1989)). "[I]nsurance contracts are to be construed in a manner

4 A-0170-15T1 that recognizes the reasonable expectation of the insured."

Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J. Super. 421, 429 (App.

Div. 2004). Moreover, "[w]hen an insurance carrier puts in issue

its coverage of a loss under a contract of insurance by relying

on an exclusionary clause, it bears a substantial burden of

demonstrating that the loss falls outside the scope of coverage."

United Rental Equip. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 74 N.J.

92, 99 (1977).

Pursuant to the Business Income and Extra Expense section of

the insurance policy, defendant would have been obligated to pay

for actual loss of business income caused by the direct physical

loss of or damage to the property at the described premises.

Plaintiff alleged, however, that the business loss resulted from

the downed transformers offsite, not direct physical damage to the

leased premises.

Moreover, the insurance policy also expressly excluded loss

or damage caused "directly or indirectly" by the "failure or

fluctuation" of power or other utility services "if the cause of

the failure or fluctuation occurs away from the described

premises." The policy stated in relevant part:

B. EXCLUSIONS

1. We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded

5 A-0170-15T1 regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. These exclusions apply whether or not the loss event results in widespread damage or affects a substantial area.

. . . .

e. Utility Services

The failure or fluctuation of power or other utility service supplied to the described premises, however caused, if the cause of the failure or fluctuation occurs away from the described premises.

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Related

Pickett v. Lloyd's
621 A.2d 445 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1993)
Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co.
859 A.2d 694 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2004)
Flomerfelt v. Cardiello
997 A.2d 991 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2010)
United Rental Equipment Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins.
376 A.2d 1183 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1977)
Sealed Air Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co.
961 A.2d 1195 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2008)
Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance
170 A.2d 22 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1961)
Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee of the Township of Manalapan
658 A.2d 1230 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1995)
Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co.
562 A.2d 208 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1989)
Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of New Jersey
582 A.2d 1257 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1990)
Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
666 A.2d 146 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1995)
Oyola v. Xing Lan Liu
70 A.3d 744 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2013)
Memorial Properties, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance
46 A.3d 525 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2012)

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ROBINHOOD PLAZA, INC. VS. CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY(L-5825-10, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinhood-plaza-inc-vs-city-council-of-the-city-of-jersey-njsuperctappdiv-2017.