Robiner v. Demczyk

269 B.R. 167, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 467, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18362, 2001 WL 1402195
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedOctober 24, 2001
Docket5:01 CV 1129, 5:01 CV 1130, 5:01 CV 1131. Bankruptcy Nos. 00-52012, 95-50187, 93-51659
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 269 B.R. 167 (Robiner v. Demczyk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robiner v. Demczyk, 269 B.R. 167, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 467, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18362, 2001 WL 1402195 (N.D. Ohio 2001).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DOWD, District Judge.

The above-captioned bankruptcy appeals were filed in the Bankruptcy Court by the U.S. Trustee, Donald M. Robiner, on April 5, 2001. They were subsequently docketed in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio and later consolidated. 1 This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, which would ordinarily be taken to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 2 because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1)(A), 3 the appellant filed his election. (Bank.Doc. No. 35). 4 For the reasons set forth below, the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED in all three appeals.

These appeals are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 5 The U.S. Trustee is *169 appealing orders of Bankruptcy Judge Marilyn Shea-Stonum entered on March 26, 2001 and November 28, 2000 in the Chapter 12 cases of In re Dale R. Brookover, 259 B.R. 884 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 2001); In re Montgomery Farms, 259 B.R. 884 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 2001); and In re Jack Guilitto, 259 B.R. 884 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 2001). 6

On June 4, 2001, the Appellant filed his brief. Not surprisingly, there has been no response in any form from the “Appellee,” Michael V. Demczyk. 7

The record on appeal shows a letter dated November 7, 2000 from the United States Trustee (the “UST”) to the Chapter 12 Standing Trustee (the “Trustee”). (Bankr.Doc. No. 14). 8 In the letter, which was copied to all of the bankruptcy judges (Bankr.Doc. No. 15) and others, the UST accepted the Trustee’s letter of resignation effective November 30, 2000. 9 The letter also indicated that notice of the resignation (and of appointment of the UST as interim trustee) would be filed in each Chapter 12 case.

On November 28, 2000, Bankruptcy Judge Marilyn Shea-Stonum issued the following order in all three Chapter 12 cases:

Michael V. Demczyk is the Standing Chapter 12.Trustee in this case. The Court recently received correspondence from Donald M. Robiner, United States Trustee, Ohio/Michigan Region 9, which consists of two letters dated November 7, 2000 (the “Letters”) (Docket Nos. 14 and 15). The Letters raise a question about whether Mr. Demczyk wishes to continue to serve as the Chapter 12 Trustee. If a change is requested, the Court will await a motion filed and served on all parties in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 324. Mr. Demczyk is to continue to carry out his responsibilities in this case, absent a Court Order to the contrary.

(Bankr.Doc. No. 16).

On December 7, 2000, the UST filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, urging that “the Bankruptcy Code and Rules do not support the Court’s apparent contention that a removal action under section 324 is the exclusive means for a trustee to vacate his or her position.” (Bankr.Doc. No. 17, at 3). The UST also stated that

the Court’s requirement of a motion to remove if applied to all resignations would unduly burden the Courts and the Bankruptcy System. Panel and standing trustees often resign from individual cases because of conflicts of interest. *170 The filing of a motion to remove would be impracticable and would delay the appointment of a successor trustee. This delay could create problems for the successor trustee, who must operate under strict deadlines. E.g., Fed.R.Bankr. P.2003 (time for 341 meeting), 4003 (exemptions), 4004 (objection to discharge).

(Id. at 4).

On February 16, 2001, Judge Shea-Sto-num conducted a hearing on the motion for reconsideration. There, she stated the crux of the issue in her mind:

THE COURT: Okay, now at issue here is [sic] my mind is not whether Mr. Demczyk can be forced to continue to serve in cases where he was initially appointed, but rather the appropriate channels for the resignation. Mr. Ro-biner says, I have accepted your resignation. In his letter, he says I have accepted your resignation. I, the U.S. Trustee, believe I have the power to say you can resign from pending cases that are on a particular judge’s docket. That is the rub for me. Trustees can and do resign. There is no question in my mind that in terms of Mr. Demczyk’s appointment to any additional Chapter 12 cases — that’s the U.S. Trustee’s business. The U.S. Trustee can decide that Mr. Demczyk will not be appointed to newly filed cases. Congress has taken bankruptcy judges out of the business of the initial appointment of trustees. But once a trustee is serving in a pending case, please tell me how the U.S. Trustee views that individual. Is that individual not then an officer of the Court? And if somebody is going to accept the resignation of that individual, is it not the judge who accepts the resignation of the individual?

(Tr. at 4-5, Bankr.Doc. No. 39) (emphasis added). Counsel for the UST indicated in response that, since the UST had the appointing power, he also had the power to accept the resignation of the Trustee. To that, the Bankruptcy Judge responded, in relevant part:

... reading the correspondence that Mr. Robiner ... shared — with me, Mr. Ro-biner appears to have said, we’re going to approach the Chapter 12 case load in a different matter [sic], going forward. Fine. He can do that. You know, it presumably is within his prerogative to do that with respect to newly filed cases. But in cases that are on my docket — and you have to understand I take a very, very strong view that once somebody is involved in a case, I expect the person who got started in that case to discharge the obligations in that case. I feel very strongly that the bankruptcy system has enough inefficiencies that you can’t just have people waltzing in and waltzing out.... Counsel are — when counsel come into a case, they come into the case until the case is closed or until they have been allowed to resign from their position in that case on motion to the Court.
That reflects this Court’s local rules. That reflects the view of Courts around the country that once a party — once somebody has become engaged as an officer of the Court in a pending case, you can’t just say, well you know what, I’m tired of this, I’m moving on.
So I view this through the lens of the officer of the Court seeking to resign from a pending case.

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269 B.R. 167, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 467, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18362, 2001 WL 1402195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robiner-v-demczyk-ohnd-2001.