Robin Lynn Cain v. Commonwealth of Virginia
This text of Robin Lynn Cain v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Robin Lynn Cain v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Duff Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
ROBIN LYNN CAIN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2737-97-4 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY SEPTEMBER 29, 1998 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHENANDOAH COUNTY Perry W. Sarver, Judge Designate David H. N. Bean for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Robin Lynn Cain (defendant) was convicted by a jury for
felonious petit larceny pursuant to Code § 18.2-104. On appeal,
defendant complains that the evidence failed to establish that
all prior convictions necessary to the subject offense resulted
from prosecutions during which she was assisted by counsel.
Finding no error, we affirm the verdict.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary for
disposition of the appeal.
During trial, the Commonwealth offered several exhibits to
prove the requisite prior larceny convictions. Over defendant's
objection, the court admitted into evidence a certified and
authenticated copy of a "Warrant of Arrest," together with the * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. related order of the Fairfax County General District Court, which
established a previous conviction of defendant for petit larceny
in that jurisdiction. The preprinted form reflected a check mark
at the words "Defendant's Attorney (Name)," without naming
counsel, and illegible notations below "Attorney for the
Accused." The order also assessed "Costs" of $100 for a "Court
Appointed Attorney." Nevertheless, defendant contends that the
exhibit failed to establish that she was represented by counsel
in such prosecution, although she presented no evidence on the
issue during the guilt phase of trial. It is well established that, "[a] previous misdemeanor conviction attended by incarceration is constitutionally offensive and may support neither guilt nor enhanced punishment for a later offense, unless the accused either waived or was represented by counsel in the earlier proceeding." 1 However, when . . . a prior conviction is collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceeding, "the Commonwealth is entitled to a presumption of regularity which attends the prior conviction because 'every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done, till the contrary appears[,]'" "'[e]ven when a collateral attack on a final conviction rests on constitutional grounds . . . .'" Thus, unless the defendant presents evidence rebutting the presumption of regularity, by which it may be presumed that the conviction was obtained in compliance with the defendant's right to counsel, the Commonwealth has satisfied its burden of proving that the prior conviction was valid and, therefore, was admissible to establish a third offense in order to enhance
1 The briefs presuppose that incarceration attended the prior misdemeanor conviction, although the record is unclear.
- 2 - punishment. 2
Samuels v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 119, 123-24, 497 S.E.2d 873,
875 (1998) (citations omitted); see Harris v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. App. 794, 803-04, 497 S.E.2d 165, 169-70 (1998); Nicely v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 579, 583-84, 490 S.E.2d 281, 283
(1997).
Here, the prior conviction in dispute was clearly clothed
with the presumption of regularity, unrebutted by defendant
during trial. Moreover, like Samuels, the instant record supports the trial court's implicit finding that defendant was
actually represented by counsel in the earlier proceeding. Under
such circumstances, the trial court properly received the exhibit
into evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
2 Defendant's testimony at the sentencing phase of trial was immaterial to the jury's previous finding of guilt. Tyler v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 702, 709, 467 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1996).
- 3 -
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