Robin Kimbell v. Stephen Benner
This text of Robin Kimbell v. Stephen Benner (Robin Kimbell v. Stephen Benner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 24 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN DUBOC KIMBELL, No. 18-56260
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-04767-FMO-SS
v. MEMORANDUM* STEPHEN BENNER, Doctor; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 15, 2019**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Robin Duboc Kimbell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her civil rights action seeking to recoup funds that were seized by the
federal government in connection with her ex-husband’s criminal proceedings. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). sua sponte dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kimbell’s claims against the judicial
and prosecutorial defendants because these defendants are entitled to judicial
immunity or quasi-judicial immunity. See Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,
1133-34 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing judicial immunity, factors relevant to whether
an act is judicial in nature, and extension of judicial immunity to officials other
than judges “who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed the remainder of Kimbell’s action
because Kimbell failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” and conclusory allegations are not entitled to be
assumed true) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Raditch v.
United States, 929 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (procedural due process requires
“notice and an opportunity to respond in some manner”).
Kimbell’s motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum of law
(Docket Entry No. 11) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
2 18-56260
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