NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0139-24
ROBIN COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KARL COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Argued March 5, 2026 – Decided April 30, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FM-01-0379-23.
Karl Coleman, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf.
Kelly T. McGriff (Kelly McGriff Law, LLC) argued the cause for respondent.
PER CURIAM Defendant Karl Coleman appeals from a July 16, 2024 final judgment of
divorce, which dissolved his marriage with plaintiff Robin Coleman, allocated
the parties' debts and assets, and awarded defendant alimony. We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part for the reasons expressed in this opinion .
I.
We derive the facts from the record and the court's decision entered
following a four-day trial.
A. Trial Testimony
The parties were in a long-term marriage and were each sixty-three years
old at the time of trial. One child was born of the marriage, who is now an adult.
Plaintiff also has three adult children from a prior relationship.
In 1985, plaintiff began working for the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division), and as a result of her service, qualified for a pension.
In 1997, she purchased a home in Egg Harbor Township, where she lived with
her three older children.
Defendant worked as a construction laborer while attending college. In
1984, he graduated with a bachelor's degree but continued working as a laborer.
He joined Laborers' International Union of North America (Laborers'
International) and Laborers' Local 415 (Local 415) and had premarital pensions
A-0139-24 2 with each union. One month before his marriage to plaintiff, he joined Laborers'
Local 1174 (Local 1174) and later vested in its pension system.
After the parties married in 2000, defendant moved into plaintiff's home,
where he resided for almost the entirety of their marriage and throughout the
divorce litigation. When they married, plaintiff was employed with the Division
and earned approximately $40,000 per year, and defendant earned about $600
per week from his work with Local 1174. For the duration of the marriage,
plaintiff provided defendant with health insurance through her employment.
Shortly after they were married, plaintiff began a two-year master's
program in social work. Her degree was paid for by the State through her
employment with the Division. The program allowed plaintiff to attend school
full-time and receive half of her salary.
As a result, plaintiff struggled to pay her bills and sought financial
assistance from defendant, but he did not contribute, leaving her to pay
expenses, including the mortgage, property taxes, utilities, and costs of
childcare. By the time plaintiff obtained her master's degree in 2002, her car
had been repossessed and her premarital home was headed into foreclosure,
prompting her to declare bankruptcy.
A-0139-24 3 The parties both testified they kept many of their finances separate in the
earlier part of their marriage, with each paying for their respective auto
insurance policies, cell phone plans, credit cards, and tax debts. Plaintiff
claimed she paid the mortgage on the home for the entirety of the marriage.
Defendant paid the electric bill for most of their marriage.
In 2015, the parties separated, and defendant temporarily moved out of
the home until they reconciled five months later. Upon their reconciliation,
defendant began giving her $900 per month for bills. She would deposit the
money into a "household account" and use it to pay living expenses. The parties
purchased an auto insurance policy together and added their daughter to the plan.
In 2020, plaintiff added defendant to the home's deed in order to qualify for
credit to purchase solar panels.
Defendant testified he contributed throughout the marriage and they
"basically split everything." He claimed plaintiff's poor financial decisions
caused her money troubles at various points in their marriage. During those
times, he would loan plaintiff money, pay for her gas, and buy her lunch. From
the start of the marriage, he recounted he paid plaintiff $900 each month for
household expenses and bills, while plaintiff paid $1,100 towards the monthly
A-0139-24 4 mortgage. He stated he helped whenever plaintiff failed to pay their monthly
expenses.
Defendant disapproved of how much plaintiff spent on her adult children,
including their daughter. By May 2023, plaintiff accumulated approximately
$18,000 in credit card debt. The debt was normal for plaintiff but she noted
some of it belonged to their daughter. Defendant described his monthly
expenses, including approximately $162 for dog food and $300 for restaurants.
In 2018, defendant retired at the age of fifty-seven, explaining "[t]hirty-
nine years as a laborer is a lot," and he did "the hardest work in the construction
field." He had a rotator cuff and knee injury, sleep apnea, plantar fasciitis,
sciatica, and hypertension. Defendant testified he could not return to work as a
laborer "because the contractors want younger guys . . . pouring concrete and
working with bricklayers and . . . at this age you can't do it."
Upon retirement, defendant received a $50,000 annuity and used it, in
part, to make repairs to the home, including replacing the gutters and windows,
installing insulation, planting a tree line, building a fence, painting, maintaining
the pool, and building a gazebo. He made most of the repairs himself.
Defendant also began receiving payments from his three pensions and Social
Security, which total $5,461 per month.
A-0139-24 5 In January 2020, plaintiff retired from the Division. At the time, she
earned approximately $103,000 per year. She began receiving a pension
payment of $5,276 per month, which was reduced by $724.39 to pay back a
pension loan. The loan balance was less than $3,000 in 2024.
In October 2020, plaintiff accepted part-time employment earning
$75,000 per year with discretionary bonuses and profit-sharing. Her
compensation totaled $114,747.78 in 2023. Two paystubs from April 2024
show plaintiff's semi-monthly net pay was $4,907.03 and $3,183.93,
respectively. At trial, plaintiff estimated her gross monthly income from all
sources was $14,116. She intended to retire after their daughter completed
graduate school.
The parties' daughter graduated college in May 2023. Plaintiff paid for
her to live in off-campus housing for her senior year. She also paid for food,
sorority dues, and club fees. Plaintiff did not request any contribution from
defendant. These expenses totaled $1,033 per month. At the time of trial, their
daughter resided in New York City and attended graduate school at Columbia
University, which she funded with a scholarship and a loan. Plaintiff also gave
the daughter a biweekly allowance of $600.
A-0139-24 6 In July 2023, defendant retained an appraiser who valued the parties' home
at $240,000. As of May 2024, the mortgage balance was $120,110.18. The
parties stipulated to the appraiser's expertise, and he testified at trial.
Defendant expressed his desire to purchase plaintiff's equity in the home
because she was better financially equipped to purchase a new home than he
was. If the court declined to permit him to purchase plaintiff's equity, he
preferred the home be sold because he believed it would yield greater proceeds.
However, when the court asked defendant how much he was willing to offer for
plaintiff's equity, defendant could not determine a number, asserting the home
value increased since its appraisal so a new appraisal was needed. Plaintiff
explained the home held sentimental value to her and she wanted to buy out
defendant's equity. She offered to pay defendant one-half of the net equity,
defined as the appraised value less the mortgage divided by two.
B. The Trial Court's Findings and Decision
The trial court found plaintiff and the appraiser credible and "believed . . .
most, if not all, of what [defendant] said, too." However, the court noted the
case did not revolve around credibility. The most complicated part of the case
was that the parties were "in the twilight years of their earning capacities." The
major issues were the alimony and "equitable distribution, primarily of the
A-0139-24 7 home, but to some degree of the retirement vehicles," which were "intimately
intertwined."
The court addressed the equitable distribution statutory factors in N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23.1, which findings we need not repeat here. We simply highlight the
court's salient findings.
The court found although both parties were generally healthy, defendant's
age and health issues due to his prior employment impacted both equitable
distribution and alimony. Although plaintiff owned her home prior to the
marriage, the court also considered she put defendant's name on the deed as well
as the repairs and renovations defendant made to the home. Even though the
parties disputed the extent of defendant's role in repairing the home, "there is
[no] question that both parties treated that home as their own . . . long before
[defendant's] name was ever put on the deed." For these reasons, the court found
defendant "entitled to a substantial portion of the equity in the home." Because
the parties' pensions were in pay status, the court noted it would consider them
in its alimony calculation.
The court found the parties live a middle-class lifestyle. Plaintiff clearly
"earned substantially more than" defendant in the latter part of their marriage.
The parties had "pooled their incomes" and had an "arrangement in which they
A-0139-24 8 both contributed, [though] not equally, . . . throughout their marriage to the
carrying costs of their marital budget."
The court analyzed the parties' marital lifestyle budgets and needs in their
Case Information Statements. It quantified the marital lifestyle at approximately
$6,000 per month. The court observed although plaintiff's expenses were
greater, they were mostly due to her daughter who, once graduated, would
reduce plaintiff's expenses and allow both parties to live comparably with the
marital lifestyle.
The court found the parties contributed to each other's earning power by
working together as a "marital unit." They likewise each contributed to the
marital home as the court had noted previously. The court evaluated the parties'
claims related to the value of the home. It was "puzzled" by defendant's position
he wanted to buy out plaintiff because he did not make an effort to value the
property and could not articulate a buyout figure to the court. As for the marital
debt, the court observed plaintiff was "willing to take on a disproportionate share
of the debts and liabilities of the parties," which it would consider in its analysis.
Pursuant to its equitable distribution analysis, the court ordered the parties
to retain their respective vehicles and maintain their own bank accounts and
debts. It noted the parties agreed to split their tangible property, and, if needed,
A-0139-24 9 they would mediate the issue. It ordered an equal distribution of the marital
portion of any retirement or investment funds plaintiff accumulated with her
current employer as of the date of the complaint for divorce.
The court noted the parties' federal tax liability would be resolved as
placed on the record at trial, which was that plaintiff would be bearing more of
the debt. It ordered any remaining joint State tax debt to be split equally and
paid from the equity in the marital home. The court ordered the parties to pay
their daughter's college loan equally for three years, after which the daughter
would assume the payment.
As for the home, based on the trial evidence, the court permitted
defendant, at his expense, to have the appraiser re-appraise the home. It then
granted plaintiff the right of first refusal to buy out defendant's interest in the
home by giving him a written offer within ten days of the appraisal. If plaintiff
did not exercise her right, then defendant would have ten days to give her a
written buyout offer. And if neither party exercised their right to a buyout, the
home would be sold, with the net proceeds apportioned sixty percent to plaintiff
and forty percent to defendant.
The court found the marital retirement assets could not simply be divided
equally because defendant who has a
A-0139-24 10 stream of funds through his retirement, which primarily are premarital, would be receiving a pretty good share of [plaintiff]'s retirement funds. And [plaintiff] would be left with a much smaller cash flow from her retirement fund than [defendant] would be. And that may work now because [the court] can adjust [for] . . . [plaintiff]'s income[,] but it's not going to work in the long run.
Considering "all of the equitable distribution factors" and accounting for
its alimony analysis, the court concluded each party would retain their own
premarital and marital retirement assets and loans thereon free and clear of an
equitable distribution to, or contribution by, the other party. The court found,
after plaintiff paid off her debt and retires, "the amount of money [she] will be
receiving from her retirement vehicle is fairly equal [to and] within a few
hundred dollars of the amount of cash flow [defendant] will be receiving from
his three retirement vehicles."
The court next addressed the alimony statutory factors under N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(b). It adopted its relevant findings from its equitable distribution
analysis, including the marital lifestyle findings. Again we need not repeat the
court's findings under every factor.
As for needs, the court credited defendant's argument his budget would
increase after he lost his health insurance through plaintiff’s employment. It
A-0139-24 11 found plaintiff would have the ability to pay for health insurance as long as she
remained with her current employer.
The court found defendant could not return to work as a full-time laborer
but could earn an income. Given defendant's age, work history, absence from
the job market, and his Social Security, the court imputed $22,320 per year to
him, less than minimum wage, accepting defendant could not earn more than
that sum without a reduction in Social Security.
The court then addressed factor four, the "standard of living established
in the marriage," restating its finding the joint lifestyle was $6,000 per month.
For factor five, the "earning capacity, educational levels, vocational skills[,] and
employ[ability] of the parties," although the court found plaintiff had a greater
earning capacity than defendant, it "d[id not] expect that[ to] last[] forever,"
because she was sixty-three years old, "had already retired once," and testified
"she took [her current] job as a way to help her children." Consistent with its
equitable distribution findings, the court found both parties made financial and
non-financial contributions to the marriage.
The court emphasized its finding under the equitable distribution factors
that defendant had a stream of income from his pensions, which it noted was a
significant factor in the alimony award. Although there was no pendente lite
A-0139-24 12 support paid to defendant, the court observed plaintiff had "the lion's share of
the parties' liabilities and . . . costs of the marital expense."
The court reiterated defendant's monthly receipts from all sources totaled
"$5,461, which is close to carrying his own budget." It found the $22,320
income it imputed to defendant would amount to $1,395 each month if tax -
effected at a twenty-five percent rate. Thus, defendant would have a total
monthly income of $6,856 and arguably no need for alimony. However, the
court observed defendant's budget did not consider that he would have to acquire
new health insurance, which would cost him approximately $1,000 per month.
The court also considered that in less than two years, defendant would be sixty -
five and eligible for Medicare at little to no cost.
The court found plaintiff earned approximately $7,219 per month. It
reached this figure by averaging plaintiff's net income from the prior two years.
After repayment of her pension loan, plaintiff would have $3,956 per month in
pension income. Thus, plaintiff's net income would be approximately $11,175
per month. The court noted plaintiff did not intend to continue working and
would likely work for only the "next couple of years" to help her daughter pay
for graduate school. It reasoned as follows:
[The court] d[id]n't want to say, [plaintiff], as long as you are working, you are going to be paying X, and it
A-0139-24 13 doesn't make sense to her to keep working at that level. [The court] d[id]n't want to give her disincentive . . . to leave what seems to be [a] fairly lucrative job, and again, no disrespect intended to [the parties], . . . who are . . . in the twilight years of their earning potential. . . . She is at a time in her life where people like to start thinking about retirement . . . but [she] was given this opportunity and took it.
The court also did not want plaintiff to quit her job for feeling like she
was working only to give the "lion's share to" defendant. It credited defendant's
testimony that "if the parties had disagreements over anything, it was over how
the[y] . . . spent their money." It continued:
Oddly enough, . . . that's a factor that's important to [the court's] analysis. Because it wasn't your typical ["]let's throw all our money into one account["] and ["]let's just make decisions together.["] They clearly[,] for [twenty-]some years[,] coexisted where [plaintiff] made more than [defendant]. She contributed a disproportionate share [to] the cost of their life[style], but she had money that [was] leftover and she had . . . boxes from Amazon coming, and she sent money to her adult children from another relationship, and she did things for [their daughter] that [defendant] didn't necessarily agree with. But that was her lifestyle. The lifestyle was th[at] extra money wasn't banked. It wasn't put away into an account where they shared. . . . She used it in a way that made her happy. And [the court] believe[s] that that was part of their lifestyle . . . .
The court noted it did not give a great amount of weight to this consideration,
but it was in the "back of [the court's] mind" in fashioning an alimony award.
A-0139-24 14 The court concluded defendant was entitled to a "nominal amount of
alimony." Commencing with the sale or buyout of the marital home, the court
ordered plaintiff to pay defendant alimony of $400 per month until she retired.
Regardless of plaintiff's retirement, the court ordered alimony payable at least
until April 28, 2026, when defendant turned sixty-five and qualified for
Medicare. It ruled "alimony is going to be terminated effective the day of her
retirement, as long as that occurs subsequent to May 1[], 2026."
II.
"[F]indings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-
12 (1998). This court "do[es] not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of
witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J.
Super. 286, 293 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Mountain Hill, LLC v. Twp. of
Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. Div. 2008)). This is because the
Family Part has "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," which
often requires the exercise of reasoned discretion. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413. If
this court concludes there is satisfactory evidentiary support for the trial court's
findings, "its task is complete and it should not disturb the result." Beck v. Beck,
86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)).
A-0139-24 15 "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely
testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412
(quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). This is
because the trial court "hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and]
hears them testify," affording them "a better perspective than a reviewing court
in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Id. at 412 (alteration in original)
(quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
This court does not "accord the same deference to a trial [court's] legal
determinations. Rather, all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci,
448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted) (citing Reese v.
Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). "[L]egal conclusions, and
the application of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to our plenary
review." Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568.
Alimony awards are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. S.W. v. G.M.,
462 N.J. Super. 522, 530 (App. Div. 2020). The Family Part also has broad
discretion to allocate assets in equitable distribution. Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J.
Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 2012). The breadth of this discretion also includes the
allocation of debt. See Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 566-67 (App. Div.
A-0139-24 16 1986). Income imputation decisions are also discretionary. Storey v. Storey,
373 N.J. Super. 464, 474 (App. Div. 2004).
A.
Defendant asserts the equitable distribution of the pensions was an abuse
of discretion. The parties had agreed to QDRO 1 the pensions and were ordered
to retain an actuary to prepare the QDROs. However, he contends the court did
not give them time to retain the actuary. Defendant claims when trial
commenced, the only issue left to be addressed was alimony, yet the court also
addressed equitable distribution notwithstanding the parties agreement
otherwise.
Defendant further contends the court ignored the law by refusing to apply
the coverture fraction to determine how the pensions should be distributed. He
claims the court violated the three-step process for equitable distribution
articulated in Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974).
Defendant argues the trial court's reasoning for its decision on the pension
issue was unsupported by the evidence. The court improperly focused on
plaintiff's future financial needs rather than the current value of her assets and
income. It speculated about when plaintiff would retire and her retirement
1 Qualified Domestic Relations Order. A-0139-24 17 income without determining the actual amount of her income in retirement.
Defendant contends the evidence shows plaintiff would have more than enough
income from her pension and Social Security to meet her needs and the martial
lifestyle thereby contradicting the court's analysis of her cash flow.
Defendant further asserts the court did not consider N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
23.1(f), the economic circumstances of the parties at the time the division of
property became effective, in its decision. If the court had done so, it would
have found plaintiff earns $180,000 a year, meaning her income is around
$12,000 a month, or $6,000 more than the marital lifestyle. On the other hand,
defendant earns only $72,000 a year, which equates to around $5,400 per month,
and is $700 short of the $6,000 marital lifestyle. Defendant also claims the court
erroneously imputed income to him and ignored that it would require him to
rejoin the workforce after seven years of retirement.
Defendant argues the court failed to properly apply the equitable
distribution factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1, did not make detailed
findings of fact, and ignored and misrepresented the evidence. Regarding factor
(b), he asserts the court failed to make specific findings about his health
conditions or how those conditions would impact his future employability.
A-0139-24 18 As to factor (c), defendant asserts the court erred in relying only on the
fact plaintiff had a higher income than him in determining she contributed more
financially during the marriage. The court did not account for the fact much of
plaintiff's income went to her numerous debts and that she struggled to pay her
bills, which evidenced she did not contribute a disproportionate amount to the
marital finances.
Defendant contends the court failed to make findings of facts sufficient to
support its analysis of factor (d). He argues the court's finding plaintiff
contributed more financially to the parties' lifestyle is unsupported by the
evidence, which showed the parties split expenses equally.
As to factor (f), defendant maintains the court should not have considered
the parties' hypothetical financial circumstances three to five years in the future,
and instead, it should have considered their financial status as of the date of the
complaint. He asserts the court's findings under factor (g) contradicted its
alimony analysis and findings because it acknowledged it would not be fair to
require defendant to recreate himself, acquire new training, and reenter the
workforce, as he was already retired and of an older age.
A-0139-24 19 B.
Defendant insists we must not defer to the trial court's alimony
determination because its findings were unsupported by the record. See State v.
Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990). He argues it did not make specific findings
on the parties' health or their standard of living under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(3)
and (4). Defendant asserts the court did not make the necessary findings under
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(9) and merely proclaimed plaintiff financially contributed
more to the marriage than he because she earned more than him.
Defendant further contends the parties established and maintained a
lifestyle in retirement that did not anticipate defendant's return to the workforce.
He maintains, considering the length of time he was absent from the workforce,
his health issues, his limited technical skills, and plaintiff's clear ability to
financially support him, any finding by the court indicating defendant could
rejoin the workforce and imputing an income to him was reversible error and
contrary to the purpose of the alimony statute.
Defendant urges us to remand to a different trial court because the court
was prejudiced against him throughout the trial. He also asks us to invoke
original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5 to determine the pension issue and
QDRO the retirement assets.
A-0139-24 20 C.
Alimony and equitable distribution are interrelated. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
23(b)(10) (requiring the court to consider the equitable distribution awarded and
any direct or indirect payouts on equitable distribution when determining the
type and amount of alimony); Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 324 (1992)
(noting the intimate relationship of equitable distribution and support ).
Our review of equitable distribution determinations is narrow. Valentino
v. Valentino, 309 N.J. Super. 334, 339 (App. Div. 1998). We decide only
whether the trial court "mistakenly exercised its broad authority to divide the
parties' property and whether the result was 'reached by the trial judge on the
evidence, or whether it is clearly unfair or unjustly distorted by a misconception
of law or findings of fact that are contrary to the evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting
Wadlow v. Wadlow, 200 N.J. Super. 372, 382 (App. Div. 1985)). "A sharp
departure from reasonableness must be demonstrated before our intercession can
be expected." Wadlow, 200 N.J. Super. at 382 (quoting Perkins v. Perkins, 159
N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1978)).
"[T]he goal of equitable distribution . . . is to effect a fair division of
marital assets." Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 299 (2005) (omission in
original) (quoting Steneken v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div.
A-0139-24 21 2004)). The trial court must identify the assets subject to equitable distribution,
value the assets as of the date of the complaint, and determine how the assets
should be distributed between the parties. Rothman, 65 N.J. at 232. Pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1, the Legislature has provided sixteen factors the trial
court must utilize in making an equitable distribution.
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 "reflects a public policy that is 'at least in part an
acknowledgment that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that
in many ways . . . is akin to a partnership.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J.
269, 284 (2016) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 361 (1977)) (additional
internal quotation marks omitted). The statute "advance[s] the policy of
promoting equity and fair dealing between divorcing spouses." Barr v. Barr,
418 N.J. Super. 18, 45 (App. Div. 2011). "This requires evaluation of unique
facts attributed to each asset." Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 358
(App. Div. 2017).
Equitable distribution does not mean an equal distribution. See Rothman,
65 N.J. at 232 n.6. "N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1[] requires an equitable distribution be
'designed to advance the policy of promoting equity and fair dealing between
divorcing spouses.'" M.G., 457 N.J. Super. at 295 (quoting Barr, 418 N.J. Super.
at 45). "This policy is best implemented by evaluating the facts and evidence
A-0139-24 22 associated with each asset." Ibid. An appellate court's review is constrained to
determining whether the Family Part's decision was based on sufficient, credible
evidence in the record, and if it considered the controlling legal principles. See
id. at 294.
The purpose of an alimony award is to "assist the supported spouse in
achieving a lifestyle that is reasonably comparable to the one enjoyed while
living with the supporting spouse during the marriage." Crews v. Crews, 164
N.J. 11, 16 (2000). "The standard of living during the marriage is the way the
couple actually lived," taking into consideration whether parties "resorted to
borrowing . . . or if they limited themselves to their earned income." Hughes v.
Hughes, 311 N.J. Super. 15, 34 (App. Div. 1998).
Alimony is a right arising out of the marital relationship to maintain a
lifestyle in accordance with "the economic standard established during the
marriage as far as economic circumstances will allow." Aronson v. Aronson,
245 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 1991); see also Crews, 164 N.J. at 26-27
(explaining a court must consider the parties' need for new residences and
increased expenses associated with both parties maintaining a standard of living
"reasonably comparable" to their marital standard of living). As such, an award
A-0139-24 23 of alimony is not intended as a reward, punishment, or windfall for the receiving
party. Aronson, 245 N.J. at 364.
The marital lifestyle is important and is the measure used to establish
alimony. See S.W., 462 N.J. Super. at 532-33. The court must consider how
the parties actually lived during the marriage, calculate the money associated
with their lifestyle, and apportion money to the supported spouse in accordance
with those lifestyle figures. See id. at 532; Weishaus v. Weishaus, 360 N.J.
Super. 281, 290-91 (App. Div. 2003) ("[T]he trial court [should consider] . . .
the marital residence, vacation home[s], cars owned or leased, typical travel and
vacations each year, schools, special lessons, and camps for [the] children,
entertainment . . . , household help, and other personal services."), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 180 N.J. 131 (2004).
Notably, a lifestyle determination is not the end of inquiry. Crews
established after the court makes a finding on the parties' marital standard of
living, it "should review the adequacy and reasonableness of the support award
against this finding." 164 N.J. at 26. The court must always consider what is
equitable. Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J. Super. 357, 372 (App. Div. 2004).
Therefore, an alimony award is not solely based on a lifestyle finding, as there
are other considerations. See ibid.
A-0139-24 24 Having considered the record under our standard of review and guided by
the above principles, with one exception, we affirm the trial court's rulings
substantially for the reasons expressed in its comprehensive and cogent opinion.
We add the following comments.
The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding equitable distribution of
the pensions because the record shows the parties had not resolved that issue
through settlement. Given the parties' pensions were in pay status at the time of
trial, the trial court appropriately considered the cash flow generated from them
without utilizing a coverture formula because the court also had to decide the
interrelated alimony issue in light of the unique economic circumstances of the
parties' marriage where they did not pool income or assets.
The alimony calculation was sound, and we reject defendant's arguments
to the contrary as without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
However, we part company with the trial court insofar as its order allowed
for the termination of alimony upon plaintiff's retirement. Although defendant
did not raise this issue on appeal, it is subject to our de novo review because it
is a question of law.
To recapitulate, the court stated plaintiff's alimony obligation would
"automatically terminate" as early as May 1, 2026, if she elects to retire that day.
A-0139-24 25 It imposed an obligation on plaintiff to notify defendant thirty days before she
anticipates retiring. Plaintiff's counsel then sought clarification and asked the
court, "just in terms of the alimony, just so I am clear, [plaintiff] cannot file an
application to terminate alimony prior to May 1[ ], 2026. If she continues
working beyond [that date] that application may be denied[?]" The court
responded, "[c]orrect." However, it then proceeded to state plaintiff could move
to terminate alimony if she had a medical issue and noted "[a]nything after May
1[ ], 2026, she just needs to notify [defendant]. She doesn't have to file an
application [and] alimony [would] be terminated effective the day of her
retirement," provided it occurs after May 1, 2026.
Alimony does not automatically terminate upon an obligor's retirement or
early retirement. Indeed, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1) merely creates a rebuttable
presumption for termination and requires the trial court to make a written finding
whether the presumption has been overcome. In the context of an early
retirement, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(2) requires the obligor to file an application
showing the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good
faith. The court is then obligated to make the necessary findings. Ibid. At oral
argument before us, plaintiff's counsel conceded plaintiff would be obligated to
file a motion to terminate alimony upon retirement under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j).
A-0139-24 26 Accordingly, we remand for the court to enter an amended order requiring
plaintiff to move to terminate alimony at retirement.
III.
Finally, defendant's claims of bias were never raised before the trial court.
Regardless, they are unsupported by the record and lack sufficient merit to
warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The same
is true of defendant's remaining arguments that we have not addressed in this
opinion. Ibid.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for the entry of an
amended order consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0139-24 27