Robie Fisher Crawford Hinds v. George Hinds

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: March 9, 2005
• Docket: CA-0004-1358
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-1358

ROBIE FISHER CRAWFORD HINDS

VERSUS

GEORGE HINDS

**********

APPEAL FROM THE PINEVILLE CITY COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 4-0312 HONORABLE PHILLIP J. TERRELL, JR., CITY COURT JUDGE

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Jimmie C. Peters, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Richard E. Lee 810 Main Street Pineville, LA 71360 Telephone: (318) 448-1391 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - Robie Fisher Crawford Hinds

Andrew S. Vallien 801 Third Street Natchitoches, LA 71457 Telephone: (318) 357-0546 COUNSEL FOR: Defendant/Appellant - George Hinds THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this eviction case, the city court granted plaintiff, Robie Fisher

Crawford Hinds, through her duly appointed mandatary, Melvin J. Crawford, an

eviction of her husband, George Hinds, from the separate property of the late Mrs.

Hinds. The separate property was immovable property and the matrimonial domicile

of Mr. and Mrs. Hinds. Mr. and Mrs. Hinds were not divorced. Defendant, George

Hinds, appeals the judgment and asserts several issues including no right of action,

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and wrongful eviction. We reverse and vacate the

judgment of the city court based on the interspousal immunity set forth in La.R.S.

9:291.

I.

ISSUE

We will consider whether an eviction suit is barred by interspousal

immunity set forth by La.R.S. 9:291.

II.

FACTS

Defendant, George Hinds, and plaintiff, Robie Hinds, now deceased,1

lived in a mobile home on property owned by Mr. Hinds. In 1995, the Department

of Transportation and Development (DOTD) expropriated Mr. Hinds’ land and

agreed to move the mobile home free of charge, provided Mr. Hinds owned a tract of

1 Mrs. Hinds died during the pendency of this appeal. Melvin J. Crawford was appointed the executor of her succession, and our court substituted Mr. Crawford, as Executor of the Succession of Robie Fisher Crawford Hinds, as party plaintiff. We recognize that Mrs. Hinds’ death eviscerates interspousal immunity. Such a conclusion, however, does not negate the relationship of the parties which existed at the time of trial and at the time the judgment we are considering was signed. Thus, our analysis of interspousal immunity before Mrs. Hinds’ death and its impact on this case remains unchanged because of the substitution of Mr. Crawford as party plaintiff in his capacity as executor. The effect of our decision today terminates at Mrs. Hinds’ death.

1 land on which to place it. Mrs. Hinds transferred a tract of land that she acquired

from her previous marriage to Melvin Crawford, Sr., by quitclaim deed to Mr. Hinds

in order to have the costs of moving paid by the DOTD. The transfer was recorded

in the conveyance records. Once the costs to move were paid by the DOTD, the land

was transferred back to Mrs. Hinds by quitclaim deed and the transfer was again

recorded. This tract of land is the property from which Mrs. Hinds, through her duly

appointed mandatary, Melvin Crawford, sought eviction of Mr. Hinds, her husband.

The city court evicted Mr. Hinds. He appeals.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Mrs. Hinds petitioned the Pineville City Court for an eviction of her

husband, Mr. Hinds, from her separate property. Mrs. Hinds is presently married to

Mr. Hinds. In addition, the property at issue maintained the status of separate

property of Mrs. Hinds, as she received the land from the estate of her first husband,

Melvin Crawford, Sr. Therefore, the status of the land is not in dispute. See

La.Civ.Code. art. 2341.

In response to the eviction suit, Mr. Hinds filed an exception of no right

of action based on La.R.S. 9:291, which sets forth the general provision for

interspousal immunity. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:291 states:

Spouses may not sue each other except for causes of action pertaining to contracts or arising out of the provisions of Book III, Title VI of the Civil Code; for restitution of separate property; for divorce or declaration of nullity of the marriage; and for causes of action pertaining to spousal support or the support or custody of a child while the spouses are living separate and apart.

(Footnote omitted). Mrs. Hinds posits that the eviction suit is pursuant to La.R.S.

9:291 in that it is a “restitution of separate property” and, therefore, falls within one

2 of the exceptions to spousal immunity. The trial court incorrectly overruled the

exception of no right of action. Louisiana Civil Code Article 98 states that “[m]arried

persons owe each other fidelity, support, and assistance.” Article 98 incorporates the

basic principles of the marital relationship. We find the phrase “restitution of

separate property” does not contemplate an eviction proceeding as it is inconsistent

with the mutual duties of married persons and the interspousal immunity statute.

A similar situation was discussed in Purdy v. Purdy, 331 So.2d 868

(La.App. 2 Cir. 1976), where a husband, whose separate property served as the

marital domicile, sought to evict his wife. In Purdy, the second circuit explained,

“[t]o allow a husband to evict his wife by summary process from the marital domicile

prior to a judicial separation is . . . contrary to the Louisiana civil concept of

marriage.” Id. at 869. Furthermore, Purdy held “the action is illegal and contrary to

the public policy of this State.” Id.

To bolster the claim of falling into an exception, Mrs. Hinds relies

heavily on Cloud v. Cloud, 425 So.2d 329 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1982), where the court

allowed a suit in which the husband sought to have certain property declared separate

as opposed to community in light of an impending action for separation. However,

the plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced as this case is distinguishable from Cloud. The

issue in Cloud involved the status of the land in dispute, i.e., whether the land was

community or separate. There is no such dispute here. In addition, the suit in Cloud

was brought pursuant to La.R.S. 9:291, not as an eviction proceeding. In this

proceeding, Mrs. Hinds’ land maintained the status of separate property, and no

declaration was needed. Cloud is unpersuasive.

3 IV.

CONCLUSION

The eviction suit in this case is barred because of interspousal immunity

pursuant to La.R.S. 9:291. Mrs. Hinds does not have a right of action. It is

unnecessary to address the other issues brought up in this appeal, namely, subject

matter jurisdiction and wrongful eviction. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court.

All costs are assessed to Melvin J. Crawford, as Executor of the

Succession of Robie Fisher Crawford Hinds.