Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated

District Court, E.D. Louisiana·Decided October 3, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-00610·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

FELTON ADAM ROBICHAUX, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO: 22-CV-0610

VERSUS JUDGE DARREL JAMES PAPILLION

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INC., ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE MICHAEL NORTH

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant/Cross Defendant Uniroyal Holdings Incorporated (“Uniroyal”) and a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant/Cross Defendant Foster Wheeler, LLC (“Foster Wheeler”). R. Docs. 238 and 243. Uniroyal’s motion is opposed by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Cross Plaintiff Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (“Avondale”), and Foster Wheeler’s motion is opposed by Avondale and Plaintiffs Carolyn Robichaux, Scott Robichaux, and Tessa Robichaux (“Plaintiffs”). R. Docs. 263, 263, and 272. For the reasons assigned below, Uniroyal and Foster Wheeler’s motions are DENIED. BACKGROUND Mr. Felton Robichaux (“Robichaux”) worked as an insulator and carpenter at Avondale Shipyard from 1961 to 1979 and, as part of his job, worked with asbestos-containing products. R. Doc. 101 at ¶ 13. In January 2022, Robichaux was diagnosed with mesothelioma which Plaintiffs allege is the direct and proximate result of his work at Avondale Shipyard, as well as his exposure to other Avondale Shipyard employees. Id. at ¶ 20. On January 27, 2022, Robichaux filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans against Avondale, as his employer, and against a number of suppliers and/or manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, including Uniroyal and Foster Wheeler. R. Doc. 1-2. Thereafter, this suit was removed to this Court and Avondale filed cross claims against Uniroyal and Foster Wheeler, among others. R. Doc. 3. Robichaux passed away in July 2022, and Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint as Robichaux’s survivors. R. Doc. 101. Uniroyal and Foster Wheeler filed motions for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs cannot show Robichaux was exposed to asbestos through their products and alternatively, that any such

exposure was not a substantial factor in Robichaux’s development of mesothelioma. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before the Court shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the

non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). Thereafter, if the non-movant is unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). ANALYSIS “Under Louisiana law, to prevail in an asbestos injury case, ‘the claimant must show . . .

he had significant exposure to the product complained of to the extent that it was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury.” Williams v. Boeing Co., 23 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Vodanovich v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 869 So.2d 930, 934 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted). “To defeat an asbestos defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which [are] the relevant motion[s] here, the [responding parties] need only show that a reasonable jury could conclude that it is more likely than not that [Robichaux] inhaled defendant’s asbestos fibers, even if they were only ‘slight’ exposures.” Id. (citing Held v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 672 So.2d 1106, 1109 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1996)). The plaintiff’s burden is by a preponderance of the evidence and may be satisfied by direct or circumstantial evidence. Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., No. 20-CV-836, 2021 WL 5448751, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2021) (internal citations

omitted). I. Whether Uniroyal Is Entitled to Summary Judgment Plaintiffs submit evidence showing Uniroyal asbestos cloth was regularly and frequently used by and around insulators working at Avondale Shipyard during the period of Robichaux’s employment. Former Avondale Shipyard employees testified cloth with the name “Uniroyal” was “a commonplace thing” on Avondale ships and the product was “probably used by everyone in the ship at one time or another.” R. Doc. 262-8 at 18, 19. Multiple witnesses testified Uniroyal cloth was used “throughout the engine room” to insulate pipe, which, as an insulator, was one of Robichaux’s duties throughout his time at Avondale Shipyard. R. Doc. 262-9 at 4 and 262-11 at 2-3. It is true Uniroyal was not the exclusive supplier of asbestos cloth at Avondale Shipyard during Robichaux’s employment. The testimony of former Avondale Shipyard employees, however, establishes the use of Uniroyal asbestos cloth was routine and widespread while Robichaux worked at Avondale. This evidence raises a genuine issue as to whether Robichaux

was exposed to Uniroyal asbestos cloth while employed at Avondale Shipyard. Plaintiffs also present summary judgment evidence showing insulators frequently inhaled dust created from asbestos cloth. Uniroyal’s corporate representative, Mr. Max McCord, testified cutting Uniroyal cloth could expose one to asbestos fibers, and a number of former Avondale Shipyard employees testified insulators commonly cut or tore asbestos cloth during the insulation process. R. Docs. 262-5 at 12, 262-19 at 9, and 262-16 at 13. For example, Mr. Earl Gisclair, a former Avondale Shipyard employee who worked closely with insulators, testified he saw insulators cut asbestos cloth which created dust that employees inhaled. R. Doc. 262-19 at 9-10. Similarly, Mr. Kevin Cortez, a former Avondale Shipyard insulator, testified he used Uniroyal asbestos cloth to insulate engine rooms and that insulators were responsible for cutting cloth as

part of their work in engine rooms. R. Doc. 262-20 at 10. Mr. Cortez further testified cutting and tearing asbestos cloth created dust that would “fly” around the engine room. Id. Finally, Plaintiffs present evidence to support a finding that Robichaux’s exposure to Uniroyal asbestos cloth substantially contributed to Robichaux’s development of mesothelioma. Mr.

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
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719 F.3d 424 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
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