Robey v. Seattle Municipal Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMarch 14, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00280
StatusUnknown

This text of Robey v. Seattle Municipal Corporation (Robey v. Seattle Municipal Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robey v. Seattle Municipal Corporation, (W.D. Wash. 2023).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 WILLIAM ROBEY, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00280-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING VOLUNTARY 12 v. RECUSAL 13 SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff William Robey’s “Affidavit of 17 Prejudice,” Dkt. No. 13, which the Court construes as a motion for recusal. Having considered the 18 motion and the remainder of the record, the undersigned judge declines to voluntarily recuse 19 herself from this case. 20 Under the Local Civil Rules of this Court, whenever a motion to recuse is filed pursuant to 21 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455, “the challenged judge will review the motion papers and 22 decide whether to recuse voluntarily.” LCR 3(f). A judge is required to recuse herself “in any 23 proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see 24 1 also id. § 144. A judge’s impartiality can reasonably be questioned where, for example, she has “a 2 personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 3 concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1). If the challenged judge decides not to recuse, “he or 4 she will direct the clerk to refer the motion to the chief judge, or the chief judge’s designee.” LCR

5 3(f). 6 Here, Mr. Robey appears to seek the recusal of the undersigned judge because she “has a 7 personal bias or prejudice against the plaintiff in favor of the adverse party” and “violates the 8 plaintiff[’]s 14th Amendment right[.]” Dkt. No. 13 at 1. Mr. Robey states no facts or reasons for 9 such a belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144; see also id. § 455(b)(1). To the extent he moves for recusal due 10 to the undersigned judge having previously dismissed his claims in a similar action, see Robey v. 11 City of Seattle, No. 2:22-CV-00685-LK, 2022 WL 2703988, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2022), 12 this alone does not constitute grounds for recusal, see, e.g., Ndoromo v. Barr, 486 F. Supp. 3d 388, 13 394 (D.D.C. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Ndoromo v. Garland, No. 20-5323, 2021 WL 2525717 (D.C. 14 Cir. May 17, 2021).

15 Because there is no basis to find that the undersigned judge’s impartiality “might 16 reasonably be questioned” or to find that there is an appearance of bias in this case, and because 17 none of the other conditions for recusal laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 455 are met, the undersigned judge 18 declines to recuse herself from this case. The undersigned judge DIRECTS the Clerk to refer the 19 Motion to Chief Judge Estudillo in accordance with Local Civil Rule 3(f). 20 Dated this 13th day of March, 2023. 21 A 22 Lauren King United States District Judge 23 24

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Robey v. Seattle Municipal Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robey-v-seattle-municipal-corporation-wawd-2023.