Robertson v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development

2007 WI App 215, 740 N.W.2d 162, 305 Wis. 2d 432, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 695
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 9, 2007
Docket2007AP96
StatusPublished

This text of 2007 WI App 215 (Robertson v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robertson v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, 2007 WI App 215, 740 N.W.2d 162, 305 Wis. 2d 432, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 695 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

DYKMAN, J.

¶ 1. The Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development and Bureau of Apprenticeship Standards (Bureau) appeals from a circuit court order vacating its decision to deny Donald Robertson an apprenticeship with Main Fire Protection, Inc. (Main). It also appeals from an order awarding Main costs against the Bureau. The Bureau contends that its decision is entitled to deference, and that its interpretation of its own State Apprenticeship Standards for the Automatic Fire Sprinkler Industry (Standards) for determining when to approve an apprenticeship must be affirmed because it was reasonable. Main argues that the Bureau's decision is not entitled to deference because the Bureau has offered inconsistent interpretations of its Standards, and its interpretation must be *435 rejected because it is inconsistent with the language of the Standards. We conclude that even under a de novo review, the standard of review most favorable to Main, the Bureau's decision must be affirmed. Accordingly, we reverse. 1

Background

¶ 2. The following facts are undisputed. Main operates a fire protection business in Madison. Main employs an individual with an automatic fire sprinkler contractor's license under Wis. Admin. Code § Comm. 5.51 (May 2007). 2 In October 2005, the Associated Builders and Contractors Apprenticeship Advisory Committee denied Robertson's application for an apprenticeship with Main. Main appealed to the Bureau, and the Bureau determined that Main could not employ an apprentice because Main did not meet the requirements for employing an apprentice under the Bureau's Standards. The Bureau explained that its Standards "require that the qualified employer, to receive one apprentice, must employ or be a licensed journey level worker (this could be the contractor). Based on the information provided, Main Fire Protection does not employ a licensed journey level fire sprinkler fitter."

¶ 3. Main filed a petition for judicial review of the Bureau's decision in the circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 through 227.57 (2005-06). The circuit court vacated the Bureau's decision and awarded costs to Main. The Bureau appeals.

*436 Standard of Review

¶ 4. Because this is an appeal from a judicial review of an administrative decision, we review the decision of the agency, not of the circuit court. See Kruczek v. DWD, 2005 WI App 12, ¶ 12, 278 Wis. 2d 563, 692 N.W.2d 286. Generally, we give great weight deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules unless that interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the rules or clearly erroneous. Id. However, there are circumstances under which we afford a lower level of deference to the agency's decision. See, e.g., id., ¶ 12 & n.3. Main and the Bureau contest the standard of review we are to apply in this case; Main contends that the review must be de novo while the Bureau argues that we owe at least some degree of deference to its determination. We need not resolve this dispute. Even assuming that our review is de novo, we affirm the Bureau's decision. 3

Discussion

¶ 5. This case requires that we interpret the apprenticeship ratio provision of the Bureau's standards. We interpret administrative rules as we do statutes generally. Kruczek, 278 Wis. 2d 563, ¶ 13. Thus, we begin with the plain language of the rule. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, *437 ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We interpret the language of the rule in context, relating it to surrounding or closely related rules. See id., ¶ 46.

¶ 6. The crux of the dispute between the Bureau and Main is the interpretation of the following provision in Section VIII of the Standards: "RATIO OF APPRENTICES TO JOURNEYWORKERS: Any qualified employer with at least one (1) licensed journey level worker (this could be the contractor) may employ one apprentice. Additional apprentices may be employed as follows: A. An additional apprentice may be employed for each regularly employed journey level Sprinkler Fitter . . . ." Specifically, this case turns on the interpretation of the term "journey level worker."

¶ 7. The Bureau argues that a "journey level worker" is an individual who holds a journeyman license under Wis. Admin. Code § Comm. 5.52. Thus, the term includes journey workers (or journeymen) and those contractors holding a journeyman license. The Bureau argues, therefore, that the Standards clearly state that a qualified employer is entitled to one apprentice per licensed journey level worker, and that the contractor may be counted for the first apprenticeship if that contractor holds a journeyman license. Main argues that the Bureau's interpretation is contrary to the language of the provision, and that "journey level worker" must mean both journeymen and contractors. 4 Thus, Main asserts, the provision states that a qualified employer is automatically entitled to one apprentice *438 because the contractor 5 is a journey level worker, and that the employer is entitled to additional apprentices for each additional journey level worker. We agree with the Bureau that the only reasonable interpretation is that "journey level worker" means an individual holding a journeyman license, and that a contractor may or may not be a journey level worker.

¶ 8. Main argues that the Standards use the term "journeyman" in addition to "journey level worker," and thus the two terms must have distinct meanings. See Zehetner v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 2004 WI App 80, ¶ 20, 272 Wis. 2d 628, 679 N.W.2d 919 (when the legislature uses two different terms, we must assume it purposefully selected each term and intended to give each a distinct meaning). In Section XVI(l), under "Conditions op WÓRK," the Standards mandate that "[djuring the first three (3) years, apprentices must be under the direct supervision of an individual who holds either an automatic fire sprinkler contractor license or a journeyman automatic fire sprinkler fitter license." Main argues that the Standards' use of the term "journeyman" in this section shows that the Bureau understood the distinction between a journeyman and a journey level worker, and that if it had meant to say that the contractor had to be a journeyman to qualify for an apprentice, it would have said so. However, in this section, the Standards use the term "journeyman" only to refer to the name for the required license, not to refer to the class of people holding that license. The use of the term "journeyman automatic fire sprinkler fitter license" obviously reflects the actual name of the license *439 under Wis. Admin. Code. § Comm. 5.52. When referring to people holding that license, the Standards only use the terms "journey workers," "journey level Sprinkler Fit- • ters," or "journey level workers."

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Related

Kruczek v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development
2005 WI App 12 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2004)
Zehetner v. CHRYSLER FINANCIAL CO., LLC.
2004 WI App 80 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2004)
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County
2004 WI 58 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
2007 WI App 215, 740 N.W.2d 162, 305 Wis. 2d 432, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robertson-v-wisconsin-department-of-workforce-development-wisctapp-2007.