Robertson v. Stevens

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 11, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00769
StatusUnknown

This text of Robertson v. Stevens (Robertson v. Stevens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robertson v. Stevens, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ ROBERT E. ROBERTSON, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-769-pp

CHRISTOPHER STEVENS, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Robert E. Robertson, Jr., who is incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On July 17, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $4.37. Dkt. No. 7. The court received that fee on August 15, 2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing

fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as defendants Green Bay Warden Christopher Stevens, Assistant District Attorney Wendy Lemkuil and Kyle Grabowski. Dkt. No. 1 at 1–3. The plaintiff alleges that in October 2023, he invoked his right to a speedy trial under federal and state law in his state court criminal case. Id. at 3. He says he asked Grabowski “to file the paperwork for [his] intrastate

detainer,” and that Grabowski told him he had forwarded the paperwork for processing when he had not. Id. at 3–4. When the plaintiff brought this issue to Grabowski’s attention, Grabowski told him “he did not forward and process [the plaintiff’s] request because he forgot.” Id. at 4. The plaintiff alleges that he filed an administrative complaint about this incident. Id. He says Stevens “took part in violating [his] rights” when he affirmed the complaint and asked the plaintiff what remedy he was seeking. Id. The plaintiff provided his requested remedy, although he does not say what it

is, but he alleges that “no remedy has been given to [him].” Id. The plaintiff says it was Stevens’s duty as warden “to oversee [his] demand for prompt disposition.” Id. He claims Stevens “was negligent in accomodating [sic] [his] demand and remedy.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that Lemkuil is the prosecutor in his state court criminal case. Id. He says she “took part in violating” his rights after he “wrote a pro se motion to the clerk of courts notifying Wendy Lemkuil that [his] rights were violated in [his] case.” Id. He claims Lemkuil “was negligent against [his]

claim” and did not attempt to correct “the error and violations that took place.” Id. at 5. The plaintiff seeks a court order directing Stevens “to write an affidavit about his involment [sic] in the incident and ordering him to give [the plaintiff] the remedy [he] asked for in [his] complaint.” Id. at 6. He also asks the court to order Grabowski to write a similar affidavit “to provide the courts of his involvement in violating [the plantiff’s] rights” and to order Lemkuil to notify

the state judge in the plaintiff’s state court criminal case “that [the plaintiff’s] rights ha[ve] been violated . . . and that the only remedy is to dismiss [his] case with prejudice.” Id.

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Robertson v. Stevens, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robertson-v-stevens-wied-2024.