Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.

255 S.W. 223
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 18, 1923
DocketNo. 878. [fn*]
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 255 S.W. 223 (Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 255 S.W. 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1923).

Opinion

O’QUINN, J.

April- 1, 1920, J. M. Robertson, husband and father of appellants, was an employé of appelleé, Magnolia Petroleum Company, and lost his life as the result of a gas explosion under one of appellee’s receiving houses, where he was engaged in the discharge'of his duties as such employé. Appel-lee was a subscriber under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Texas (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, arts. 5246 — 1- to 5246— 91), and appellants received actual damages in the form of compensation under said Compensation Act for the death of said Robertson.,

Mrs. Pearl Robertson, wife of J. M. Robertson, brought this suit in her own behalf and as next friend of her minor children, Reha Robertson, Wesley Robertson, and Vera Robertson, for the recovery of exemplary damages against appellee for the death of her said husband and father of the minor children. Her petition alleged that J. M. Robertson lost his life in said gas explosion because of the gross negligence of appellee; that it was the duty of said J. M. Robertson to repair and build pipe lines in and about the buildings, yard, and plant of appellee for the purpose of transporting oil to the different receiving houses, and that at the time of the' accident the deceased was working in the basement of one of said receiving houses, the house being a two-story brick structure, and that the second story was used for the purpose of receiving tests of different oils through pipes from different stills, and that the first story of said house was the place where all the pipes running from the stills into the receiving house were received and assembled, the pipes coming through the basement into the first story, and that the entire structure, including the raised portion of the basement, was entirely inclosed, with two or three openings at the bottom, and that in the basement there was a cesspool, which received waste oils from leaking pipes, and that on the date of the accident this cesspool was full of oil and gas, all being of a highly inflammable and explosive nature; that on said date said Robertson, with other employés, was sent by appellee to repair certain leaking pipes in the.basement of said receiving house, and that while in the discharge of said duty there was an explosion in said, basement from which he received injuries causing his death. It was alleged that the basement in which deceased was at work *224 was dark, and that in repairing said leaking pipes it was necessary and customary for the employés to use an extension electric light cord attached to a socket on the outside of said receiving house; that said receiving house was so constructed that there was very little ventilation, and that the openings in same were so small that gas and oil were allowed to accumulate under said building in said basement, and .that the accumulation of gas could have been prevented by sufficient ventilation, or by the use of compressed air, or by the use of steam jets; that the cesspool in said basement, at the time deceased was required to do said work, was full of gas and oil; that while deceased was engaged in said repair work it became so dark that it was necessary to secure a light, and that deceased and the other employés engaged with him in said work were supplied by appellee with an extension electric light cord which was defective in that the insulation thereon was worn and broken, and that, while using this defective cord, it struck or came in contact with one of the iron pipes, thereby causing a spark "which ignited the gas which had accumulated in said basement, and causing an explosion which resulted in the death of said Robertson. It was alleged that appellee was guilty of gross negligence by reason of the manner in which said receiving house was constructed, in that sufficient openings were not made to allow the escape of the accumulated gases and oils, and in not providing compressed air or steam jets to dissipate the gas, and in not removing the accumulated gas and oil before directing deceased to work in said basement, and in providing deceased with a defective extension electric light cord, knowing the dangerous conditions under which it was to be used.

Appellee filed its plea in abatement alleging that it was a subscriber under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and held a policy of insurance under the provisions of said act, and that the deceased, Robertson, was an employé and covered by the provisions of said act and said policy of insurance, and that he met his death while in the discharge of his duties, and that by reason thereon appellants had no cause of action for actual damages against appellee, and having no legal claim for actual damages could not assert a right or claim for exemplary damages.

This plea was overruled by the court, and appellee then answered by general demurrer, several special exceptions, and specially answered that it was a subscriber under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Texas, and that deceased, Robertson, was an employé, and that appellants had elected to accept compensation, and that they, therefore, were barred from asserting any claim for actual damages, and having no claim for actual damages they could not assert a claim for exemplary damages. It also | pleaded assumed risk, contributory negligence, and alleged that deceased knew of the conditions of the receiving house, and that it was part of his duties to keep said receiving house in proper condition and fix the pipes, and that he had the power and authority to make all necessary changes in same to make same safe, and that he also knew the condition of the extension electric light cord which was used at the time.

The case was tried before a jury, but at the conclusion of the evidence offered by appellants the court granted appellee’s motion for a peremptory instruction in its favor, said motion and said instruction being based upon the ground that appellants failed to make out a case of liability for exemplary damages (failed to raise the issue of gross negligence) against appellee. Judgment was thereupon entered in favor' of appellee, to which appellants excepted, and from which they have appealed.

We will first notice appellee’s contention that the court erred in not sustaining its plea in abatement, contending that—

“Section 3, pt. 1, of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Texas, having taken from the employés of a subscriber their right of action for damages for, personal injuries, and from the representatives and beneficiaries of deceased employés their right of action against such subscribing employer for damages resulting in death, section 7, pt. 1, of said act, wherein it is attempted to create a right of action for exemplary damages in favor of the class named therein for homicide occasioned by the gross negligence of the employer is of no effect for the reason that exemplary damages cannot be recovered unless actual damages may be recovered, and as the right of action for actual damages is denied the beneficiaries of a deceased employé, no action may be maintained for exemplary damages by the representatives of beneficiaries of a deceased e'mployé.”

In answer to this contention, appellants say that their cause of action is authorized, by article 5246 — 7, Vernon’s Statutes, which is based upon and is but the re-enactment of section 26 of article 16 of the Constitution of Texas, which reads:

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Bluebook (online)
255 S.W. 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robertson-v-magnolia-petroleum-co-texapp-1923.