Robertson v. Johnson

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Robertson v. Johnson

129 S.E.2d 358, 107 Ga. App. 61, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 569

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 27, 1962

Docket39821

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 129 S.E.2d 358 (Robertson v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Robertson v. Johnson, 129 S.E.2d 358, 107 Ga. App. 61, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

Eberhardt, Judge.

The only question presented here is whether plaintiff proved his case as laid against the defendant Johnson. Code § 110-310. The gist of Johnson’s alleged negligence was that he failed to give a proper signal of his intention to stop. The only witness on the trial was plaintiff himself. In [62]*62the factual context presented, it would be physically impossible for plaintiff, who was facing Johnson’s car, to swear that Johnson’s brake lights did not work and he admitted that he could not have seen the signal if given. Barbara Wages, driver of the vehicle following Johnson, was not called to testify.

Where there is nothing to support the only allegation of negligence, a nonsuit is proper and it is not necessary to consider the statutory interpretation of Code Ann. § 68-1647 advanced by plaintiff dealing with a possibility that defendant may have given a signal indicating an intention to turn off the road to the right, as well as one indicating an intention to stop, at the same time.

Judgment affirmed.

Carlisle, P. J., and Russell, J., concur.

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Eberhardt, Judge.

The only question presented here is whether plaintiff proved his case as laid against the defendant Johnson. Code § 110-310. The gist of Johnson’s alleged negligence was that he failed to give a proper signal of his intention to stop. The only witness on the trial was plaintiff himself. In [62]*62the factual context presented, it would be physically impossible for plaintiff, who was facing Johnson’s car, to swear that Johnson’s brake lights did not work and he admitted that he could not have seen the signal if given. Barbara Wages, driver of the vehicle following Johnson, was not called to testify.

Where there is nothing to support the only allegation of negligence, a nonsuit is proper and it is not necessary to consider the statutory interpretation of Code Ann. § 68-1647 advanced by plaintiff dealing with a possibility that defendant may have given a signal indicating an intention to turn off the road to the right, as well as one indicating an intention to stop, at the same time.

Judgment affirmed.

Carlisle, P. J., and Russell, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

129 S.E.2d 358, 107 Ga. App. 61, 1962 Ga. App. LEXIS 569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robertson-v-johnson-gactapp-1962.

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