Roberts v. Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development

473 F. Supp. 52, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12206
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedMay 23, 1979
DocketNo. EC 78-48-K
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 473 F. Supp. 52 (Roberts v. Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roberts v. Secretary, Department of Housing & Urban Development, 473 F. Supp. 52, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12206 (N.D. Miss. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEADY, Chief Judge.

In this action, Denton Roberts, property owner in the City of Aberdeen, Monroe County, Mississippi, instituted suit against the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Federal Insurance Administrator of the Federal Insurance Administration (Administrator); the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Aberdeen, and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Mississippi State Highway Commission, seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 et seq., of HUD’s administrative decision with respect to the application of the National Flood Insurance Program to the City of Aberdeen.1 The only issue remaining in the case, in accordance with this court’s prior orders, is whether the National Flood Insurance Program made applicable to the City of Aberdeen is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law so as to make HUD’s decision come within the scope of judicial review provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706.2 By order dated February 5, [54]*541979, we refused to grant the federal defendants summary judgment and ordered that the cause proceed solely with respect to the accuracy of the flood plain designations developed for the City of Aberdeen and whether defendants’ actions relevant to the development thereof were arbitrary and capricious. The federal defendants have again moved for summary judgment in their favor, asserting that the court should limit its consideration to the administrative record made by the federal defendants, and by so doing, there are no facts that are subject to trial de novo by us as a reviewing court. It is urged that to determine whether the federal defendants’ actions were arbitrary should be based entirely upon the administrative record, and where the facts have been adequately considered in the administrative proceeding, de novo review of the agency decision by a court as “unwarranted by the facts,” in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), is appropriate, under teachings of the Supreme Court, only under limited circumstances. Federal defendants cite Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). In Camp v. Pitts, the Supreme Court expressly held:

It is quite plain from our decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 [, 91 S.Ct. 814, 21 L.Ed.2d 136] (1971), that de novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain administrative actions.

More specifically, federal defendants contend that the administrative record shows that all of the procedural steps contemplated by statute were complied with, that certain original objections raised by the City of Aberdeen were taken into account before the Mayor and Board of Aldermen on February 28, 1978, unanimously adopted the Flood Plain Management Ordinance and Flood Boundary Floodway Map, prerequisites for the City of Aberdeen to qualify for the sale of flood insurance to Aberdeen property owners. The plaintiff stands on his position that the flood plain designations developed for the City of Aberdeen arid the defendants’ actions relevant to the development thereof were arbitrary and capricious. No supporting affidavits in opposition to the federal defendants’ motion for summary judgment have been filed.

Therefore, the problem before the court is to determine whether the administrative record contains adequate facts with respect to judicial review so as to make inappropriate the receipt of evidence upon a de novo review of the agency decision. Upon a review of the applicable law, regulations and administrative record, we hold that the fact finding procedures in the administrative proceedings were adequate and make unnecessary the receipt of additional evidence on a de nov.o hearing before this court.

The second question is a more complicated and difficult one, that is, whether the determination of the federal defendants in the development of the flood plain designations for the City of Aberdeen, the federal defendants’ actions relevant thereto concerning the Draft Flood Insurance Study and Flood Insurance Rate Map and resulting decisions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure required by law.

Under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review of agency action, the reviewing court is to search for clear error of judgment, but it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. American Medical Ass’n v. Mathews, 429 F.Supp. 1179 (D.C.Ill.1977); Montana Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agcy., 429 F.Supp. 683 (D.Mont.1977); American Federation of Government Emp. v. Hoffmann, 427 F.Supp. 1048 (D.C.Ala.1976). These cases make plain that it is not for the reviewing court to supply its own interpretation so long as the interpretation or determination applied by the agency was reasonable, even though that interpretation might not appear as reasonable as some others. [55]*55An equally well-settled principle is that in construing administrative regulations, the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977). It is for this reason that the courts have uniformly accorded great deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation based on the agency’s greater expertise in the particular area which is subject to regulation by that agency. Jicarella Apache Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1978). A decision, to be “arbitrary and capricious,” must be based on facts not supported by the record; however, factual certainty is' not necessary, and an agency may regulate even though facts do not illuminate a clear path. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 555 F.2d 938 (1977), reversed on other grounds, 436 U.S. 775, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 56 L.Ed.2d 697.

Guided by the foregoing principles which emphasize the narrow scope of our review, we proceed to examine the administrative record as follows:

1.

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Bluebook (online)
473 F. Supp. 52, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roberts-v-secretary-department-of-housing-urban-development-msnd-1979.