Roberts v. Grigas
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
March 24, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1818
JOSEPH ROBERTS, a/k/a JOSEPH CORAL,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE GRIGAS, ETC.,
Respondent, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Valeriano Diviacchi on brief for appellant. ___________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Duensing, __________________ ____________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. In September 1984, petitioner, Joseph __________
Roberts, was convicted of armed robbery. His court-appointed
attorney timely filed a notice of appeal. Later, counsel
filed a motion to withdraw which the Massachusetts Appeals
Court denied. Ultimately, the Appeals Court dismissed
petitioner's appeal on November 10, 1986, counsel never
having filed a brief on petitioner's behalf.
Upon discovering this in 1991, petitioner filed, in
the Appeals Court, a pro se motion to reinstate his appeal.
In support, he argued that he had not authorized his attorney
to forego the direct appeal of his conviction. As a result,
petitioner went on, his right to the effective assistance of
counsel, as secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
had been violated. The Appeals Court denied both the motion
to reinstate and a subsequent request for reconsideration.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") denied
petitioner's request for further appellate review.
In April 1992, petitioner filed this habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. He again claimed that his
court-appointed attorney's conduct had been constitutionally
defective. The district court appointed counsel to represent
petitioner, but dismissed the habeas petition on the ground
that petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies. See 28 ___
U.S.C. 2254(b). Specifically, the court held that Mass. R.
-3-
Crim. P. 30(b)1 provided petitioner with a chance to present
his ineffective assistance claim to the courts of the
Commonwealth. Thus, petitioner was required to exhaust this
remedy under 2254(c).2 We agree.
As a matter of comity, "[t]he exhaustion principle
ensures that state courts have the first opportunity to
correct their own constitutional errors." Mele v. Fitchburg ____ _________
Dist. Court, 850 F.2d 817, 819 (1st Cir. 1988). Although an ___________
applicant for the writ is not required to exhaust every _____
conceivable state procedure before filing his or her claim in
federal court, the applicant "is at risk to present the state
courts with a fair opportunity to confront and correct an
alleged infirmity." Id. at 818-19. Here, there appears to ___
be no question that petitioner's motions alerted both the
Appeals Court and the SJC to the constitutional dimensions of
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, the
question is whether the context in which this claim was
____________________
1. Rule 30(b) provides:
New Trial. The trial judge upon New Trial.
motion in writing may grant a new trial
at any time if it appears that justice
may not have been done. Upon the motion
the trial judge shall make such findings
of fact as are necessary to resolve the
defendant's allegations of error of law.
2. Section 2254(c) provides that "[a]n applicant shall not
be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented."
-4-
raised constitutes "fair presentation." Castille v. Peoples, ________ _______
489 U.S. 346 (1989).
In Castille, a 2254 petitioner presented new ________
constitutional claims in his request for allocatur to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court; such review is discretionary.
The United States Supreme Court held that the exhaustion
requirement is not satisfied "where the claim has been
presented for the first and only time in a procedural context
in which its merits will not be considered unless `there are
special and important reasons therefor.'" Id. at 351 ___
(citation omitted). We think it obvious that when the
Appeals Court considers a motion to reopen or reinstate an
appeal five years after the appeal's dismissal, its review is
discretionary. The same goes for the SJC's decision whether
to grant further appellate review. Consequently, petitioner
has not exhausted his state remedies.
"The requisite exhaustion may nonetheless exist, of
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Related
Evitts v. Lucey
469 U.S. 387 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Harris v. Reed
489 U.S. 255 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Castille v. Peoples
489 U.S. 346 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., Applicant v. State of Maine
421 F.2d 1327 (First Circuit, 1970)
Lane T. Mele v. Fitchburg District Court
850 F.2d 817 (First Circuit, 1988)
Dennis Bonneau v. United States
961 F.2d 17 (First Circuit, 1992)
Commonwealth v. Cowie
533 N.E.2d 1329 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)