Roberts v. Grigas

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided March 24, 1995·No. 94-1818·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


March 24, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1818

JOSEPH ROBERTS, a/k/a JOSEPH CORAL,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

GEORGE GRIGAS, ETC.,

Respondent, Appellee.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Valeriano Diviacchi on brief for appellant. ___________________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Duensing, __________________ ____________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. In September 1984, petitioner, Joseph __________

Roberts, was convicted of armed robbery. His court-appointed

attorney timely filed a notice of appeal. Later, counsel

filed a motion to withdraw which the Massachusetts Appeals

Court denied. Ultimately, the Appeals Court dismissed

petitioner's appeal on November 10, 1986, counsel never

having filed a brief on petitioner's behalf.

Upon discovering this in 1991, petitioner filed, in

the Appeals Court, a pro se motion to reinstate his appeal.

In support, he argued that he had not authorized his attorney

to forego the direct appeal of his conviction. As a result,

petitioner went on, his right to the effective assistance of

counsel, as secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,

had been violated. The Appeals Court denied both the motion

to reinstate and a subsequent request for reconsideration.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") denied

petitioner's request for further appellate review.

In April 1992, petitioner filed this habeas

petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. He again claimed that his

court-appointed attorney's conduct had been constitutionally

defective. The district court appointed counsel to represent

petitioner, but dismissed the habeas petition on the ground

that petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies. See 28 ___

U.S.C. 2254(b). Specifically, the court held that Mass. R.

-3-

Crim. P. 30(b)1 provided petitioner with a chance to present

his ineffective assistance claim to the courts of the

Commonwealth. Thus, petitioner was required to exhaust this

remedy under 2254(c).2 We agree.

As a matter of comity, "[t]he exhaustion principle

ensures that state courts have the first opportunity to

correct their own constitutional errors." Mele v. Fitchburg ____ _________

Dist. Court, 850 F.2d 817, 819 (1st Cir. 1988). Although an ___________

applicant for the writ is not required to exhaust every _____

conceivable state procedure before filing his or her claim in

federal court, the applicant "is at risk to present the state

courts with a fair opportunity to confront and correct an

alleged infirmity." Id. at 818-19. Here, there appears to ___

be no question that petitioner's motions alerted both the

Appeals Court and the SJC to the constitutional dimensions of

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, the

question is whether the context in which this claim was

____________________

1. Rule 30(b) provides:

New Trial. The trial judge upon New Trial.
motion in writing may grant a new trial
at any time if it appears that justice
may not have been done. Upon the motion
the trial judge shall make such findings
of fact as are necessary to resolve the
defendant's allegations of error of law.

2. Section 2254(c) provides that "[a]n applicant shall not
be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law
of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented."

-4-

raised constitutes "fair presentation." Castille v. Peoples, ________ _______

489 U.S. 346 (1989).

In Castille, a 2254 petitioner presented new ________

constitutional claims in his request for allocatur to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court; such review is discretionary.

The United States Supreme Court held that the exhaustion

requirement is not satisfied "where the claim has been

presented for the first and only time in a procedural context

in which its merits will not be considered unless `there are

special and important reasons therefor.'" Id. at 351 ___

(citation omitted). We think it obvious that when the

Appeals Court considers a motion to reopen or reinstate an

appeal five years after the appeal's dismissal, its review is

discretionary. The same goes for the SJC's decision whether

to grant further appellate review. Consequently, petitioner

has not exhausted his state remedies.

"The requisite exhaustion may nonetheless exist, of

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Related

Evitts v. Lucey
469 U.S. 387 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Harris v. Reed
489 U.S. 255 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Castille v. Peoples
489 U.S. 346 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., Applicant v. State of Maine
421 F.2d 1327 (First Circuit, 1970)
Lane T. Mele v. Fitchburg District Court
850 F.2d 817 (First Circuit, 1988)
Dennis Bonneau v. United States
961 F.2d 17 (First Circuit, 1992)
Commonwealth v. Cowie
533 N.E.2d 1329 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)