[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED No. 97-5195 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 2/18/03 D. C. Docket No. 95-2508-cv-LCN THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK
BERTRAM ROBERTS, HANNI ROBERTS,, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, A Florida Public Utility Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________
(July 22, 1998)
Before CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Bertram and Hanni Roberts filed this tort action in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida
against Florida Power & Light (“FPL”), alleging that Bertram Roberts developed leukemia as a
result of exposure to radiation at FPL’s Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. FPL removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and subsequently moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The district court granted that motion. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the past 50 years, Congress has established a comprehensive federal framework
governing the nuclear power industry, beginning with the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act in
1946. That statute granted the federal government a monopoly on the development of nuclear
power. Congress subsequently determined that it was in the national interest to encourage the
private sector to participate in this effort. Toward that end, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
established the Atomic Energy Commission and gave it authority to license and regulate nuclear
power plants. See 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. Private power companies were reluctant to invest in
nuclear facilities, however, because of concerns about their liability. To address that problem,
Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act in 1957. That statute contained three main features: it (1)
established a limit on the aggregate liability of those who wished to undertake activities involving
the handling of nuclear material, 2) channeled public liability resulting from nuclear incidents to the
federal government and 3) provided that all public liability claims above the amount of required
private insurance would be indemnified by the federal government. See Pub.L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576
(1957).
After several further changes to the statute, Congress passed the Price-Anderson
Amendments Act of 1988 (“the Amendments Act”), creating an exclusive federal cause of action
for radiation injury. The statute defines a “public liability action” as any suit asserting public
liability growing out of exposure to nuclear radiation, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh), and defines “public
liability” as any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident1 or precautionary
1 A “nuclear incident” is defined in part “as any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or without the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of
2 evacuation, id. at 2014(w). The Amendments Act also provided for the removal of, and original
federal jurisdiction over, claims for any nuclear incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).2 Congress further
required that the substantive rules of decision to be applied by the courts in such cases “shall be
derived from the law of the state in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is
inconsistent with the provisions of” section 2210 of the Price Anderson Act.3 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).
One of the principal issues arising out of these hybrid actions is whether state tort standards of care
are consistent with federal radiation exposure regulations or are inconsistent and, thereby,
preempted.4
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE
Bertram Roberts was employed as an electrician by FPL at its Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
from 1966 to 1989. He developed myelogenous leukemia in 1993 after his retirement. Roberts and
his wife, Hanni Roberts, filed this action against FPL contending that his disease resulted from his
exposure to radiation at the plant. The complaint asserted causes of action for negligence, strict
liability and Hanni Roberts’ claim for loss of consortium. Since this was a public liability action
within the meaning of the Amendments Act, the district court had original jurisdiction over all the
plaintiffs’ allegations of liability, and FPL timely removed the action to that court.
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). 2 Prior to the passage of the Amendments Act, the grant of federal jurisdiction and right of removal were available only in actions resulting from an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 3 While the statute actually reads “unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such section,” “such section” can only reasonably be interpreted to mean § 2210. 4 The plaintiffs contend that the traditional Florida tort law standards for negligence, strict liability and loss of consortium claims should govern this action. The detailed federal standards for protection against radiation are found at 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1001-20.2402.
3 FPL then moved to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs had failed to allege an essential
element of a public liability action, to wit: for a negligence claim, exposure to radiation in excess
of the permissible “dosage” levels set by federal regulation; or, for a strict liability cause of action,
offsite exposure from an event declared to be an extraordinary nuclear occurrence by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Since there was no extraordinary nuclear occurrence involved in this case,
the district court concluded that, to state a negligence claim under the Amendments Act, the
plaintiffs must allege and prove that the defendant breached its duty of care by exposing Bertram
Roberts to an amount of radiation in excess of federally defined permissible radiation dose
standards. In other words, state standards of care were preempted by federal regulatory standards
in cases involving exposure to radiation. Since the plaintiffs had failed to allege that Bertram
Roberts had been exposed to such excessive levels of radiation, the court granted FPL’s motion to
dismiss. The plaintiffs filed this appeal from that order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief de novo,
accepting all allegations in the complaint as true and construing those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs. Lopez v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED No. 97-5195 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 2/18/03 D. C. Docket No. 95-2508-cv-LCN THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK
BERTRAM ROBERTS, HANNI ROBERTS,, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, A Florida Public Utility Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________
(July 22, 1998)
Before CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Bertram and Hanni Roberts filed this tort action in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida
against Florida Power & Light (“FPL”), alleging that Bertram Roberts developed leukemia as a
result of exposure to radiation at FPL’s Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. FPL removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and subsequently moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The district court granted that motion. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the past 50 years, Congress has established a comprehensive federal framework
governing the nuclear power industry, beginning with the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act in
1946. That statute granted the federal government a monopoly on the development of nuclear
power. Congress subsequently determined that it was in the national interest to encourage the
private sector to participate in this effort. Toward that end, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
established the Atomic Energy Commission and gave it authority to license and regulate nuclear
power plants. See 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. Private power companies were reluctant to invest in
nuclear facilities, however, because of concerns about their liability. To address that problem,
Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act in 1957. That statute contained three main features: it (1)
established a limit on the aggregate liability of those who wished to undertake activities involving
the handling of nuclear material, 2) channeled public liability resulting from nuclear incidents to the
federal government and 3) provided that all public liability claims above the amount of required
private insurance would be indemnified by the federal government. See Pub.L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576
(1957).
After several further changes to the statute, Congress passed the Price-Anderson
Amendments Act of 1988 (“the Amendments Act”), creating an exclusive federal cause of action
for radiation injury. The statute defines a “public liability action” as any suit asserting public
liability growing out of exposure to nuclear radiation, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh), and defines “public
liability” as any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident1 or precautionary
1 A “nuclear incident” is defined in part “as any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or without the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of
2 evacuation, id. at 2014(w). The Amendments Act also provided for the removal of, and original
federal jurisdiction over, claims for any nuclear incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).2 Congress further
required that the substantive rules of decision to be applied by the courts in such cases “shall be
derived from the law of the state in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is
inconsistent with the provisions of” section 2210 of the Price Anderson Act.3 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).
One of the principal issues arising out of these hybrid actions is whether state tort standards of care
are consistent with federal radiation exposure regulations or are inconsistent and, thereby,
preempted.4
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE
Bertram Roberts was employed as an electrician by FPL at its Turkey Point Nuclear Plant
from 1966 to 1989. He developed myelogenous leukemia in 1993 after his retirement. Roberts and
his wife, Hanni Roberts, filed this action against FPL contending that his disease resulted from his
exposure to radiation at the plant. The complaint asserted causes of action for negligence, strict
liability and Hanni Roberts’ claim for loss of consortium. Since this was a public liability action
within the meaning of the Amendments Act, the district court had original jurisdiction over all the
plaintiffs’ allegations of liability, and FPL timely removed the action to that court.
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). 2 Prior to the passage of the Amendments Act, the grant of federal jurisdiction and right of removal were available only in actions resulting from an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 3 While the statute actually reads “unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such section,” “such section” can only reasonably be interpreted to mean § 2210. 4 The plaintiffs contend that the traditional Florida tort law standards for negligence, strict liability and loss of consortium claims should govern this action. The detailed federal standards for protection against radiation are found at 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1001-20.2402.
3 FPL then moved to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs had failed to allege an essential
element of a public liability action, to wit: for a negligence claim, exposure to radiation in excess
of the permissible “dosage” levels set by federal regulation; or, for a strict liability cause of action,
offsite exposure from an event declared to be an extraordinary nuclear occurrence by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Since there was no extraordinary nuclear occurrence involved in this case,
the district court concluded that, to state a negligence claim under the Amendments Act, the
plaintiffs must allege and prove that the defendant breached its duty of care by exposing Bertram
Roberts to an amount of radiation in excess of federally defined permissible radiation dose
standards. In other words, state standards of care were preempted by federal regulatory standards
in cases involving exposure to radiation. Since the plaintiffs had failed to allege that Bertram
Roberts had been exposed to such excessive levels of radiation, the court granted FPL’s motion to
dismiss. The plaintiffs filed this appeal from that order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief de novo,
accepting all allegations in the complaint as true and construing those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs. Lopez v. First Union National Bank of Florida, 129 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th
Cir. 1997). A complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitled them
to relief. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the plaintiffs maintain that, rather than preempting state law standards of care,
the language of § 2014(hh), quoted above, actually preserves them. They assert that the section
4 preempts state law only to the extent it is inconsistent with § 2210, which governs, inter alia,
indemnification for plant operators, abrogation of certain defenses in public liability actions and
limitations on aggregate liability. They argue that § 2210 does not even mention radiation exposure
limits and further contend that, since the statute is so clear on this point, there is no need to inquire
whether it impliedly preempts state standards of care. They also urge that, even if that inquiry were
to be undertaken, there is no inconsistency between the federal standard and common-law tort
standards but, rather, that the state tort standards further federal objectives in this area.
FPL, on the other hand, urges that the comprehensive federal nuclear regulatory framework
completely preempts the field of nuclear safety, in keeping with the clear language of § 2014(hh),
and any state law rule of decision which is inconsistent with this statutory and regulatory framework
has no force or effect.
The Supreme Court has concluded that “the safety of nuclear technology [is] the exclusive
business of the Federal Government ....” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 208, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1724, 75 L.Ed.2d
752 (1983). This holding was reaffirmed one term later in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). In that case, the Court held that “states are precluded
from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear power.” Id. at 240-41, 104 S.Ct. at 617.5 The result
is, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “state regulation of nuclear safety, through
either legislation or negligence actions, is preempted by federal law.” O’Conner v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1232 (1994).
5 The plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in Silkwood actually supports their position because the court held that even an award of punitive damages against a nuclear plant operator was not preempted by federal radiation dose regulations. As FPL points out, however, Silkwood was brought as a diversity tort action governed by Oklahoma law which was filed a decade before the enactment of the Amendments Act and the creation of the public liability action. Moreover, Silkwood’s exposure to radiation in her apartment was two and one- half times the amount permitted by federal regulations. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F.Supp. 566, 583 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
5 Turning to the precise question presented by this case, virtually every federal court to
consider the issue, including three circuit courts of appeals, have held that “federal regulations must
provide the sole measure of the defendants’ duty in a public liability cause of action.” O’Conner,
13 F.3d at 1105; see also Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997); In re TMI Litigation
Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991).6 This is because “any state duty would infringe upon
pervasive federal regulation in the field of nuclear safety, and thus would conflict with federal law.”
TMI, 940 F.2d at 859. Moreover, the federal statutory scheme limits the liability of operators of
nuclear power facilities and provides for indemnification but does so against a stringent regulatory
background. Therefore, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[i]mposing a standard of
care other than the federal regulations would disturb the carefully crafted balance between private
involvement and safety that Congress has achieved.” O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1105. Consequently,
we join those courts in holding that federal safety regulations conclusively establish the duty of care
owed in a public liability action. As the plaintiffs have failed to allege that FPL breached its duty
of care by exposing Bertram Roberts to an amount of radiation in excess of the maximum
permissible amount allowed by federal regulation, they have failed to state causes of action for
negligence, strict liability or loss of consortium. See, e.g., McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light
Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977)(en banc).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
6 Because the Amendments Act provides that state law shall provide the substantive rules of decision in a public liability action, at least one court has begun its analysis by trying to determine if the state would apply the federal regulations as an absolute standard of care for a negligence action. O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1103. The court went on to conclude, however, that even if the state would not do so, the federal safety standards would preempt the application of a state standard of care. Id. at 1105. Since we concur with the latter conclusion, we need not reach the question whether Florida would apply the federal regulations as the standard of care in a negligence action.