Roberto Guzman v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00452-CR

Roberto GUZMAN,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas Trial Court No. CRW2208211 Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice (concurring in the judgment without opinion)

Delivered and Filed: August 19, 2026 AFFIRMED Roberto Guzman challenges his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, in an amount less than one gram. After a jury trial, Guzman was sentenced to two years in state jail which was suspended for five years. On appeal, he claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The City of Poth’s Chief of Police, Gerald Sanchez, initiated a traffic stop on November 24, 2021, after he observed Guzman travelling at 72 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. Guzman initially stopped his truck, then continued driving, stopped again, and continued driving multiple times before eventually coming to a complete stop. Chief Sanchez testified that this behavior indicated to him that an occupant in the vehicle could be concealing contraband. As Chief Sanchez approached Guzman’s vehicle, he smelled marijuana through the open window of the truck. Chief Sanchez asked Guzman to step out of the vehicle and began to question him about his purpose of travel, criminal history, and ownership of the truck and equipment. Guzman explained that he was traveling to Boerne with his wife, Jasmine Zuniga, to cut firewood to sell. Guzman further admitted that he had previous arrests. However, when Chief Sanchez pulled Guzman’s criminal history, it initially came back clear.

Based on the smell of marijuana, Chief Sanchez indicated he was going to perform a search of Guzman’s vehicle. Guzman did not consent to the search and insisted Chief Sanchez get a warrant first. Chief Sanchez then detained Guzman by placing him in handcuffs. Chief Sanchez first searched a backpack located behind the driver’s seat in the cab of the truck which Zuniga confirmed belonged to Guzman. In the backpack, he located a small baggie with marijuana and a handgun. During his continued search of the vehicle, Chief Sanchez located another handgun and a small bag located between the driver’s seat and center console, containing what appeared to be cocaine. Guzman was arrested for possession of a controlled substance in an amount less than one gram.

Before trial, Guzman filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during Chief Sanchez’s warrantless search. The trial court held a hearing on the motion where Guzman’s attorney cross-

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examined Chief Sanchez about his probable cause to search and the length of the detention. In his closing remarks, Guzman’s attorney asked the court to grant the motion to suppress because he did “not believe that [Chief Sanchez] smelt the odor of marijuana.” He further argued that the search was the result of a prolonged, illegal detention. The court denied the motion to suppress.

Following a trial by jury, Guzman was found guilty. The judge sentenced him to two years’

confinement which was probated for five years, a thousand dollar fine, and 250 hours of community service. Guzman filed a motion for new trial which was denied by operation of law. On appeal, Guzman argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the smell of legal hemp and illegal marijuana are indistinguishable, thus there was no probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle. He further argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Suppress Evidence In his first point of error, Guzman argues Chief Sanchez lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle based on the smell of marijuana alone because legal hemp and illegal marijuana are indistinguishable in odor.

A motion to suppress is a specialized objection to the admissibility of evidence. Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.). “Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires a litigant to present his objection to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion, that is sufficiently specific to make the trial court aware of his complaint.” Vasquez v. State, 483 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. “Although there are no technical considerations or forms of words required to preserve an error for appeal, a party must be specific enough so as to ‘let the trial judge know what he wants, why

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he thinks himself entitled to it, and do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.’” Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The complaint on appeal also must coincide with the specific objection made at trial or during the hearing on the motion to suppress, or error has not been preserved. Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). If an appellant does not preserve an issue for appeal, we should not address the merits of that issue. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Guzman’s motion to suppress was generic, arguing generally that there was no probable cause or consent to search the vehicle. The motion did not state specific, pertinent facts; it cited only to the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and it contained no particularized analysis of the facts to the law. At the suppression hearing, Guzman argued that he did not believe the officer actually smelled any marijuana and that the search was the result of an illegal, prolonged detention. He did not contend either during the suppression hearing or later at trial that the smell of legal hemp is indistinguishable from illegal marijuana, such that smell cannot provide a sufficient basis for probable cause. See Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Appellant was responsible for preserving the error he sought to raise on appeal by specifically articulating the legal basis for his proffer at trial.”); Mayfield, 800 S.W.2d at 935 (“It is also elementary that an appellant may not rely upon an objection on appeal which he has not raised in the trial court, or which varies from the objection made at trial.” (citations omitted); Fontenot v. State, 903 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (“An objection stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.”) (citing Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 292 (Tex. Crim.

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App.1990); Sebree v. State, 695 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.)). Thus, Guzman did not preserve his first issue for review.

2. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence In his second point of error, Guzman complains there is insufficient evidence to show he knowingly or intentionally had actual care, custody, control, or management of the cocaine found in the vehicle.

a. Standard of Review

In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, “we consider the combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). As the reviewing court, we must “defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.” Baez v. State, 486 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence does not need to directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

b. Applicable Law

A person commits the state jail felony of possession of a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1, if they knowingly or intentionally possess an amount of a prohibited substance of less than one gram. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(a–b). Cocaine is a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.102(3)(d). “Possession” means

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“actual care, custody, control, or management.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(39). “To support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) that appellant exercised actual care, control and management over the contraband; and (2) that appellant had knowledge that the substance in his possession was contraband.” Williams v. State, 478 S.W.3d 947, 949 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Here, the State had to prove by “reasonable inference that the defendant knowingly possessed the contraband.” Id. Mere presence or proximity to the drug is insufficient without affirmative links to establish the element beyond a reasonable doubt. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

To determine whether there are sufficient links between the contraband and the defendant, courts look to a number of non-exhaustive factors:

(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested;

(7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Id. at 162 n.12. It is “not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial.” Id. at 162. “Affirmative links tend to establish that the accused’s connection with the contraband was more than just fortuitous.” Gill v. State, 57 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although these factors can help guide a court’s analysis, ultimately the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences

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therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).

c. Discussion

After reviewing the record, we conclude there were sufficient links between the cocaine and Guzman to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. After Chief Sanchez initiated the traffic stop, Guzman initially pulled off on a side street. He then stopped and started driving again three or four times before finally stopping. Chief Sanchez testified that this behavior is indicative of someone concealing contraband. When Chief Sanchez approached the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana. During the search of the vehicle, Chief Sanchez located two handguns and a small baggie with marijuana in it. The cocaine was located in close proximity to Guzman, between his driver’s seat and the center console—easily accessible to him. Guzman was driving the vehicle and confirmed the truck was his vehicle. In his appellate brief, Guzman focuses on the lack of fingerprints on the center console or “furtive gestures” on his part. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that the State need not prove all factors, but rather the sum total of the circumstantial evidence must be “sufficient to support a rational jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management of the . . . cocaine[.]” Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 163.

We hold that the logical force of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. See Id. at 166. Accordingly, we overrule Guzman’s second issue.

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CONCLUSION

Guzman’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH