Roberto Campos v. Ryan Thornell, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 16, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-08083
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Roberto Campos, No. CV-25-08083-PCT-DWL (JZB)

10 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

11 v.

12 Ryan Thornell, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 16 JUDGE: 17 Petitioner Roberto Campos has filed a pro se Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 (Doc. 1.) 19 I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION. 20 On June 15, 2009, Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, (doc. 13-1, Ex. E, at 40– 21 44), pleaded guilty to three counts of premeditated first-degree murder. (Id., Ex. F., at 53– 22 55, 62–63.) On July 13, 2009, he was sentenced to three concurrent natural life sentences. 23 (Id., Ex. H, at 77–79.) He timely commenced a Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) proceeding 24 on August 13, 2009, (id., Ex. J, at 91–93), which was dismissed by the trial court on August 25 25, 2010. (Id., Ex. N, at 104.) 26 Considering that Petitioner has taken no action between the dismissal of his Petition 27 for PCR on August 25, 2010, to the filing of the instant Habeas Petition, the Court finds 28 1 In his Petition, Petitioner has crossed-out “2254” and written “2241.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) 1 that the instant Petition is over 13-years late, a delay that is not excused by tolling or actual 2 innocence. Therefore, the Court recommends the instant Petition be dismissed with 3 prejudice. 4 II. BACKGROUND. 5 A. Facts. 6 On September 15, 2006, Petitioner was indicted by a Yavapai County grand jury on 7 nine counts: (a) three counts of premeditated first-degree; (b) three counts of felony 8 murder; and (c) three counts of kidnapping. (Id., Ex. A, at 3–6.) After settlement 9 conferences on May 12, 2009, and June 1, 2009, the parties entered into a Plea Agreement 10 on June 15, 2009. (Id., Exs. A–E, at 8, 10, 14–37, 40–44.) 11 In the Plea Agreement, the parties stipulated that Petitioner would be “sentenced to 12 concurrent terms of imprisonment . . . of natural life for each count, without the possibility 13 of commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release from confinement on any 14 basis.” (Id., Ex. E, at 41.) The state of Arizona stipulated and agreed to “withdraw its notice 15 of intent to seek the death penalty.” (Id.) Petitioner, his counsel, and the prosecutor signed 16 the Plea Agreement. (Id. at 43–44.) Petitioner initialed the operative pages of the Plea 17 Agreement. (Id. at 40–43.) 18 On June 15, 2009, the trial court reviewed the Plea Agreement with Petitioner, 19 advised him of his constitutional rights, and inquired as to whether any force, threats, or 20 promises outside of the Plea Agreement have induced his execution of the Agreement. (Id., 21 Ex. F., 48–53.) Petitioner confirmed that he agreed with the Plea Agreement, waived his 22 rights, and plead guilty. (Id. at 49–55, 62–63.) 23 Following his entry of a guilty plea pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Petitioner was 24 sentenced to three concurrent natural life sentences on July 13, 2009. (Id., Ex. H, at 77– 25 79.) 26 B. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings. 27 On August 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a timely petition for PCR.2 See (doc. 13 at 8); 28 2 See infra section IV.A. 1 see also (doc. 13-1, Ex. J, at 91–93); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1, 33.4. Petitioner raised a claim 2 for ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. J, at 92.) 3 Petitioner was provided counsel for his petition for PCR. (Id., Ex. K, at 95–96.) On 4 August 13, 2010, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss his petition for PCR. (Id., 5 Ex. L, at 98.) In the motion, counsel stated that “he reviewed the record . . . and found 6 claims sufficient for relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.” (Id.) 7 Counsel further stated that Petitioner agreed that the petition should be dismissed. (Id.) 8 On August 17, 2010, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to amend the motion to 9 dismiss petition for PCR. (Id., Ex. M, at 101.) The amended motion stated that the original 10 motion “should have read that undersigned found no claims sufficient for relief pursuant 11 to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.” (Id.) 12 On August 25, 2010, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s petition for PCR. (Id., Ex. 13 N, at 104.) 14 III. PETITIONER’S HABEAS PETITION. 15 On April 21, 2025, Petitioner initiated the instant action. (Doc. 1.) He originally 16 asserted two grounds: (a) an unclear claim which the Court construes as an allegation that 17 his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; and (b) a claim that the 18 Supremacy Clause preempts all state criminal law. (Id. at 6–7.) 19 On May 8, 2025, the District Court screened the Petition and dismissed Petitioner’s 20 Supremacy Clause claim. (Doc. 6 at 2–3.) Following the Screening Order, Respondent filed 21 a Response on July 10, 2025. (Doc. 13.) Petitioner has not filed a Reply, and the time for 22 doing so has expired. 23 IV. TIMELINESS. 24 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 25 judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 26 States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for habeas corpus are governed by the 27 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 28 A threshold matter for the Court is whether the instant Petition is time-barred by 1 AEDPA. See Blackman v. Cisneros, 122 F.4th 377, 381 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The timeliness 2 of a claim under AEDPA is a threshold question that must be decided before reaching the 3 merits.”). ADEPA establishes a 1-year statute of limitations commencing on: 4 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 5 review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 6 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 7 if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 8 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 9 the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 10 review; or 11 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 12 13 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 14 “In Arizona, a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to direct appeal and 15 may seek review only by collaterally attacking his convictions through PCR proceedings 16 under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32 (now Rule 33).” Isom v. Brnovich, No. CV-22-01084-PHX-JJT- 17 DMF, 2023 WL 4089230, at *10 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2023), report and recommendation 18 adopted, No. CV-22-01084-PHX-JJT-DMF, 2023 WL 4081807 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2023). 19 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that “Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right 20 proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 21 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716–17 (9th Cir. 2007). 22 Absent statutory or equitable tolling, or through the establishment of actual 23 innocence, a habeas petition filed after the 1-year statute of limitations is untimely. See 28 24 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (tolling the 1-year limit “during which a properly filed application for 25 State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 26 claim is pending”); see also Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (noting “that § 27 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases”); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 28 U.S. 383, 391–96 (2013) (“Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent 1 individual should not abate when the impediment is AEDPA’s statute of limitations.”). 2 A. The Instant Proceedings are Untimely. 3 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the instant Petition is untimely under 4 § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), where a petitioner seeks direct review of their 5 sentence, the statutory 1-year period begins on “the date on which the judgment became 6 final by the conclusion of direct review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because Petitioner 7 initiated PCR proceedings, see (doc. 13-1, Ex. J, at 91–93), the statutory 1-year period was 8 statutorily tolled until his PCR proceedings concluded. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 9 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) (“AEDPA’s one-year grace period is tolled during the pendency 10 of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue.”); see also 11 Summers, 481 F.3d at 716–17. 12 Here, Petitioner properly filed3 a petition for PCR on August 13, 2009.4 See (doc. 13 13 at 8); see also (doc. 13-1, Ex. J, at 91–93); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1, 33.4. While his 14 petition for PCR remained pending, the 1-year statute of limitations was tolled. See 15 Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1247. Petitioner’s petition for PCR remained pending until August 16 25, 2010, when the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. (doc. 13-1, Ex. N, at 104.) 17 Because Petitioner was provided until September 24, 2010, to file an appeal of the 18 dismissal, which Petitioner did not do, ADEPA’s 1-year statute of limitations was tolled 19 until September 24, 2010. 20 Consequently, Petitioner had until September 26, 2011, to timely file a habeas 21 petition.5 Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until April 21, 2025. See (doc. 1.) He

22 3 A petition is “properly filed” when it is delivered and accepted in compliance with the governing rules of the relevant jurisdiction. Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1016 23 (2009). 4 Although the Court notes that the Notice for post-conviction relief was filed on 24 August 20, 2009, see (doc. 13-1, Exs. J–K, at 91, 96), the prison mailbox rule, under Arizona law, applies to pro se PCR filings. Melville v. Shinn, 68 F.4th 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 25 2023). Petitioner filed his notice of PCR pro se, see (doc. 13-1, Ex. J, at 91–92), so the Court applies the prison mailbox rule. Because the notice was signed on August 13, 2009, 26 (id.), the Court assume that Petitioner turned his notice over to prison authorities on the same day he signed it. See Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 1178 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014), as 27 amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (June 24, 2014). 5 The Court notes that the one-year anniversary period, pursuant to Patterson, expired 28 on September 25, 2011. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1247. September 25, 2011, was a Sunday. Therefore, the deadline was September 26, 2011. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). 1 did not file any intervening habeas petitions or petitions for PCR. Hence, the instant 2 Petition was filed 13 years, 6 months, and 26 days late. Additionally, because Petitioner 3 has taken no action since filing his initial petition for PCR, no further statutory tolling— 4 beyond the tolling for his only petition for PCR—is applicable. 5 B. Equitable Tolling. 6 Although a petitioner’s habeas petition may be untimely, the expired statute of 7 limitations may be excused by equitable tolling. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 645. “A petitioner 8 who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1-year filing deadline must show that (1) some 9 ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and (2) he has diligently 10 pursued his rights.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Holland, 11 560 U.S. at 649). Petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. 12 See Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable 13 tolling is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 14 account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 15 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by 16 itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 17 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 18 Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 19 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) 20 (“Equitable tolling is justified in few cases[.]”). “Petitioner must show that the 21 extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 22 circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 23 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). “Indeed, the threshold necessary to trigger equitable 24 tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. 25 Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). 26 Petitioner fails to establish either an extraordinary circumstance precluded him from 27 filing a timely habeas petition or that he was diligent in pursuing his rights. Because 28 Petitioner has not filed a reply, the Court can only rely upon his Habeas Petition to elucidate 1 a reason why his Petition was untimely. In his Petition, Petitioner’s sole excuse for why 2 his Habeas Petition was untimely is an unavailing argument that “[t]here is no statute of 3 limitation on claims of illegal imprisonment[.]” (Doc. 1 at 9.) If such a statement were true, 4 the AEDPA and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent interpreting it would be for 5 naught. Because such statement is incorrect, the Court finds Petitioner’s sole excuse 6 unavailing. Therefore, because Petitioner was neither diligent nor precluded from filing a 7 timely habeas petition due to an extraordinary circumstance, he is not entitled to equitable 8 tolling. 9 C. Actual Innocence. 10 A petitioner’s untimely habeas petition may be excused if, in the petition, he raises 11 “a convincing claim of actual innocence[.]” See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 398. “It is 12 important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere 13 legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). The petitioner 14 “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 15 him in the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 16 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his 17 allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 18 scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 19 was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. “Given the rarity of such evidence, in 20 virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” 21 Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 Petitioner has not carried his burden in establishing a convincing claim of actual 23 innocence as required by McQuiggin and Schlup. The Court finds that Petitioner’s petition 24 mainly asserts legal insufficiency as opposed to factual innocence. See generally (doc. 1.) 25 The only instance where Petitioner appears to be asserting factual innocence is where he 26 states that he “never knew about any of those crimes,” and that the police told him “they 27 would have the State of Arizona kill [him] thr[ough the] death penalty” if he did not accept 28 responsibility. (Id. at 6.) Even assuming, arguendo, that this allegation goes towards his 1 factual innocence, it does not equate reliable “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 2 eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Furthermore, 3 given the rarity of such reliable evidence, Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990, and considering the 4 avowals he made—and trial court’s findings—during the plea hearing constitute a 5 “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding[,]” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 6 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977), the Court does not find that Petitioner has met his burden in 7 establishing a convincing claim of actual innocence. 8 V. CONCLUSION. 9 Because the Petition is untimely and not excused by tolling or actual innocence, the 10 Court recommends it be dismissed with prejudice. Because the record is sufficiently 11 developed, and the Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary for 12 resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 Furthermore, if the recommendations contained herein are adopted, the District 14 Court’s decision will be based on procedural grounds. Therefore, and for the reasons 15 contained herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether the District Judge 16 was correct in the procedural ruling. Accordingly, it is recommended that a certificate of 17 appealability should be denied. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 18 Accordingly, 19 IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 20 (doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 21 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 22 to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED. 23 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 24 Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should 25 not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The Parties shall have 14 days 26 from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific 27 written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 28 72. Thereafter, the Parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the objections. 1 Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 2 || Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the || District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 5 || Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 6|| findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 7 || recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 8 Dated this 16th day of March, 2026. 9 16 lon — ll United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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