Roberta West v. Clifford Hamilton

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 9, 2008
Docket07-07-00235-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Roberta West v. Clifford Hamilton (Roberta West v. Clifford Hamilton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roberta West v. Clifford Hamilton, (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

NO. 07-07-0235-CV


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL E


OCTOBER 9, 2008


______________________________



ROBERTA WEST, APPELLANT



                                                                   V.

 


CLIFFORD HAMILTON, APPELLEE


_________________________________


FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;


NO. 2006-534,940; HON. SAM MEDINA, PRESIDING


_______________________________


Before QUINN, C.J., CAMPBELL, J., and BOYD, SJ.

          In this appeal, appellant Roberta West seeks reversal of a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of appellee Clifford Hamilton. In doing so, she presents two points of error in which she asserts: 1) the trial court erred in granting its judgment; and 2) appellee was not entitled to assert a defense of limitations to her suit. For reasons later stated, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

          On November 17, 1999, appellant and appellee entered into a fresh and brine water lease with Panhandle Brine Sales, Inc. Parenthetically, although the parties never entered into a formal agency agreement, both parties refer to appellee as appellant’s agent in connection with the agreement. Appellant asserts that in February 2006, she discovered that in negotiating the lease, appellee had engaged in certain actions that hampered her ability to sell her property. As a result, in May 2006, she sued appellee for breach of fiduciary relationship, breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, statutory fraud, tortious interference with contract, deceptive trade practices, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

          Appellee responded to the suit by moving for summary judgment based upon the affirmative defense of limitations, asserting that prior to its execution, appellant was advised of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement and that she read it within thirty days of its execution and understood its terms. In considering this response, we note that an affirmative defense such as limitations must be included in the pleadings of the party seeking to assert it. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991). Appellee had only filed a general denial and did not raise his affirmative defense of limitations in that document. However, an unpleaded affirmative defense may serve as the basis for a summary judgment if it is raised in the motion and the opposing party does not object to the failure to plead it in its summary judgment response or before the summary judgment rendition. See Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings, L.L.C., 223 S.W.3d 676, 688 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Appellant did not file such an objection prior to the rendition of this summary judgment and she now concedes that particular issue is properly before this court.

          In his summary judgment motion, appellee contended that appellant had “no cause of action that is not time barred.” In support of the motion, appellee relied upon the fresh and brine water agreement itself as well as the depositions of himself and appellant. In her response, appellant asserted more than nineteen facts that she claimed precluded summary judgment, and, in support of that proposition, submitted her affidavit, her deposition, and the deposition of appellee.

          Appellant conceded that appellee could establish that she read the contract about one month after its execution and that she discovered it provided that appellee would receive 33% of the lease payments rather than the 15% upon which they had agreed. Even so, she contended, appellee could not overcome the overwhelming evidence that she did not understand that appellee’s commission was to be paid forever, even after her death, or that she understood that her rights to sell her property or to renegotiate were limited because of appellee’s actions.

Discussion

          Our review of a summary judgment is de novo to determine whether the movant established the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); Dickey v. Club Corp. of America, 12 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2000, pet. denied). In conducting that review, we take all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubt in the non-movant’s favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). In instances in which the movant is a defendant, it must negate at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). Likewise, a defendant who conclusively establishes each element of an affirmative defense and leaves no issue of material fact is entitled to summary judgment. Id.; Morrone v. Prestonwood Christian Academy, 215 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2007, pet. denied); AMS Constr. Co., Inc. v. Warm Springs Rehab. Foundation, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

          Because limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the initial burden to plead, prove, and secure findings on limitations. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988). Thus, when a defendant asserts a limitations defense in a motion for summary judgment, he must: 1) prove when the cause of action accrued; and 2) negate the discovery rule if it was pleaded or otherwise raised by the plaintiff. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999); see also Dolenz v. Boundy, 197 S.W.3d 416, 419-20 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (a defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations must conclusively negate any relevant tolling provision asserted by the non-movant). A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been legally injured by the alleged wrong, however slightly.

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Related

Dolenz v. Boundy
197 S.W.3d 416 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson
891 S.W.2d 640 (Texas Supreme Court, 1995)
Roark v. STALLWORTH OIL AND GAS, INC
813 S.W.2d 492 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Dickey v. Club Corp. of America
12 S.W.3d 172 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Morrone v. Prestonwood Christian Academy
215 S.W.3d 575 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Gonzales v. Shing Wai Brass & Metal Wares Factory, Ltd.
190 S.W.3d 742 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.
769 S.W.2d 515 (Texas Supreme Court, 1988)
Cathey v. Booth
900 S.W.2d 339 (Texas Supreme Court, 1995)
AMS Const. Co., Inc. v. Warm Springs Rehabilitation Foundation, Inc.
94 S.W.3d 152 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.
690 S.W.2d 546 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
Proctor v. White
172 S.W.3d 649 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Upchurch v. Albear
5 S.W.3d 274 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings, L.L.C.
223 S.W.3d 676 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Murphy v. Campbell
964 S.W.2d 265 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)
Willis v. Maverick
760 S.W.2d 642 (Texas Supreme Court, 1988)
KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Finance Corp.
988 S.W.2d 746 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)

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Roberta West v. Clifford Hamilton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roberta-west-v-clifford-hamilton-texapp-2008.