Robert William Antrobius II v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00291-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00291-CR

ROBERT WILLIAM ANTROBIUS II, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 108th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 081902-E-CR, Honorable Douglas R. Woodburn, Presiding

November 12, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Robert William Antrobius II, was convicted by a jury of attempted

aggravated sexual assault of a child.1 Before sentencing, Appellant entered into a plea

agreement with the State under which the State dismissed count one of his indictment,

Appellant agreed to a sentence of seven years of confinement, and he executed a written

waiver of his right of appeal. The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the

plea agreement and entered a certification of Appellant’s right of appeal reflecting that

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(2)(B). Appellant waived his right of appeal. Notwithstanding the certification, Appellant filed a

notice of appeal challenging his conviction.

We are required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) to dismiss an appeal “if a

certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of

the record.” By letter of October 21, 2025, we notified Appellant of the consequences of

the trial court’s certification and directed him to show grounds for continuing the appeal.

In response, Appellant asserts that he was experiencing alcohol and nicotine

withdrawal and lacked prescribed anxiety medication when he entered into the

agreement. He, therefore, contends that the appeal should proceed on the issue of

whether his plea and waiver were voluntary. However, the voluntariness of a plea

agreement in a felony conviction cannot be raised on direct appeal. See Cooper v. State,

45 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that claims of involuntary pleas must

be raised by procedures other than appeal, such as a motion for new trial or application

for writ of habeas corpus). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim of an involuntary plea does not

confer a right of appeal or invalidate the trial court’s certification. See Brown v. State, No.

04-18-00642-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 9533, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 21,

2018, no pet.) (dismissing appeal based on trial court’s certification where appellant

alleged his plea was involuntary).

Because the trial court’s certification comports with the record and confirms that

Appellant waived his right of appeal, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule of Appellate

Procedure 25.2(d).

Per Curiam

Do not publish. 2