Robert Wayne Johnson v. Seattle Bank

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 23, 2025
Docket02-25-00278-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Robert Wayne Johnson v. Seattle Bank (Robert Wayne Johnson v. Seattle Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Wayne Johnson v. Seattle Bank, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00278-CV ___________________________

ROBERT WAYNE JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

SEATTLE BANK, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-001893-1

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this forcible-detainer appeal, Appellant Robert Wayne Johnson appeals from

the trial court’s June 11, 2025 “Order for Possession” awarding Appellee Seattle Bank

possession of the subject premises.

After we received Johnson’s notice of appeal, we learned that the writ of

possession issued in the case had been executed on July 2, 2025, and that Johnson was

no longer in actual possession of the property at issue.

A case becomes moot if, at any stage of the proceedings, a controversy ceases

to exist between the parties. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio,

198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001).

An appeal in a forcible-detainer case becomes moot when the appellant vacates the

property unless the appellant holds and asserts a meritorious claim of right to current,

actual possession of the property. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787.

We notified Johnson of our concern that the appeal had become moot and that

we therefore had no jurisdiction. We stated that we would dismiss the appeal for

want of jurisdiction unless Johnson or any party wishing to continue the appeal filed a

response, within ten days, showing grounds for continuing the appeal. Ten days have

passed, and we have received no response.

Here, as evidenced by the executed writ of possession, Johnson is no longer in

actual possession of the property, and he has not presented any other basis for

claiming a current, actual right to possession. See id.; Holt v. McQueen, No. 14-09-

2 00193-CV, 2009 WL 1795698, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2009,

no pet.) (mem. op.); Gallien v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-07-00075-CV,

2008 WL 4670465, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2008, pet. dism’d

w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“Lack of any basis for claiming a current right to possess a

residential premises renders an appeal from a judgment of possession moot.”).

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case as moot.

See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785; Hizar v. 777 ER, LLC, No. 02-24-00549-CV,

2025 WL 876778, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 20, 2025, no pet.) (per curiam)

(mem. op.) (vacating judgment and dismissing case as moot in appeal from a forcible

detainer judgment).

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker Justice

Delivered: October 23, 2025

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Related

Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio
198 S.W.3d 782 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Williams v. Lara
52 S.W.3d 171 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)

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Robert Wayne Johnson v. Seattle Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-wayne-johnson-v-seattle-bank-texapp-2025.