Robert Wayne Hackett, Et Ux. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co., USA

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 4, 2015
• Docket: CA-0014-0855
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-855

ROBERT WAYNE HACKETT, ET UX.

VERSUS

MURPHY EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION CO. - USA

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 95387 HONORABLE JULES D. EDWARDS, III, DISTRICT JUDGE

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, James T. Genovese, and David Kent Savoie, Judges.

Genovese, J., concurs in the result.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Jude Christopher Bursavich Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, L.L.P. P. O. Box 3197 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3197 Telephone: (225) 387-4000 COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiffs/Appellees - Robert Wayne Hackett and Kaye Breedlove Hackett Andrew J. Halverson Milling Benson Woodward P. O. Box 51327 Lafayette, LA 70505-1327 Telephone: (337) 232-3929 COUNSEL FOR: Defendant/Appellant - Murphy Exploration & Production Co. – USA THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this dispute over the ownership of land beneath a public road right-

of-way, Murphy Exploration & Production Company (“Murphy”) appeals the grant

of summary judgment declaring Robert Hackett and Kaye Breedlove Hackett

owners of the disputed property. Murphy asserts that summary judgment is

improper because the act of sale is ambiguous as to the parties’ intent. We agree.

For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand

the matter for further proceedings.

I.

ISSUES

We are entreated to decide:

1. whether the district court erred in granting the Hacketts summary

judgment, when the act of sale contains alleged ambiguities as to the parties’

intent to sell the property in dispute; and,

2. whether the district court’s judgment is contradictory or unclear

and, therefore, cannot be enforced as written.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The property in dispute was first acquired by Elmer Stansel from H.B.

White in 1911. White sold to Stansel 125 acres “being bounded on the East by

Issac Lyons, and South and West by L. and H. Canal right-of-way, and North by an

imaginary line parallel to the South boundary.” At the time, the southern boundary, described as the “Canal right-of-way,” shown by the survey maps, was

the southern section line for Section 37.

In 1921 Stansel entered into an exchange with Issac Lyons in which

Stansel traded a triangle-shaped portion of his 125 acres acquired from White,

lying in Section 36, for a triangle-shaped portion of Lyon’s land lying in Section

37. Before this exchange, both Stansel and Lyons granted a right-of-way to

Vermilion Parish for the construction of a public road. The right-of-way ran along

the southernmost border of both properties, but was north of Section 37’s southern

section line. Therefore, after the exchange, Stansel’s property encompassed the

public road right-of-way.

Immediately following the exchange with Lyons, Stansel sold his

property to Homer Woods. The act of sale described two tracts, the first being the

remaining property Stansel acquired from White, approximately 96 acres, “more or

less,” and the second being the triangle acquired from Lyons in the exchange. It is

from this document that the current dispute arises. Robert Hackett, plaintiff, has

ultimately inherited any remaining property belonging to Stansel. Murphy,

defendant, was granted an oil and gas leasehold interest for a unit that encompasses

the property owned by Woods, now by Woods’ heirs, to whom Murphy has paid

royalties. The Hacketts initiated this suit to establish them as owners of the land

lying beneath the public road right-of-way and to collect the royalties from

Murphy that would be due to them as owners.

The Hacketts argue that the property beneath the public road was

excluded from the Stansel-Woods Sale and, therefore, has been inherited by Robert

Hackett. The Hacketts moved for partial summary judgment asking the court to

recognize them as owners of the property. The motion also asked the court to

2 declare the disputed property as being within the MIOGYP Sand Units A & B,

Reservoir A. The district court, relying largely on Lamson Petroleum Co. v.

Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 99-1937 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/10/00), 763 So.2d 40, writ

denied, 00-2305 (La. 11/27/00), 775 So.2d 446, granted the partial summary

judgment in favor of the Hacketts, declaring the Hacketts owners of the property in

dispute. Murphy now appeals.

Murphy argues that subsequent decisions in the Lamson line of cases

indicate that, where the entirety of a document transferring property evidences a

conflict between the property description and the parties’ intent, the intent of the

parties should be further investigated. Murphy contends that the Stansel-Woods

Sale document indicates the parties’ intent to sell the property in dispute. Murphy

posits that this conflict between intent and the description of the property sold

prevents this dispute from being resolved by summary judgment. Furthermore,

Murphy argues that the conduct of the parties following the sale supports the

assertion that Stansel intended to sell the land burdened by the right-of-way.

Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Hacketts are or

are not the owners of the disputed property. Murphy also appeals the written

judgment asserting it contains contradictory rulings and insists it cannot be

enforced as written.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When an appellate court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for

summary judgment, it applies the de novo standard of review, “using the same

criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is

3 appropriate.” Gray v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 07-1670, p. 6 (La. 2/26/08),

977 So.2d 839, 844 (quoting Supreme Servs. & Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny Greer,

06-1827, p. 4 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638). The motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

admissions, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material

fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P.

art. 966(B).

“Material facts are those that determine the outcome of the legal

dispute.” Carmichael v. Bass P’ship, 11-845, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 95

So.3d 1069, 1072. In order to determine whether facts are outcome-determinative,

the court looks to applicable substantive law. Id.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

For the Hacketts to be deemed owners of the disputed property, they

must demonstrate that they acquired ownership in one of two ways: (1) from a

previous owner or (2) by acquisitive prescription. La.Civ.Code art. 531. It is

undisputed that Mr. Hackett has inherited any property that belonged to Stansel by

inheriting from Stansel’s children. The Hacketts must, therefore, prove that

Stansel owned the disputed property at the time of his death. The dispute between

the parties arises from a sale between Elmer Stansel and Homer Woods (“Stansel-

Woods Sale”), in which Stansel sold to Woods two tracts of land in Vermilion

Parish. The act of sale described the two tracts as follows:

One certain tract of land lying and being situated in Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, on the West side of Rail Road right-of-way, containing Ninety-six (96) acres, more or less, lying in Section Thirty-seven (37),

4 Township Eleven (11), South Range Two (2) West, bounded on the Northwest by L. & H. Canal righ[t]-of- way, on the Southwest by the Public Road, and on the East by the Rail Road right-of-way. Being the same property acquired from H.B. White.

2nd: One certain tract of land situated in the Parish of Vermilion, Louisiana, containing Twenty-five and 54/100 acres, being in the Lyon Grant in Section Thirty-seven (37) Township Eleven (11), South of Range Two (2) West, commencing on “West side of Gueydan- Crowley High-way and running along the North line of Canal right-of-way 20.74 chains; thence North 44.30 West 27.00 chains; thence South along the West side of Road right-of-way to point of beginning, being Lot “B” of plat attached to an Act of Exchange between Vendor and Isaac H. Lyons, less a strip of land along the Southwest line sold for Public Road to Vermilion Parish and also less a strip of land on the first tract hereinabove described sold for Public Road to Vermilion Parish, containing Four and 84/100 (4.84) acres.

(Emphasis added).

The property in dispute is that described in the first paragraph above.

The Hacketts argue that the phrase “bounded by” includes the land within and up

to the public road boundary in the sale, but does not include the land under the

public road. Under this analysis, Stansel retained ownership of the land subject to

the Vermilion Parish road right-of-way. The Hacketts’ interpretation of the

“bounded by” phrase is supported by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The supreme

court stated that a sale per aversionem, conducted prior to the enactment of

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2971-9:2973 in 1956, did not include the property

underlying a right-of-way, when that right-of-way was used to describe the

boundary of the property being conveyed. State Through Dep’t of Highways v.

Tucker, 170 So.2d 371 (La.1964). “The rule had a sound basis: It effectuated the

intent of the parties, who had definitely fixed the perimeter of the property by

contract.” Id. at 373. The Hacketts, therefore, argue that the “bounded by”

5 language in the description of the first tract of land, did not transfer Stansel’s

interests to the right-of-way, and Stansel remained the owner of the disputed

property following the sale. Such an analysis would result in the Hacketts

inheriting the disputed property.

According to Louisiana Civil Code Article 2046, “[w]hen the words

of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further

interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” However, the

provisions of a contract must also be interpreted in light of each other “so that each

is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.” La.Civ.Code art.

2050.

The second tract sold to Woods describes the property Stansel

acquired through the exchange with Lyons. Before the exchange, Lyons granted

Vermilion Parish a right-of-way for the public road. In describing Tract Two in

the Stansel-Woods Sale, the description defines the property then adds, “less a strip

of land along the Southwest line sold for Public Road to Vermilion Parish and also

less a strip of land on the first tract of herein above described sold for Public Road

to Vermilion Parish, containing Four and 84/100 (4.84) acres.” (Emphasis added).

Louisiana courts have recognized that “less” a certain “right of way” language in a

conveyance of property operates to acknowledge the existence of the servitude and

remove it from the vendor’s warranty, but is not the retention of ownership by the

vendor. Hendrick v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 212 So.2d 745 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1968),

see also Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Guillory, 17 So.2d 13 (La.1943). “The

vendors under such a deed are stripped of all vestiges of ownership in the property

conveyed, and such clauses are not ambiguous under the settled jurisprudence of

this State.” Hendrick, 212 So.2d at 747.

6 Therefore, when the entirety of the Stansel-Woods Sale contract is

read together, the “bounded by” language in the description of Tract One conflicts

with the “less a strip of land” language in the description of Tract Two. The first

would only convey the property up until the public road, but not the land under it;

the second would only remove the right-of-way from the vendor’s warranty, but

transfer ownership to the land under the public road. Although Louisiana courts

have clearly determined the meaning of the phrase “bounded by” in property

descriptions, this “common sense interpretation” is limited to instances in which

“nothing in the description or elsewhere in the instrument indicat[es] otherwise.”1

Lamson Petroleum Co. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 02-138 p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

7/10/02), 823 So.2d 431, 434, writ granted in part and remanded on other

grounds, 02-1338, 02-1681, 02-2419 (La. 10/25/02), 832 So.2d 975. The

description of Tract Two specifically refers back to Tract One. It is also noted that

the “less a strip” phrase was clearly an addition to the property description,

originally in the Stansel-Lyons Exchange, made for the Stansel-Woods Sale. The

“less a strip of land” language in Tract Two simply acknowledges the right-of-way

on Tract One. If the property was not sold to Woods, the last sentence in the

description of Tract Two would be unnecessary because Stansel would not need to

discuss the servitude if the land beneath it was not being sold to Woods.

Therefore, the two phrases conflict with one another.

In addition, the description of Tract One in the Stansel-Woods Sale

has two contradictory phrases in itself. While the property is described as being

bounded by the right-of-way as previously explained, the last sentence of the

1 The transaction comprised one sale of two tracts of land. Indeed, the language of the document refers to “the property of which the following is a description, to-wit” and then goes on to describe the two tracts.

7 description states the property is “the same property acquired from H.B. White.”

When Stansel acquired property from White in 1911, there was no public road

right-of-way, and the property extended to the Canal right-of-way, which from

survey maps is the southern line of Section 37. If the land sold to Woods was the

same as that acquired by Stansel from White, then the land beneath the public road

was in fact sold to Woods. However, this interpretation would conflict with the

pre-1956 meaning of the phrase “bounded by.”

When read in its entirety, the Stansel-Woods Sale contract is

ambiguous. The language used in the description of the two properties is

susceptible to more than one conflicting interpretation. When provisions do

conflict, and the parties’ “intent cannot be clearly ascertained from the face of the

agreement, the court may consider the written provisions in light of other pertinent

evidence.” Lamson, 763 So.2d at 43-44. Generally, summary judgment is not

appropriate for claims based on intent, a subjective fact. Phipps v. Schupp, 09-

2037 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 593. Although the supreme court “has acknowledged

‘summary judgment may be granted on subjective intent issues when no issue of

material fact exists concerning the pertinent intent,’” that is not the case here. Id.

at 597 (quoting Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 28 (La.

7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751). The conflicting phrases in the Stansel-Woods Sale

raise genuine issues of material fact and require extrinsic evidence to be considered

to determine the intent of the parties in that sale. It is a general rule that when the

intent of the parties to a written contract “is not clear from the four corners of the

document, we look to parol evidence.” Carmichael, 95 So.3d at 1075.

In finding ambiguities within the Stansel-Woods Sale, extrinsic

evidence needs to be considered. Based on the foregoing and because questions of

8 intent are generally not susceptible to determination by summary judgment, the

grant of the Hacketts’ motion for summary judgment was improper.

Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment,

we pretermit discussion of whether the district court’s judgment is enforceable as

written.

V.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the grant of partial summary judgment is

reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal

are assessed to the plaintiffs-appellants.