Robert Watson v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 3, 2024
DocketPH-315H-22-0306-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Robert Watson v. Department of the Army (Robert Watson v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Watson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROBERT WATSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-315H-22-0306-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: January 3, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Renn Fowler , Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.

Jeffrey P. Meineke , Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. 2 Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify that the appellant has a property interest in continued employment and is entitled to constitutional due process, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On review, the agency does not dispute that the appellant meets the statutory definition of an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), but argues that, unlike the statute at issue in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), 5 U.S.C. § 7511 does not confer a property interest in continued employment. As set forth below, we agree with the appellant that the agency’s arguments on review disregard the plain language of the statute as well as relevant precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 3

2 We exercise our discretion to refrain from dismissing the agency’s petition for failure to certify its compliance with the interim relief order. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e) (providing that failure to provide the certification of compliance required under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a) “may” result in the dismissal of the agency’s petition or cross petition for review). 3 In pertinent part, the agency’s petition for review fails to cite controlling Federal Circuit precedent relating to due process, including the court’s decisions in Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We condemn the agency’s failure to apply controlling precedent, especially given the evidence showing that the appellant was an employee under 5 U.S.C. section 7511. See Williams v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 75 M.S.P.R. 144, 149 (1997) (condemning the agency’s efforts to seek dismissal of an appeal on timeliness grounds when it possessed evidence showing that the appeal was timely filed). 3

Contrary to the agency’s arguments on review, we find the appellant is entitled to the minimum due process described in Loudermill. In Loudermill, the Court found that the respondents, who were public employees, had a property interest in continued employment under Ohio law, which provided that “classified civil service employees” were entitled to keep their positions “during good behavior and efficient service” and could not be dismissed except for “misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.” Id. at 538-59 (internal quotations omitted). The Court concluded that, under the Due Process Clause, the respondents could not be deprived of that property interest without constitutionally adequate procedures. Id. at 541. After weighing the private and public interests at stake, the Court determined that due process required prior notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposed termination. Id. at 546. The statutory Federal employment scheme similarly provides that an agency may take an adverse action against an “employee,” as defined at 5 U.S.C. § 7511, only for “unacceptable performance,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 4303, or “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Like the statute at issue in Loudermill, these provisions confer a property interest in continued employment and entitle the employee to minimum due process. Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). It is undisputed that the appellant meets the definition of an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), i.e., “an individual in the competitive service . . . who has completed 1 year of current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.” See McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an individual who is excluded from “employee” status under section 7511(a) (1)(A)(i) is nonetheless an “employee” if the individual meets the definition under section 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Schibik v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 8 (2005) (following McCormick). Consequently, he was entitled 4

to the minimum due process described in Loudermill, i.e., prior notice and an opportunity to respond to the agency’s charges. Schibik, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 10. Because the agency denied the appellant minimum due process, the removal action must be reversed. Id.

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Related

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
470 U.S. 532 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Ward v. United States Postal Service
634 F.3d 1274 (Federal Circuit, 2011)
John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Ann M. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force
307 F.3d 1339 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Robert Watson v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-watson-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.