UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ROBERT WATSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-315H-22-0306-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: January 3, 2024 Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Renn Fowler , Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.
Jeffrey P. Meineke , Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. 2 Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify that the appellant has a property interest in continued employment and is entitled to constitutional due process, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On review, the agency does not dispute that the appellant meets the statutory definition of an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), but argues that, unlike the statute at issue in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), 5 U.S.C. § 7511 does not confer a property interest in continued employment. As set forth below, we agree with the appellant that the agency’s arguments on review disregard the plain language of the statute as well as relevant precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 3
2 We exercise our discretion to refrain from dismissing the agency’s petition for failure to certify its compliance with the interim relief order. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e) (providing that failure to provide the certification of compliance required under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a) “may” result in the dismissal of the agency’s petition or cross petition for review). 3 In pertinent part, the agency’s petition for review fails to cite controlling Federal Circuit precedent relating to due process, including the court’s decisions in Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We condemn the agency’s failure to apply controlling precedent, especially given the evidence showing that the appellant was an employee under 5 U.S.C. section 7511. See Williams v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 75 M.S.P.R. 144, 149 (1997) (condemning the agency’s efforts to seek dismissal of an appeal on timeliness grounds when it possessed evidence showing that the appeal was timely filed). 3
Contrary to the agency’s arguments on review, we find the appellant is entitled to the minimum due process described in Loudermill. In Loudermill, the Court found that the respondents, who were public employees, had a property interest in continued employment under Ohio law, which provided that “classified civil service employees” were entitled to keep their positions “during good behavior and efficient service” and could not be dismissed except for “misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.” Id. at 538-59 (internal quotations omitted). The Court concluded that, under the Due Process Clause, the respondents could not be deprived of that property interest without constitutionally adequate procedures. Id. at 541. After weighing the private and public interests at stake, the Court determined that due process required prior notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposed termination. Id. at 546. The statutory Federal employment scheme similarly provides that an agency may take an adverse action against an “employee,” as defined at 5 U.S.C. § 7511, only for “unacceptable performance,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 4303, or “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Like the statute at issue in Loudermill, these provisions confer a property interest in continued employment and entitle the employee to minimum due process. Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). It is undisputed that the appellant meets the definition of an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), i.e., “an individual in the competitive service . . . who has completed 1 year of current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.” See McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an individual who is excluded from “employee” status under section 7511(a) (1)(A)(i) is nonetheless an “employee” if the individual meets the definition under section 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Schibik v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 8 (2005) (following McCormick). Consequently, he was entitled 4
to the minimum due process described in Loudermill, i.e., prior notice and an opportunity to respond to the agency’s charges. Schibik, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 10. Because the agency denied the appellant minimum due process, the removal action must be reversed. Id.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ROBERT WATSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-315H-22-0306-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: January 3, 2024 Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Renn Fowler , Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.
Jeffrey P. Meineke , Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. 2 Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify that the appellant has a property interest in continued employment and is entitled to constitutional due process, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On review, the agency does not dispute that the appellant meets the statutory definition of an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), but argues that, unlike the statute at issue in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), 5 U.S.C. § 7511 does not confer a property interest in continued employment. As set forth below, we agree with the appellant that the agency’s arguments on review disregard the plain language of the statute as well as relevant precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 3
2 We exercise our discretion to refrain from dismissing the agency’s petition for failure to certify its compliance with the interim relief order. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e) (providing that failure to provide the certification of compliance required under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a) “may” result in the dismissal of the agency’s petition or cross petition for review). 3 In pertinent part, the agency’s petition for review fails to cite controlling Federal Circuit precedent relating to due process, including the court’s decisions in Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We condemn the agency’s failure to apply controlling precedent, especially given the evidence showing that the appellant was an employee under 5 U.S.C. section 7511. See Williams v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 75 M.S.P.R. 144, 149 (1997) (condemning the agency’s efforts to seek dismissal of an appeal on timeliness grounds when it possessed evidence showing that the appeal was timely filed). 3
Contrary to the agency’s arguments on review, we find the appellant is entitled to the minimum due process described in Loudermill. In Loudermill, the Court found that the respondents, who were public employees, had a property interest in continued employment under Ohio law, which provided that “classified civil service employees” were entitled to keep their positions “during good behavior and efficient service” and could not be dismissed except for “misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.” Id. at 538-59 (internal quotations omitted). The Court concluded that, under the Due Process Clause, the respondents could not be deprived of that property interest without constitutionally adequate procedures. Id. at 541. After weighing the private and public interests at stake, the Court determined that due process required prior notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposed termination. Id. at 546. The statutory Federal employment scheme similarly provides that an agency may take an adverse action against an “employee,” as defined at 5 U.S.C. § 7511, only for “unacceptable performance,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 4303, or “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Like the statute at issue in Loudermill, these provisions confer a property interest in continued employment and entitle the employee to minimum due process. Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). It is undisputed that the appellant meets the definition of an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), i.e., “an individual in the competitive service . . . who has completed 1 year of current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.” See McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an individual who is excluded from “employee” status under section 7511(a) (1)(A)(i) is nonetheless an “employee” if the individual meets the definition under section 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Schibik v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 8 (2005) (following McCormick). Consequently, he was entitled 4
to the minimum due process described in Loudermill, i.e., prior notice and an opportunity to respond to the agency’s charges. Schibik, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 10. Because the agency denied the appellant minimum due process, the removal action must be reversed. Id.
ORDER We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal and retroactively restore the appellant effective July 14, 2022. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts , 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b). No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not 5
fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a). For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be made within the 60-day period set forth above.
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued the initial decision on your appeal.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
4 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 6
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following address: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 7
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx . Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 8
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives this decision. If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is: Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission P.O. Box 77960 Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 131 M Street, N.E. Suite 5SW12G Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your petition for 5 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 9
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following address: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510. 10
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________ Jennifer Everling Acting Clerk of the Board Washington, D.C. DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE Civilian Pay Operations
DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at: https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.
NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.
☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.
Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:
☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.
☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.
☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***
☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***
☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).
☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment. Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also, include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation, CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums, or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.
Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g). NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts. 1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information describing what to do in accordance with decision. 2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration: a. Employee name and social security number. b. Detailed explanation of request. c. Valid agency accounting. d. Authorized signature (Table 63). e. If interest is to be included. f. Check mailing address. g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached. h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be collected (if applicable). Attachments to AD-343 1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable). 2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts. 3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency. 4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to return monies. 5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable) 6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the type of leave to be charged and number of hours. 7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave to be paid. NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and required data in 1-7 above. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.) a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above. b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided. c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable. If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.