Robert Thomas v. COmmissioner of Social Security

497 F. App'x 916
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 19, 2012
Docket12-11567
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 497 F. App'x 916 (Robert Thomas v. COmmissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Thomas v. COmmissioner of Social Security, 497 F. App'x 916 (11th Cir. 2012).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Robert Thomas appeals an order 1 affirming the decision by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to deny a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental insurance income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. On appeal, Thomas argues that the ALJ erred by finding that he had a “limited education.” Thomas also argues that the ALJ erred by determining that “there were a significant number of jobs which *918 existed in the national economy which the appellant could perform.”

When an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we review the ALJ’s decision as if it is the Commissioner’s final decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.2001). We review to “determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir.2011) (quotation marks omitted). “We may not decide facts anew [or] reweigh the evidence” and we must defer to the ALJs decision if it “is supported by substantial evidence ... even if the proof preponderates against it.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.2005) (quotation marks omitted).

Eligibility for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income requires that the claimant is under a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382(a)(l)(2). The ALJ must complete a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. This evaluation looks to whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has “a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment,” or combination of impairments, “that meets the duration requirement”; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals a statutory listing and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant work in light of his residual functional capacity; and (5) can adjust to other work given his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

I.

Thomas first argues that the ALJ erred by determining that he had a “limited education.” A claimant’s education is one of the elements that the ALJ must consider when determining whether a claimant can adjust to other work under step five of the disability determination process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In evaluating a claimant’s education, formal schooling or training is the primary factor, but the ALJ may also consider past work experience and responsibilities, daily activities, and hobbies. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(a), 416.964(a). “The term education also includes how well [the claimant] is able to communicate in English.” Id. at §§ 404.1564(b), 416.964(b). A claimant who is determined to have a “limited education” has “ability in reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills, but not enough to ... do most of the more complex job duties needed in semi-skilled or skilled jobs.” Id. at §§ 404.1564(b)(3), 416.964(a)(3).

Thomas argues that the ALJ erred in her analysis of his educational level in several ways. First, Thomas says that the ALJ failed to “address[ ] his testimony in her decision.” However, the ALJ specifically mentioned portions of Thomas’s testimony in her opinion. For example, the ALJ’s opinion explains how Thomas testified that he “participated in special education classes in grade school,” “quit school in the ninth grade,” and “was unable to understand the questionnaires that were sent to him from the Social Security Administration.” While there were other parts of Thomas’s testimony that the ALJ did not specifically refer to, such as Thomas’s failing grades in school, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in her decision. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211. The ALJ must only discuss enough evidence to demonstrate that she consid *919 ered the claimant’s condition as a whole. See id. We conclude that the ALJ’s opinion does not demonstrate that she considered Thomas’s condition as a whole.

Second, Thomas argues that the ALJ erred by relying on Thomas’s numerical grade level. “[I]f there is no other evidence to contradict it,” an ALJ can use a claimant’s “numerical grade level to determine [his] educational abilities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b), 416.964(b). Thomas’s ninth grade level put him in the “limited education” category, which generally includes individuals with “a 7th grade through the 11th grade level of formal education.” Id. §§ 404.1564(b)(3), 416.964(b)(3).

Thomas asserts that his testimony contradicted his numerical grade level and therefore, it was improper for the ALJ to rely on that level to presume that he had a “limited education.” However, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that Thomas had a “limited education” independent of his numerical grade level. For example, Dr. Mussenden, who observed and examined Thomas, concluded that he “had normal and appropriate speech; displayed moderate judgment and common sense; .... had a good recall for remote and recent events; ... had a good fund of general knowledge and information; ... had good mathematical skills; ... and could interpret abstract concepts.” The ALJ’s decision was also supported by Thomas’s past work experience. Thomas worked as a “self-employed tree surgeon,” a semi-skilled position. This experience suggests that Thomas must have at least a “limited education” because even individuals with “limited education” generally cannot “do most of the more complex job duties needed in semi-skilled jobs.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(3), 416.964(b)(3).

Third, Thomas argues that the ALJ erred by “not stat[ing] whether she found [his] testimony credible” and by not fulfilling her “obligation to develop the record further on the issue of the Appellant’s actual educational level.” These arguments were not raised before the magistrate judge. Thus, they have been waived. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir.2004); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224

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Bluebook (online)
497 F. App'x 916, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-thomas-v-commissioner-of-social-security-ca11-2012.