Robert Thomas Courtney, a/k/a Robert Thomas Courtney, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 1810242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Beales, Ortiz and Chaney UNPUBLISHED

ROBERT THOMAS COURTNEY, A/K/A ROBERT THOMAS COURTNEY, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1810-24-2 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 17, 2026 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY Victoria A.B. Willis, Judge1

(Richard A.H. Quitiquit; Jurach, Tacey & Quitiquit, PLC, on brief), for appellant.

(Jason S. Miyares,2 Attorney General; Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Hanover County convicted Robert Thomas

Courtney of two counts of conspiracy to commit burglary, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-22 and

18.2-91, and one count of possession of burglarious tools, in violation of Code § 18.2-94. On

appeal, Courtney challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He also

maintains that the trial court erred by admitting testimonial evidence concerning the nature and

use of a “jamming device” found near the location of his arrest.3

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 The Honorable Patricia Kelly presided over the bench trial. 2 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. 3 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). I. BACKGROUND4

Yasmin Somani owned the Italian Jewelry store in Ashland, Virginia. At just after

3:00 a.m. one morning in June 2023, she received an alert that there was motion in the store.

Somani accessed video of the store through her security system and observed two men inside the

store breaking glass and stealing jewelry. The two men wore black clothing and their faces were

masked. Somani’s husband spoke to the men through the computer. When they heard his voice,

they broke the cameras. Somani notified the police and gave a description of the two men that

included their body shape, their height, and their clothing.

Deputy Dante Hill of the Hanover County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol with his Dutch

Shepherd, Yoshi, when the alarm went off at the jewelry store. Deputy Hill and Yoshi first

responded to the rear of a Cracker Barrel restaurant to look “for anybody that might be in the

area” and then reported to the jewelry store’s back entry. Deputy Hill coordinated with other

officers who were setting up a perimeter at that location and then “determined that the best

method for my utilization of the K-9 was to begin a K-9 track.” Deputy Hill and Yoshi began

tracking at 3:35 a.m. directly from the back door of the jewelry store.

Deputy Hill testified that he and Yoshi initially traveled westbound, parallel to a retaining

pond fence and along a grass embankment. They then turned northbound, still following the

fence, before traveling eastward. Along the route, Deputy Hill saw a canvas bag lying in the

grass. He explained that the bag was “out in the open” and recalled “[i]t did not appear to be

covered by any foliage or anything like that. It appeared to be freshly placed.” Deputy Hill also

located a “makeshift machete” along the base line of the fence before continuing into the woods

4 “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 516 (2020) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). -2- and entering “some very thick brush.” Deputy Hill and Yoshi made their way through the brush

and reached Mechumps Creek, where Deputy Hill found a mechanic’s glove lying on a “mason

of rocks.” The glove was black with white or gray lettering on it. Deputy Hill and Yoshi then

crossed the creek and traveled eastward for several feet before walking up an embankment, at an

incline, to the north. At that point, Yoshi gave a “proximity alert,” which caused Deputy Hill to

check the surrounding area. Deputy Hill then found Courtney lying on the ground in thick

foliage.

Officer Nikulas Schobitz of the Ashland Police Department responded to the front of the

jewelry store and observed shattered glass before responding to the woods where Courtney was

found. When he arrived, Officer Schobitz noticed that Courtney wore a black glove with white

lettering on it, a black baseball cap, and a radio with an earpiece. Courtney also had leaves in his

hair “from hiding in the woodline.” Officer Schobitz testified that Courtney “had no wallet, no

phone, no identifying information of any kind.”

Investigator Anthony Nagy of the Ashland Police Department also responded to the

jewelry store to investigate. He testified that the Italian Jewelry store’s bathroom wall was

“smashed through” from Pro Nails, the neighboring business. Investigator Nagy also took

photographs of the store’s interior showing the “smashed” jewelry cases inside with much of the

jewelry missing. He then responded to the woods to collect evidence.

Investigator Nagy recovered the canvas bag, which held a sledgehammer. Investigator

Nagy identified a trash can “from Italian Jewelry that contained jewelry that was missing from

the store.” When asked where it was found, Investigator Nagy recalled, “Inside the fence of the

retention pond that’s right behind the store.” Investigator Nagy then found a “box that had

jewelry from Italian Jewelry” next to Mechumps Creek. He also located the red duffel bag and

noted that it contained a “jammer device.” At trial, over Courtney’s objection, Investigator Nagy

-3- testified that based on his “training and experience” and the “investigation in this case,” the item

was a “jammer device.” Then, without objection, Investigator Nagy explained that a jammer

device “can be used to take cell phones offline, block their signal, to block Wi-Fi signals, alarm

systems, GPS.” However, when the Commonwealth asked Investigator Nagy whether he knew

“of any legitimate purpose[] a person has for possessing a jammer device,” Courtney’s counsel

objected to the question as speculation. The trial court sustained the objection.

On cross-examination, Investigator Nagy testified that the jammer device was not

connected to a power source. He also stated that there was no evidence that the device

communicated with Courtney’s radio earpiece. Furthermore, when asked by Courtney’s counsel

whether he was “aware of any indication that there was any cell phone or Wi-Fi jamming going

on at the time of the events,” Investigator Nagy recalled, “Not at the time.” In addition,

Investigator Nagy acknowledged that a footprint found at the crime scene “did not appear to

match” the shoes Courtney was wearing that day.

After the Commonwealth presented its evidence at trial, Courtney’s counsel moved to

strike the evidence. Courtney argued that he was found 250 to 300 yards away from the crime

scene, that there was no evidence he possessed any of the items found in the woods, and that no

evidence showed the earpiece he wore communicated with the jamming device. He concluded

that the evidence was insufficient to prove Courtney committed the offenses. The trial court

denied the motion to strike.

Courtney did not present any evidence, and Courtney’s counsel renewed his motion to

strike the charges. The trial court again denied the motion to strike and convicted Courtney of two

counts of conspiracy to commit burglary and one count of possessing burglarious tools.

Courtney now appeals to this Court.

-4- II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, Courtney argues, “the trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty as the

evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction.”5 Courtney does not

challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence as to any one element of the three offenses for which

he was convicted, but rather argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence—other than his mere proximity to the jewelry store—tying him to the crime scene.

The Supreme Court has stated, “When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying a criminal conviction, its role is a limited one.” Commonwealth v. Garrick,

303 Va. 176, 182 (2024). Indeed, “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he

judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is “plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.”’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “In

such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). Thus, “[i]f there is evidence to support the

convictions, the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its

opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.” Clark v.

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 641 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520

5 This assignment of error is quoted verbatim from the appellant’s opening brief, but capitalization has been removed. -5- (1998)). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Burrous v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 275, 279 (2017) (quoting

Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257-58 (2003) (en banc)).

“A criminal conspiracy is merely an agreement between two or more persons to commit a

crime.” Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 567 (1984). “Conspiracy ‘requires knowledge

of and voluntary participation in’ the agreement to carry out the criminal act.” Carr v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 106, 117 (2018) (quoting Zuniga v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App.

523, 527 (1988)). “Proof of an explicit agreement is not required and the requisite agreement

may be established by circumstantial evidence.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 295, 301

(2010). This Court has repeatedly held that when

it has been shown that the defendants “by their acts pursued the same object, one performing one part and the others performing another part so as to complete it or with a view to its attainment, the [factfinder] will be justified in concluding that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.”

Charity v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 581, 586 (2007) (alteration added) (quoting Brown v.

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 73, 78 (1990)).

Code § 18.2-94 states, “[i]f any person have in his possession any tools, implements or

outfit, with intent to commit burglary, robbery or larceny, upon conviction thereof he shall be guilty

of a Class 5 felony.” Even objects possessed for a legitimate purpose and which are not innately

burglarious may be burglarious under Code § 18.2-94 if possessed with the intent to use those

objects to commit a burglary. Moss v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 1, 4 (1999). Furthermore,

possession of burglarious tools may be proven by constructive possession. Hagy v. Commonwealth,

35 Va. App. 152, 158 (2001). In such cases, “the Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts,

statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the

-6- defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the [item] and that it was subject to his

dominion and control.” Id. at 158-59 (alteration in original) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 4

Va. App. 317, 322 (1987)).

In this case, Somani testified that she saw two men in the jewelry store at around 3:00 a.m.

breaking the glass cases and stealing jewelry. The men were wearing black or dark clothing and

their faces were concealed by masks. The men broke through the wall from Pro Nails, the

neighboring store, and smashed the glass jewelry cases, leaving dry wall and broken glass in the

store. When Somani’s husband spoke to the men through the computer, they broke the camera to

conceal themselves. By 3:35 a.m., Deputy Hill and his police canine, Yoshi, responded to the

jewelry store and began a “K-9 track,” which started at the back door of the jewelry store and

traveled along a nearby fence parallel to a retaining pond where a trash can filled with stolen

jewelry was later recovered. He eventually crossed Mechumps Creek and ascended a steep

embankment. Along the route, Deputy Hill found a canvas bag containing a sledgehammer lying in

the grass. The bag appeared to be “freshly placed” in that location because no foliage covered it.

Deputy Hill also found a black mechanic’s glove with white or gray lettering on it. As he climbed

the embankment, Yoshi gave a proximity alert and Deputy Hill found Courtney hiding on the

ground nearby in thick foliage with leaves in his hair. He was only about 300 yards from the

jewelry store, and he wore a single black mechanic’s glove with white lettering on it, a black

baseball cap, and a radio with an earpiece. A red duffel bag containing a jammer device was near

where Courtney was hiding, and Investigator Nagy found a box with more stolen jewelry on an

embankment overlooking Mechumps Creek.

From this evidence, a rational factfinder could conclude that Courtney and his unidentified

accomplice conspired together to burglarize the nail salon and jewelry store and that Courtney

possessed the jamming device that could be used to block Wi-Fi signals and alarm systems. The

-7- evidence also gave rise to a reasonable inference that Courtney possessed the sledgehammer—

obviously used during the burglary—which was recovered from the canvas bag that had been

freshly placed on the path that Deputy Hill and Yoshi followed to find Courtney. The

circumstantial evidence was clearly enough for a rational factfinder to conclude that Courtney

conspired with another person to commit two burglaries—and that he possessed burglarious

tools.

Courtney further contends that he presented “multiple and reasonable hypothesis [sic] of

innocence” at trial, including that he was homeless or that he had been drinking in a nearby

restaurant and was passed out drunk in the woods, but the trial court rejected those assertions and

the record fails to support them. “Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a

question of fact and, therefore, is binding on this Court unless plainly wrong.” Wood v.

Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 286, 306 (2010) (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App.

263, 277 (2004)). Indeed, “the factfinder ‘determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn

from the evidence, and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced by

a defendant.’” Sample v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 2, 17 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017)). Moreover, “the Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable

hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of

the defendant.” Emerson, 43 Va. App. at 277 (quoting Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App.

751, 755 (1993)).

The trier of fact was free to disbelieve Courtney’s theories, and the evidence supports that

factfinder’s conclusion. We therefore conclude, as we must under our standard of review, that the

trial court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to support Courtney’s convictions for

conspiracy to commit two burglaries and for possession of burglarious tools.

-8- B. Testimony Pertaining to the Jammer Device

Courtney further argues that the trial court “improperly admitted testimonial evidence at trial

regarding the nature and use of a piece of evidence” when the trial court “overruled the defendant’s

objections to foundation and speculation.”6

“[W]e review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of

discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence absent a

finding of abuse of that discretion.” Kenner v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 414, 423 (2021) (alteration

in original) (quoting Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197 (2010)). “In evaluating whether a

trial court abused its discretion, . . . ‘we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.’” Carter v.

Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Grattan v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). “The abuse-of-discretion standard [also] includes

review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Id. at

543-44 (alteration in original) (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260 (2008)). “Only

when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Lambert

v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 749 (2019) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App.

741, 753, adopted upon reh’g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811 (2005)).

Unless otherwise prohibited, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible.” Va. R. Evid. 2:402(a).

“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact in

issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Va. R. Evid. 2:401.

“The scope of relevant evidence in Virginia is quite broad, as ‘[e]very fact, however remote or

insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue is relevant.’”

6 This assignment of error is quoted verbatim from the appellant’s opening brief, but capitalization has been removed. -9- Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 634 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia Elec.

& Power Co. v. Dungee, 258 Va. 235, 260 (1999)). Furthermore:

Opinion testimony by a lay witness is admissible if it is reasonably based upon the personal experience or observations of the witness and will aid the trier of fact in understanding the witness’ perceptions. Lay opinion may relate to any matter . . . . However, lay witness testimony that amounts only to an opinion of law is inadmissible.

Va. R. Evid. 2:701. “Our Supreme Court has clarified that Rule 2:701 does not allow lay opinion

testimony that is ‘not based on the perception of the witness or on the witness’s personal

knowledge.’” Murray v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 449, 457 (2020) (quoting Martin v. Lahti,

295 Va. 77, 85 (2018)).

Here, the duffel bag contained a black box with “a bunch of antennas” protruding from it

and “a bunch of knobs.” Investigator Nagy testified that in his training and experience the item was

a “jammer device” and explained that it “can be used to take cellphones offline, block their signal,

to block Wi-Fi signals, alarm systems, [and] GPS.” Investigator Nagy’s testimony was relevant to

show that Courtney possessed the “jammer device” in an attempt to break into the jewelry store

undetected. The mere fact that it was not hooked up to Courtney’s earpiece or turned on when the

police found it does not alter the relevance of Investigator Nagy’s testimony. Investigator Nagy

explained, after conducting his investigation, what the item was and, more importantly, its use.

Because Investigator Nagy’s testimony was based on his training, experience, and investigation into

the facts and was useful in deciding whether Courtney possessed burglarious tools, Nagy’s

testimony was relevant and admissible.

Contrary to Courtney’s assertion, Investigator Nagy did not testify that he had no idea what

the jammer device was. Rather, he testified that because he had no “prior experience with these

types of devices,” he was unaware of any lawful reason for using one. When the Commonwealth

asked him to speculate if a jammer device could be used for “legitimate purposes,” the trial court - 10 - sustained Courtney’s objection and held that Investigator Nagy’s testimony would be limited to the

fact that a jammer device is used to block signals from cell phones, alarms, Wi-Fi, and GPS.

Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Investigator Nagy’s

testimony about the jammer device.

Even if the trial court erred, any error would be harmless because even without the jamming

device, the evidence sufficiently proved that Courtney conspired with another to burglarize the nail

salon and the jewelry store and that he used the sledgehammer to do it. Under Virginia’s harmless

error statute, “[w]hen it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the

parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached, no judgment shall

be arrested or reversed.” Proffitt, 292 Va. at 641 (alteration in original) (quoting Code § 8.01-678).

Therefore, we do not disturb the trial court’s judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm each of Courtney’s convictions by the trial

court.

Affirmed.

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