Robert Taylor v. Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board and Arkansas Division of Correction

2025 Ark. 176

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. 176 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-24-750

Opinion Delivered: November 13, 2025 ROBERT TAYLOR APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 35CV-24-333]

ARKANSAS POST-PRISON HONORABLE JODI RAINES TRANSFER BOARD AND DENNIS, JUDGE ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION APPEAL DISMISSED. APPELLEES

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice

Appellant Robert Taylor appeals the dismissal of his petition for declaratory and

mandamus relief on the basis that he had failed to accomplish sufficient service of process

on appellees, the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (APPTB) and the Arkansas Division

of Correction (ADC). For reversal, Taylor argues that (1) the motion to dismiss was void

because it was filed by an assistant attorney general who was not counsel of record at the

time; (2) the motion to dismiss was not timely filed; (3) he served process on appellees in

compliance with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(g); and (4) his claims were dismissed

with prejudice and the dismissal therefore operated as an adjudication on the merits. Because

there is no final order on the merits, we dismiss the appeal.

In October 2023, Taylor pleaded guilty to aggravated assault on a family or

household member, violation of a protective order, second-degree terroristic threatening, and failure to appear. Taylor was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment followed

by forty-eight months’ suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) for aggravated assault, twelve

months’ SIS for violation of the protective order and for terroristic threatening, and twenty-

four months’ imprisonment followed by forty-eight months’ SIS for failure to appear. The

sentences were imposed concurrently for an aggregate term of twenty-four months’

imprisonment.

In March 2024, Taylor applied for parole, which was denied for a period of two

years. Taylor later filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. In the

petition, Taylor argued that appellees had acted outside of their statutory authority and in

contravention of the APPTB policy manual in denying him parole for two years. The circuit

court dismissed Taylor’s petition on appellees’ motion based on his failure to properly serve

them with process.

Taylor’s failure to obtain valid service of process on appellees is dispositive of this

appeal. The law in Arkansas is well settled that service of valid process is necessary to give a

court jurisdiction over a defendant. Ligon v. Bloodman, 2021 Ark. 124. Because Taylor failed

to accomplish service of process, the circuit court did not have personal jurisdiction over

the appellees, and the circuit court dismissed the petition without reaching its merits.

Without a final order on the merits, this court does not have appellate jurisdiction. Nooner

v. Hobbs, 2021 Ark. 204 (per curiam); see also Jefferson v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 83 (dismissing

appeal because the order appealed from—a circuit court’s dismissal for failure to perfect

service on the defendant within 120 days—was not a final order). Importantly, there is no

2 indication in the record that the dismissal of Taylor’s petition was a second dismissal, 1 and

the circuit court did not state that the petition was dismissed “with prejudice.” See Ark. R.

Civ. P. 4(i)(1) (“If service of process is not made on a defendant within 120 days after the

filing of the complaint or within the time period established by an extension . . . the action

shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice[.]”) (emphasis added); Middlebrooks v.

Graves, 2022 Ark. 107 (concluding that because the circuit court dismissed the complaint

under Rule 4(i)(1) without indicating whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice,

the dismissal is without prejudice for refiling the claims). As we have previously explained,

a plaintiff whose case is dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely obtain valid service

of process may refile those claims, and his position after the dismissal is no different than that

of a plaintiff who voluntarily nonsuits his claims. See McCullough v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 78.

When the plaintiff may refile his or her claims, the order appealed from is not a final,

appealable order. Id. (citing Bevans v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 373 Ark. 105, 281 S.W.3d

740 (2008)).

Appeal dismissed.

WOMACK, J., concurs.

BRONNI, J., dissents.

1 A second dismissal based on failure to serve valid process shall be made with prejudice when the plaintiff’s complaint has been previously dismissed either voluntarily or involuntarily. Nooner v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 80, 568 S.W.3d 766.

3 SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. I agree with the court’s decision to

dismiss Taylor’s appeal. The court, however, should dismiss the appeal because sovereign

immunity bars Taylor’s underlying claims against the State. 1 When sovereign

immunity bars a lawsuit against the State, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction over

that lawsuit.2 And when the circuit court does not have jurisdiction over a lawsuit, this

court, too, lacks jurisdiction.3

I respectfully concur.

NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, J., dissenting. The majority confuses how dismissals and

the qualifiers, “with prejudice” and “without prejudice,” operate. Dismissal concerns an

order’s finality; whether it was dismissed with or without prejudice speaks to the order’s

preclusive effect. Here, Taylor appeals the dismissal of his case—a final order ending his

case—as improper. He should get a ruling on that, but the majority dismisses for lack of a

final, appealable order. If he wins his appeal, his case should go back to the circuit court on

remand. But if he loses, his dismissal without prejudice should convert to a dismissal with

prejudice—still a final order, but now one with preclusive effect that protects the defendants

from continued litigation of a claim. That is the proper procedure, and the one I’d apply

here.

1 Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112, at 5–6 (Womack, J., dissenting). 2 Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319, 327 (Womack, J., dissenting). 3 See, e.g., Lawrence v. City of Texarkana, 364 Ark. 466, 469, 221 S.W.3d 370, 372 (2006).

4 Our cases also recognize that rule generally makes sense. See Griffin v. Ark. Bd. of

Corrections, 2025 Ark. 81, at 4–5, 711 S.W.3d 784, 788 (“Generally, when a complaint has

been dismissed without prejudice, a party may either appeal the dismissal or elect to plead

further. If the party chooses the first course, and the appeal is affirmed, then the dismissal

converts to a dismissal with prejudice.” (citations omitted)); Robinson v. Felts, 2025 Ark. 67,

at 2 (explaining the general rule that a plaintiff can choose to appeal after a dismissal and that

the dismissal is with prejudice when affirmed); Orr v. Hudson, 2010 Ark. 484, 374 S.W.3d

686 (holding that a dismissal without prejudice is converted to a dismissal with prejudice on

appeal); Born v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2010 Ark. 292, at 25, 372 S.W.3d 324, 339

(affirming a dismissal without prejudice and converting it to one with prejudice); Sluder v.

Steak & Ale of Little Rock, Inc., 368 Ark. 293, 298, 245 S.W.3d 115, 118 (2006) (applying

the rule that a dismissal without prejudice becomes a dismissal with prejudice when it is

affirmed on appeal); Ratliff v. Moss, 284 Ark. 16, 18–19, 678 S.W.2d 369, 371 (1984) (stating

that when a case is dismissed without prejudice, the plaintiff has the choice to either correct

its mistake or appeal). And I don’t see any reason not to apply it here—whatever exceptions

we’ve previously conjured.

Granted, much of our prior case law applying that common-sense rule is in the Rule

12(b)(6) context and appears alongside a statement that by appealing, a plaintiff waives the

right to plead further. But this court has never articulated a principled distinction between

that situation and this one. Nor do I see one. So rather than rely on a hodgepodge of

unreasoned exceptions, I’d hold the appellant to his choice and dismiss this case with

5 prejudice. Anything less unnecessarily wastes resources and risks undermining finality

principles. I respectfully dissent.

Robert Taylor, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Sean M. Rowland, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.