Robert Strickland v. Ge Capital Retail Bank
This text of 670 F. App'x 582 (Robert Strickland v. Ge Capital Retail Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM ***
Robert Earl Strickland appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Strickland failed *583 to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the release agreement that Strickland signed was invalid. See Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1989) (a release of claims is valid if it is voluntary, deliberate, and informed); see also Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding settlement agreement releasing ADA claims where plaintiff failed to establish that the agreement was procured by duress or any other basis that would render it invalid).
We do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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670 F. App'x 582, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-strickland-v-ge-capital-retail-bank-ca9-2016.