Robert Sickle v. JTJ Indiana, LLC

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 26, 2023
• Docket: 23A-PL-00644
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Oct 26 2023, 9:29 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Thomas M. Johnston Raegan M. Gibson Carmel, Indiana Mackenzie E. Skalski Monica S. McCoskey Kaylin O. Cook Paganelli Law Group Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert Sickle, October 26, 2023 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-PL-644 v. Appeal from the Marion Circuit Court JTJ Indiana, LLC, The Honorable Amber Collins- Appellee-Plaintiff. Gebrehiwet, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49C01-2111-PL-37001

Opinion by Judge Mathias Judges Riley and Crone concur.

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Robert Sickle appeals the Marion Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to set

aside a default judgment against him on JTJ Indiana, LLC’s (“JTJ’s”)

complaint to quiet title to a residential property in Indianapolis. Sickle presents Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-644 | October 26, 2023 Page 1 of 6 a single dispositive issue for our review, namely, whether the default judgment

is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On July 1, 2021, JTJ bought a residence at 5102 Hillside Avenue in

Indianapolis (“the property”) from Janice Wright. Wright executed a quitclaim

deed, which was recorded in Marion County on August 16. On November 4,

JTJ filed a complaint to quiet title to the property “against ‘The World.’”

Appellee’s App. Vol. 2, p. 2. JTJ named as defendants Wright’s predecessors in

title to the property as well as “unknown occupant,” “John Doe/Jane Doe,”

and “The World[.]” Id. at 5. JTJ served the unnamed defendants notice of its

complaint by publication pursuant to Indiana Code section 32-30-3-14(f) and

Trial Rule 4.13.

[4] Sickle has lived at the property continuously since March 1, 2004, when he first

leased the property from Wright. In 2007, Wright “renewed” Sickle’s lease for

“25 years[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. And, following a judgment for Sickle against

Wright in November 2008, Wright agreed that Sickle could live at the property

for as long as he wanted to. However, both Wright and Sickle acknowledged a

“pending foreclosure” on the property and that Sickle might be evicted.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 68. Sickle never recorded his leasehold interest in

the property.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-644 | October 26, 2023 Page 2 of 6 [5] On April 18, 2022, JTJ moved for default judgment on its complaint. The trial

court granted that motion on May 4. On September 16, JTJ served Sickle with

an eviction notice. As a result, Sickle hired an attorney. The attorney told Sickle

about the quiet title action, and, on November 12, Sickle filed a motion to set

aside the default judgment. In his motion, Sickle argued that the default

judgment should be set aside pursuant to both Trial Rule 60(B)(1) and (8). In

support, Sickle alleged excusable neglect in that he “had no actual knowledge”

of the quiet title action until after the default judgment was entered. Appellant’s

App. Vol. 2, p. 22. And in support of relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), Sickle

alleged that equity required that the default judgment be set aside because he

had not been personally served and because JTJ had “made no inquiry of

Sickle’s interest” in the property. Id. at 25. Sickle also alleged meritorious

defenses.

[6] The trial court denied Sickle’s motion following a hearing. And the trial court

denied Sickle’s subsequent motion to correct error. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision [7] Sickle contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to set aside

the default judgment. In particular, Sickle argues that the default judgment is

void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process.

While he purported to base his motion to set aside default judgment on Trial

Rule 60(B)(1) and (8), we treat his motion as though he argued Trial Rule

60(B)(6), which applies where a default judgment is alleged to be void.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-644 | October 26, 2023 Page 3 of 6 [8] Our standard of review is well settled. Typically, we review a trial court’s ruling

on a motion to set aside a judgment for an abuse of discretion, meaning that we

must determine whether the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts and inferences supporting the ruling. Hair v. Deutsche Bank Nat.

Tr. Co., 18 N.E.3d 1019, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). However, whether personal

jurisdiction exists over a defendant is a question of law that we review de novo.

Id. A judgment entered where there has been insufficient service of process is

void for want of personal jurisdiction. Id. “By the plain terms of the rule,

motions to set aside under subsection (6) of Rule 60(B) do not require proof of a

meritorious defense to the judgment being challenged.”1 Id.

[9] Sickle argues that JTJ knew or “should have known of Sickle’s occupancy” of

the property when it filed its complaint. Appellant’s Br. at 22. He maintains that

his occupancy was “open and conspicuous” and that JTJ had actual knowledge

of his lease agreement with Wright prior to the entry of default judgment. Id.

Thus, Sickle contends that JTJ’s notice by publication, which did not name

him, was insufficient as a matter of law.

[10] However, as JTJ argued to the trial court, Indiana Code section 32-30-3-14(b)

governs who may be named as a defendant in a quiet title action. That statute

provides that a plaintiff who brings a quiet title action

may . . . name as a defendant any of the following individuals:

1 Accordingly, we need not address Sickle’s contentions on appeal regarding his alleged meritorious defenses.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-644 | October 26, 2023 Page 4 of 6 (1) A person:

(A) who may have an interest in real estate that is the subject of the proceeding; and

(B) whose name appears of record in a record concerning the real estate.

(2) A person who bears one of the following relationships to a former owner or encumbrancer of the real estate:

(A) Spouse.

(B) Widow or widower.

(C) Heir or devisee.

The person who institutes the proceeding does not have to know the name of a person described in subdivision (2).

Ind. Code § 32-30-3-14(b) (emphases added).

[11] The undisputed evidence establishes that Sickle’s lease for the property was not

recorded. Thus, whether JTJ knew that Sickle lived at the property is of no

moment. Under the statute, JTJ was not required to name Sickle as a defendant

in the quiet title action, and Sickle cannot be heard to complain that he was not

served with the complaint. See id.

[12] Moreover, Sickle’s motion to set aside the default judgment presumes that he

has an interest in this quiet title action, but he is incorrect. As the trial court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-644 | October 26, 2023 Page 5 of 6 found, JTJ owns the property, and Sickle claims only a leasehold interest. Our

Supreme Court has held that a tenant has no right to bring a quiet title action

against an owner of real property. Santa Claus, Inc. v. Santa Claus of Santa Claus,

217 Ind. 251, 255-56, 27 N.E.2d 354, 356 (1940). And Sickle has not

demonstrated that his unrecorded leasehold interest is enough to challenge

JTJ’s quiet title complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of

Sickle’s motion to set aside the default judgment.

[13] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Crone, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-644 | October 26, 2023 Page 6 of 6