Robert Randall McAlary, III v. Igloo Products Corp.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01904
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 ROBERT RANDALL MCALARY, III, No. 2:25-cv-01904-JAM-CSK an individual, 14 Plaintiff, 15 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS v. 16 IGLOO PRODUCTS CORP., a 17 Delaware corporation, 18 Defendant. 19 20 Plaintiff alleges his finger was pinched and severely 21 injured by an Igloo-brand cooler in 2021 while placing the cooler 22 in a bear-proof storage locker. Plaintiff theorizes that the 23 accident was caused by an alleged manufacturing defect, design 24 defect, and/or failure to warn of the risk of injury, and asserts 25 claims for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of 26 implied warranties as a result. Defendant has moved to dismiss 27 Plaintiff’s claims, arguing they are untimely and also 28 insufficiently pled. 1 As discussed further below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 2 claims as pled are untimely and dismisses them with leave to 3 amend. 4 5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 Defendant Igloo Products Corp. designs and manufactures 7 numerous products intended to cool food and beverages, including 8 an “Igloo 90 Quart Flip & Tow Rolling Cooler.” Compl. ¶¶ 3, 8, 9 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff Robert Randall McAlary III purchased an 10 Igloo 90 Quart Flip & Tow Rolling Cooler (the “Cooler”) from a 11 Costco store on or about May 28, 2021. Id. ¶ 20. 12 On or about June 28, 2021, Plaintiff was camping in Yosemite 13 National Park and attempted to store the Cooler in a bear-proof 14 storage locker for the night. Id. ¶ 21. While doing so, 15 Plaintiff’s left index finger was forcefully caught and pinched 16 by a concealed mechanical junction in the Cooler associated with 17 the tow handle, tearing open the tip of his finger. Id. ¶ 22. 18 The injury resulted in severe bleeding and visible trauma 19 consistent with partial amputation of the finger. Id. 20 Emergency responders were called to the scene but were 21 unable to locate Plaintiff’s missing fingertip. Id. ¶ 27. 22 Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room and was later 23 discharged with instructions to see an orthopedic specialist. 24 Id. ¶¶ 28–30. Upon evaluation, the orthopedic specialist 25 concluded that the only viable treatment option was amputation of 26 the finger to the level of the knuckle, and surgery was scheduled 27 for the next day. Id. ¶ 31. The amputation left Plaintiff with 28 permanent disfigurement and functional limitations, including 1 ongoing sensitivity at the amputation site, diminished grip 2 strength, and cosmetic deformity. Id. ¶ 33. 3 Plaintiff returned the Cooler to Costco on July 2, 2021. 4 Id. ¶ 34. Subsequently, on February 13, 2025, the United States 5 Consumer Product Safety Commission announced a nationwide recall 6 of more than one million of Defendant’s 90 Quart Flip & Tow 7 Rolling Coolers due to the risk of fingertip amputation and 8 crushing injuries. Id. ¶ 9. The initial recall cited at least 9 12 known injury incidents. Id. In May 2025, the recall was 10 expanded after Defendant received more than 78 additional injury 11 reports, 26 of which involved serious harm such as amputations, 12 fractures, or deep lacerations. Id. 13 Following the recall, Plaintiff filed suit on July 7, 2025, 14 alleging six causes of action for (1) Strict Products Liability – 15 Manufacturing Defect; (2) Strict Products Liability – Design 16 Defect; (3) Strict Products Liability – Warning Defect; 17 (4) Negligence; (5) Breach of Implied Warranties; and 18 (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id. ¶¶ 39–104. 19 Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) on 20 September 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a timely Opposition (ECF No. 21 22), and Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 23). The matter was 22 submitted without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 23 ECF No. 24. 24 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 27 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 28 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted 1 only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or 2 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 3 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 4 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true 5 and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 6 party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 7 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 8 Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if 9 the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an 10 entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 12 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement 13 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.” 15 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, 16 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient 17 factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 18 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic 19 recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has 20 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 21 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 22 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 23 24 III. OPINION 25 A. Plaintiff’s Claims are Untimely on the Face of the 26 Complaint 27 As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s 28 claims are untimely as they were not brought within the 1 applicable statute of limitations period and Plaintiff has not 2 adequately pled any tolling of the statutory period. Mot. 3 Dismiss at 4–7, ECF No. 11. 4 The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claims as pled are 5 untimely. A motion to dismiss based on a statute of limitations 6 defense is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6). See Huynh v. 7 Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2006). A 8 “claim may be dismissed as untimely pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion 9 ‘only when the running of the statute [of limitations] is 10 apparent on the face of the complaint.’” U.S. ex rel. Air 11 Control Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 12 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art 13 at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010)). 14 Here, Plaintiff’s strict liability and negligence claims 15 (including Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of 16 emotional distress) are subject to a two-year statute of 17 limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section 18 335.1. See Jorden v. Covidien, LP, No. C 19-05709 WHA, 2019 WL 19 6327373, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019). For these claims, the 20 limitations period usually runs from accrual, meaning the date 21 when the wrongdoing, harm, and causation essential to the cause 22 of action occurred. Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 23 1185, 1191 (2013). Plaintiff’s remaining claim for breach of 24 implied warranties is subject to a four-year statute of 25 limitations under California Commercial Code section 2725. 26 Harris v. LSP Prods. Grp., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-02973-TLN-KJN, 2021 27 WL 2682045, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2021). For this claim, the 28 cause of action “accrues at tender of delivery.” Id. 1 Plaintiff purchased his Cooler on May 28, 2021, and 2 sustained his injury on June 28, 2021. See Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. 3 Plaintiff did not commence this lawsuit, however, until July 7, 4 2025—more than four years after delivery and more than two years 5 after his alleged injury. As such, absent tolling, Plaintiff’s 6 claims are untimely as Plaintiff’s warranty claim is outside the 7 applicable four-year statutory period and his strict liability 8 and negligence claims are outside the applicable two-year 9 statutory period. 10 B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Plead Tolling Under the Delayed 11 Discovery Doctrine 12 Plaintiff alleges that his claims are timely because the 13 applicable statutes of limitations were tolled under the delayed 14 discovery doctrine. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that, at 15 the time his injury occurred, he believed the injury was 16 accidental or the result of user error and did not suspect that 17 the Cooler was defective. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that 18 it was not until the national recall was issued in February 2025 19 that he understood the true source of his injury. Id. Thus, 20 Plaintiff alleges the recall was “the earliest date on which 21 Plaintiff became aware, or reasonably could have become aware 22 through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the defective 23 nature of the Igloo cooler and its causal relationship to his 24 injuries,” such that his claims are timely under the delayed 25 discovery doctrine. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 26 The Court disagrees. “California law recognizes a general, 27 rebuttable presumption, that plaintiffs have ‘knowledge of the 28 wrongful cause of an injury.’” Grisham v. Phillip Morris U.S.A., 1 Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 638 (2007) (quoting Fox v. Ethicon Endo- 2 Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 808 (2005)). One manner of 3 rebutting this presumption is the discovery rule, which “delays 4 accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice 5 of the cause of action.” Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 807. “In order to 6 rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of 7 action, a plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his 8 claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule 9 must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of 10 discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery 11 despite reasonable diligence.” Id. at 808 (citation and internal 12 quotation marks omitted). “Under the discovery rule, the statute 13 of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or 14 should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that 15 someone has done something wrong to her.” Jolly v. Eli Lilly & 16 Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1110 (1988). Once the plaintiff suspects 17 wrongdoing, the plaintiff is under a duty to investigate the 18 cause of his or her injury. Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 98 Cal. 19 App. 4th 218, 242 (2002) (“Once [parties] knew or reasonably 20 should have known that [a product] was the likely potential 21 source of their respective injuries, they had the responsibility 22 to investigate and determine whether to pursue legal action.”); 23 Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1112 (“Because a plaintiff is under a duty 24 to reasonably investigate and because a suspicion of wrongdoing, 25 coupled with a knowledge of the harm and its cause, will commence 26 the limitations period, suits are not likely to be unreasonably 27 delayed, and those failing to act with reasonable dispatch will 28 be barred.”); id. at 1111 (“So long as a suspicion exists, it is 1 clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait 2 for the facts to find her.”). 3 Here, Plaintiff alleges he was severely injured by the 4 Cooler while camping, needed urgent medical care, ultimately had 5 his finger partially amputated, and returned the Cooler to Costco 6 just four days later. See Compl. ¶¶ 21–34. These facts strongly 7 indicate Plaintiff suspected or at least had reason to suspect 8 wrongdoing. However, the Complaint is entirely silent as to 9 Plaintiff’s reasonable diligence following his accident, i.e., 10 any efforts to investigate the cause of his injury after it 11 occurred, until the recall notice was issued in February 2025. 12 See id. ¶¶ 34–38. Plaintiff’s failure to plead any diligence 13 despite clear reason to suspect wrongdoing precludes application 14 of the delayed discovery rule here. 15 C. Plaintiff Has Failed to Plead Tolling Under the 16 Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine 17 Plaintiff also pleads tolling under the fraudulent 18 concealment doctrine, which “tolls the statute of limitations 19 where a defendant, through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim 20 to grow stale.” Aryeh, 55 Cal. 4th at 1192. In particular, 21 Plaintiff alleges that, “[o]n information and belief, Defendant 22 had knowledge of the defect in the Igloo cooler handles well 23 before the February 2025 recall,” including during a period in 24 2024 when it was actively working on a redesigned handle. Compl. 25 ¶¶ 26, 38. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s concealment of the 26 defect further delayed Plaintiff’s discovery of the cause of his 27 injury and provides an independent basis for tolling the 28 applicable statute of limitations under the fraudulent 1 concealment doctrine. Id. ¶ 38. 2 Plaintiff’s claim of fraudulent concealment is inadequately 3 alleged. Tolling under the fraudulent concealment doctrine “will 4 last as long as a plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentations 5 is reasonable.” Grisham, 40 Cal. 4th at 637. This requires “the 6 plaintiff (1) plead with particularity the facts giving rise to 7 the fraudulent concealment claim and (2) demonstrate that he or 8 she used due diligence in an attempt to uncover the facts.” 9 Vanella v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:19-CV-07956-WHO, 2020 WL 887975, 10 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020) (internal quotation marks and 11 citation omitted). To satisfy the second element, “the complaint 12 must allege (1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the 13 circumstances under which it was discovered; and (3) that the 14 plaintiff was not at fault for failing to discover it or had no 15 actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on 16 inquiry.” Cmty. Cause v. Boatwright, 124 Cal. App. 3d 888, 900 17 (1981). Because the exception sounds in fraud, it must be 18 pleaded with particularity. Finney v. Ford Motor Co., No. 17-CV- 19 06183-JST, 2018 WL 2552266, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2018). 20 Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to publicly 21 disclose the Cooler’s defect, delaying his discovery of his 22 claim. Compl. ¶ 38. However, in the absence of a fiduciary 23 relationship, mere non-disclosure will not support fraudulent 24 concealment. See Herremans v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 14– 25 02363 MMM (PJWx), 2014 WL 5017843, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 26 2014); see also Long v. Walt Disney Co., 116 Cal.App.4th 868, 874 27 (2004) (“Absent a fiduciary relationship, nondisclosure is not 28 fraudulent concealment — affirmative deceptive conduct is 1 required.”). Plaintiff has alleged no fiduciary relationship 2 here. 3 Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead tolling 4 under the delayed discovery doctrine or the fraudulent 5 concealment doctrine. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 6 claims as pled are untimely. 7 D. The Court Will Grant Leave to Amend 8 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide 9 whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely 10 given where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 11 motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the 12 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] 13 futility of amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 14 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 15 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 Here, Plaintiff argues that “although [he] believes he 17 adequately pled the delayed discovery doctrine, all of 18 Defendant’s criticisms can be cured by amendment,” asking the 19 Court’s leave to cure any deficiencies. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 5, 20 ECF No. 22. Given that this is the Court’s first dismissal of 21 Plaintiff’s claims, and amendment is not clearly futile, the 22 Court will grant leave to amend. 23 24 IV. ORDER 25 For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 26 No. 11) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s First through Sixth Causes of 27 Action are DISMISSED with leave to amend. If Plaintiff elects to 28 file an amended complaint, he must do so within twenty (20) days ee nn een en EEE IE II ED eee

1 of this Order. Defendant shall file its response to the amended 2 complaint within twenty (20) days thereafter. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: February 27, 2026

6 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11