December 8, 2020
Supreme Court
No. 2019-50-Appeal. (KC 17-585)
Robert Paroskie :
v. :
Linda Rhault. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Flaherty, for the Court. The pro se plaintiff, Robert Paroskie,
appeals from a Superior Court entry of summary judgment against him and in favor
of the defendant, Linda Rhault, with respect to claims for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Those claims arise from promises the
plaintiff contends were made during the course of a romantic relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant that came to an end in 2009. This appeal came before
the Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause
why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing
the arguments of the parties, and after thoroughly examining the record, we conclude
that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further
-1- briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
The plaintiff’s underlying claims stem from a relationship between plaintiff
and defendant.1 The plaintiff and defendant were involved romantically for some
time between October 2001 and February 2009—approximately seven years—when
defendant ended the relationship. According to plaintiff, defendant is a very wealthy
woman and an heir to the Guggenheim fortune.2 The plaintiff filed an action against
defendant on May 31, 2017, alleging that defendant falsely represented to plaintiff
that his life would be enhanced and secure if he remained with defendant as a
companion partner and that, but for this representation, plaintiff would not have
devoted his time, energy, and expertise to defendant. At bottom, plaintiff’s argument
rests on his claim that he and defendant had committed to each other to be in a
long-term relationship, but defendant decided to end that relationship. The plaintiff
pointed to the fact that, among other things, he stayed with defendant overnight up
to four nights per week; presented defendant with gifts of jewelry, lodging, and
1 The facts in this case are gleaned from the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties. 2 The Guggenheim family is an American family known for their involvement in the mining industry and later for their philanthropy.
-2- meals; prepared dinners for defendant and her family; tutored defendant’s children;
and assisted with kitchen renovations at defendant’s home. All of those actions,
according to plaintiff, were evidence of his commitment to a relationship with
defendant. The plaintiff also swore that he “relied upon [defendant’s] continuing
representations and acts of a committed relationship” when he performed the
aforementioned acts. The plaintiff claimed that, but for these representations of
commitment from defendant, he would not have devoted so much of his time to her.
The plaintiff also alleged in his complaint that he provided financial advice to
defendant at her request. That advice, he maintains, will someday result in a
substantial favorable tax impact for defendant. Specifically, plaintiff maintained that
he assisted defendant with a family trust inherited by her grandmother, of which
defendant was a beneficiary. The plaintiff contends that he advised defendant on
certain actions that she should take and that she followed the advice. That advice
included the locating of certain documents and the filing of a request for a tax ruling
from the Internal Revenue Service that would relieve the trust of a substantial tax
liability and would greatly inure to the financial benefit of defendant at a future time.
Thus, he asserts, it was inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit of his advice
without conferring the value of the lifetime security that she had promised to him.
There were three counts in plaintiff’s complaint: (1) fraud; (2) negligent
misrepresentation; and (3) unjust enrichment. In due time, defendant moved for
-3- summary judgment, arguing that there were no issues of material fact in dispute and
that plaintiff’s claims could not survive as a matter of law. In response to
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, contending that it was he who was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The hearing justice held several hearings on the competing motions
for summary judgment before issuing a lengthy written decision, granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant on all counts and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion.
Final judgment was entered on September 10, 2018. Ten days later, plaintiff
filed a motion, which he styled as a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule
59(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In that motion, plaintiff
maintained that the hearing justice had committed myriad errors when she applied
the law to the facts, and that she had failed to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff.
After hearing plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment, the hearing justice
denied the motion. The hearing justice found that plaintiff was attempting to recycle
the same arguments that he had pressed during the hearings on the motions for
summary judgment. The hearing justice also determined that she had applied the
correct standard when she decided the competing motions for summary judgment.
An order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment entered on October 19,
2018. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to this Court on November 7, 2018.
-4- II
Discussion
Before addressing the merits of plaintiff’s arguments, we must determine
whether plaintiff’s appeal is properly before this Court. Judgment in favor of
defendant entered on September 10, 2018. Thus, plaintiff had twenty days from that
date to file his notice of appeal. See G.L. 1956 § 9-24-1; Super. R. Civ. P. 4(a).
However, he failed to do so until November 7, 2018. Although plaintiff did file a
post-judgment motion, styled as a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, within
ten days, which in normal circumstances would toll the twenty-day appeal period,
the motion was in reality one to reconsider the judgment and as such does not extend
the time limits under Rule 4(a).3 Further, while the notice of appeal indicates that
plaintiff was appealing from the October 19, 2018 order denying his so-called
motion to amend, it is clear from his argument on appeal that it is the grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant with which he takes issue.
We have held that a proper Rule 59(e) motion is directed at correcting “a
‘manifest error of law in the judgment’—meaning an error that is ‘apparent, blatant,
conspicuous, clearly evident, and easily discernible from a reading of the judgment
document itself.’” Greensleeves, Inc. v.
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December 8, 2020
Supreme Court
No. 2019-50-Appeal. (KC 17-585)
Robert Paroskie :
v. :
Linda Rhault. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Flaherty, for the Court. The pro se plaintiff, Robert Paroskie,
appeals from a Superior Court entry of summary judgment against him and in favor
of the defendant, Linda Rhault, with respect to claims for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Those claims arise from promises the
plaintiff contends were made during the course of a romantic relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant that came to an end in 2009. This appeal came before
the Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause
why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing
the arguments of the parties, and after thoroughly examining the record, we conclude
that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further
-1- briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
The plaintiff’s underlying claims stem from a relationship between plaintiff
and defendant.1 The plaintiff and defendant were involved romantically for some
time between October 2001 and February 2009—approximately seven years—when
defendant ended the relationship. According to plaintiff, defendant is a very wealthy
woman and an heir to the Guggenheim fortune.2 The plaintiff filed an action against
defendant on May 31, 2017, alleging that defendant falsely represented to plaintiff
that his life would be enhanced and secure if he remained with defendant as a
companion partner and that, but for this representation, plaintiff would not have
devoted his time, energy, and expertise to defendant. At bottom, plaintiff’s argument
rests on his claim that he and defendant had committed to each other to be in a
long-term relationship, but defendant decided to end that relationship. The plaintiff
pointed to the fact that, among other things, he stayed with defendant overnight up
to four nights per week; presented defendant with gifts of jewelry, lodging, and
1 The facts in this case are gleaned from the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties. 2 The Guggenheim family is an American family known for their involvement in the mining industry and later for their philanthropy.
-2- meals; prepared dinners for defendant and her family; tutored defendant’s children;
and assisted with kitchen renovations at defendant’s home. All of those actions,
according to plaintiff, were evidence of his commitment to a relationship with
defendant. The plaintiff also swore that he “relied upon [defendant’s] continuing
representations and acts of a committed relationship” when he performed the
aforementioned acts. The plaintiff claimed that, but for these representations of
commitment from defendant, he would not have devoted so much of his time to her.
The plaintiff also alleged in his complaint that he provided financial advice to
defendant at her request. That advice, he maintains, will someday result in a
substantial favorable tax impact for defendant. Specifically, plaintiff maintained that
he assisted defendant with a family trust inherited by her grandmother, of which
defendant was a beneficiary. The plaintiff contends that he advised defendant on
certain actions that she should take and that she followed the advice. That advice
included the locating of certain documents and the filing of a request for a tax ruling
from the Internal Revenue Service that would relieve the trust of a substantial tax
liability and would greatly inure to the financial benefit of defendant at a future time.
Thus, he asserts, it was inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit of his advice
without conferring the value of the lifetime security that she had promised to him.
There were three counts in plaintiff’s complaint: (1) fraud; (2) negligent
misrepresentation; and (3) unjust enrichment. In due time, defendant moved for
-3- summary judgment, arguing that there were no issues of material fact in dispute and
that plaintiff’s claims could not survive as a matter of law. In response to
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, contending that it was he who was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The hearing justice held several hearings on the competing motions
for summary judgment before issuing a lengthy written decision, granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant on all counts and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion.
Final judgment was entered on September 10, 2018. Ten days later, plaintiff
filed a motion, which he styled as a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule
59(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In that motion, plaintiff
maintained that the hearing justice had committed myriad errors when she applied
the law to the facts, and that she had failed to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff.
After hearing plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment, the hearing justice
denied the motion. The hearing justice found that plaintiff was attempting to recycle
the same arguments that he had pressed during the hearings on the motions for
summary judgment. The hearing justice also determined that she had applied the
correct standard when she decided the competing motions for summary judgment.
An order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment entered on October 19,
2018. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to this Court on November 7, 2018.
-4- II
Discussion
Before addressing the merits of plaintiff’s arguments, we must determine
whether plaintiff’s appeal is properly before this Court. Judgment in favor of
defendant entered on September 10, 2018. Thus, plaintiff had twenty days from that
date to file his notice of appeal. See G.L. 1956 § 9-24-1; Super. R. Civ. P. 4(a).
However, he failed to do so until November 7, 2018. Although plaintiff did file a
post-judgment motion, styled as a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, within
ten days, which in normal circumstances would toll the twenty-day appeal period,
the motion was in reality one to reconsider the judgment and as such does not extend
the time limits under Rule 4(a).3 Further, while the notice of appeal indicates that
plaintiff was appealing from the October 19, 2018 order denying his so-called
motion to amend, it is clear from his argument on appeal that it is the grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant with which he takes issue.
We have held that a proper Rule 59(e) motion is directed at correcting “a
‘manifest error of law in the judgment’—meaning an error that is ‘apparent, blatant,
conspicuous, clearly evident, and easily discernible from a reading of the judgment
document itself.’” Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 68 A.3d 425, 434 (R.I. 2013)
3 Although Rule 4(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure permits an extension of the period for filing the notice of appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect, plaintiff made no such argument before the hearing justice.
-5- (quoting American Federation of Teachers Local 2012 v. Rhode Island Board of
Regents for Education, 477 A.2d 104, 105, 106 (R.I. 1984)). The purpose of Rule
59(e) is to correct “obvious errors of law or of fact in the judgment.” Peloso v.
Imperatore, 434 A.2d 274, 279 (R.I. 1981). This Court has specified that “if the
error is not obvious unless one reads the underlying decision, the error is not a
manifest error in our opinion.” Bogosian v. Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1119 (R.I.
2003) (brackets and deletion omitted) (quoting American Federation of Teachers
Local 2012, 477 A.2d at 106).
In support of his motion to amend the judgment, plaintiff argued that the
hearing justice made manifest errors in applying the law to the facts in the record
and failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. In other
words, plaintiff was, in essence, seeking to relitigate the motion for summary
judgment. We have held previously that “reconsideration merely to relitigate old
matters is not available under Rule 59(e).” American Federation of Teachers Local
2012, 477 A.2d at 106; see Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 899 (R.I. 1996)
(upholding the denial of the plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion when it was merely a
request that the trial justice “schedule a brief evidentiary hearing” so that the plaintiff
could attempt to persuade the trial justice to change his mind). We therefore
conclude that plaintiff’s motion was not proper under Rule 59(e).
-6- Even if the motion for reconsideration were to be treated as one to vacate
under Rule 60(b),4 which does not extend the time for filing an appeal with this
Court, the motion is best characterized as an attack on the hearing justice’s decision
on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In other words, the plaintiff did
not seek to provide newly discovered evidence, allege fraud, or seek any other
avenue of relief that is available under Rule 60(b). The plaintiff instead asserted that
the hearing justice did not properly assess the evidence and “gave no probative
weight to [his] Requests for Admission of facts that were deemed admitted by the
Court and that demonstrate genuine issues of material facts which must be resolved.”
4 Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part, that: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: “(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; “(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); “(3) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; “(4) The judgment is void; “(5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or “(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. “The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one (1) year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.”
-7- He also asked the hearing justice to vacate her decision, deny the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, and order that the case proceed to trial. These types of
claims of error are the “kind of error [that] may be reviewed only on appeal to the
Supreme Court.” American Federation of Teachers Local 2012, 477 A.2d at 106.
Therefore, the motion was properly denied, and it did not extend the time in which
to file an appeal to this Court. See id.; see also Iozzi v. City of Cranston, 52 A.3d
585, 588 (R.I. 2012) (“[T]he time specified in Rule 4(a) is mandatory, and * * * once
the prescribed time has passed there can be no review by way of appeal.”) (quoting
Wachovia Bank v. Hershberger, 911 A.2d 278, 279-80 (R.I. 2006) (mem.)). The
plaintiff’s appeal, therefore, was untimely.5
III
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the final judgment is affirmed, and the papers of this
case are remanded to the Superior Court.
5 Even though we deny the plaintiff’s appeal as untimely, we nonetheless pause to note that we discern no merit in any of the plaintiff’s substantive claims. The plaintiff failed to present competent evidence to prove the existence of any disputed issue of material fact, and he failed to present competent evidence to support a single element of his claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or unjust enrichment. Thus, the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
-8- STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Robert Paroskie v. Linda Rhault.
No. 2019-50-Appeal. Case Number (KC 17-585)
Date Opinion Filed December 8, 2020
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Francis X. Flaherty
Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Susan E. McGuirl
For Plaintiff:
Robert Paroskie, Pro Se Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
Lauren E. Jones, Esq. Robert S. Thurston, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)