Robert Parker v. Vince Dequito

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 23-55771
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT L. PARKER, Ph.D., an individual, No. 23-55771

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00661-LL-JLB

v. MEMORANDUM* VINCE DEQUITO, an individual; JONATHAN BECERRA, an individual; CARRIE HOGAN, an individual; DOES, 1- 50, individuals,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 26, 2026**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Robert L. Parker appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment violations for unlawful

detention and arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). novo a district court’s summary judgment and qualified immunity determination.

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Parker’s claim for

unlawful detention because Parker failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact

as to whether defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Parker or whether

the detention was unduly prolonged. See Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1077

(9th Cir. 2011) (reasonable suspicion requires that an officer have “specific,

articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the

basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal

activity” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v.

Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985) (there is “no rigid time limitation” on stops,

and the relevant inquiry is “whether the police diligently pursued a means of

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly”).

The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity on Parker’s claim for unlawful arrest because it is not clearly

established that arresting a person for failing to provide an identification violates

the Constitution. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014)

(defendants sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they

violated a right that was clearly established, meaning that “the right’s contours

were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes

2 23-55771 would have understood that he was violating it”); Vanegas v. City of Pasadena,

46 F.4th 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that, even if plaintiff’s failure to

identify himself did not provide probable cause to arrest under California Penal

Code § 148(a)(1), the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity because

“[n]either this court nor the Supreme Court has said that arresting a person for

failing to provide an identification violates the Constitution”).

AFFIRMED.

3 23-55771