IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 444444444444 NO . 11-0332 444444444444
ROBERT MASTERSON, MARK BROWN, GEORGE BUTLER, CHARLES WESTBROOK, RICHEY OLIVER, CRAIG PORTER, SHARON WEBER, JUNE SMITH, RITA BAKER, STEPHANIE PEDDY, BILLIE RUTH HODGES, DALLAS CHRISTIAN AND THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE G OOD SHEPHERD , PETITIONERS,
v.
THE DIOCESE OF NORTHWEST TEXAS, THE REV. CELIA ELLERY, DON GRIFFIS AND MICHAEL RYAN, RESPONDENTS
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
JUSTICE LEHRMANN , joined by CHIEF JUSTICE JEFFERSON , dissenting.
Today the Court applies state law governing corporations to bar summary judgment for TEC1
on an ecclesiastical matter over which the Court has no jurisdiction. While I wholeheartedly agree
with the Court that church property disputes should be resolved under the neutral-principles
approach approved by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), in my view, the
Court has misapplied those principles in this case. In deciding that the secular law governing
corporations controls the outcome of this matter, the Court places undue emphasis on the local
church’s incorporated status. Although a corporation is a separate entity with authority to amend its
1 Unless otherwise noted, abbreviated terms shall have the meaning specified in the Court’s opinion. bylaws and articles of incorporation, it cannot do so when such an action results in the circumvention
of an ecclesiastical decision made by a higher authority within a hierarchical church structure. In
this case, the Court determines that Good Shepherd’s incorporation allows it to disregard TEC’s
governing documents by withdrawing from TEC and taking church property with it—actions that
go beyond the parish’s authority. All the while, Good Shepherd has sought, agreed to, and received
the benefits of association with TEC. Because the decision about whether a subordinate church
entity can withdraw involves a matter of church polity, which is clearly an ecclesiastical issue, we
have no jurisdiction over the subject under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Moreover, even if this dispute could be resolved by conducting a purely secular analysis,
summary judgment in favor of the Episcopal Leaders remains appropriate. Considering all the
relevant statutes and documents, I would hold that a trust on the church property was created in favor
of TEC and the Diocese, which became irrevocable upon Good Shepherd’s vote to withdraw.
Alternatively, I would hold that Good Shepherd was estopped from revoking the trust. Good
Shepherd freely and eagerly chose to accept the use and benefit of the property at issue, paying
nothing for the privilege. It cannot now unilaterally escape its part of the arrangement. Accordingly,
I respectfully dissent.
I. Background
A. Good Shepherd Sought the Benefit of TEC Structure
As the Court notes, TEC is structured in three tiers, from the General Convention (at the
highest level) to the regional dioceses (at the intermediate level) to the local congregations, divided
into parishes, missions, and congregations (at the lower level). See ___ S.W.3d at ___. In turn, each
2 subordinate Episcopal affiliate must accede and be subject to the Constitution and Canons of the
higher entity or entities. See id. Good Shepherd expressed this agreement to be bound by the higher
entities repeatedly and consistently until its vote to withdraw in 2006.
When the original members of Good Shepherd first applied to TEC to organize a mission in
1965, the applicants stated that they were “desirous of obtaining the services of the Church, and
ready, according to our several abilities, to sustain the same.” In accordance with diocesan Canon,
the applicants further “promise[d] conformity to [TEC’s] Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship” and
“to the Constitution and Canons of the General Convention and the Diocese of Northwest Texas.”
In the 1972 Instrument of Donation declaring the church building and grounds free from debt or lien,
Good Shepherd’s Vicar and Bishop’s Committee further stated “that the building and grounds are
secured from the danger of alienation, either in whole or in part, from those who profess and practice
the Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship of this Church.” Good Shepherd applied for and was granted
parish status in 1974, reaffirming in its petition that the signatories thereto were “conscientiously
attached to the Doctrine, Discipline and Worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America.”
Upon being granted parish status, Good Shepherd incorporated in accordance with diocesan
Canon. The Articles of Incorporation provided that “[t]he corporation is organized for religious
purposes in order to provide a location for religious worship, education, and the furtherance of the
Christian religion.” The initial Bylaws, adopted in January 1975, state in Article I:
The Church of the Good Shepherd is situated in San Angelo, Tom Green County, Texas. It is a constituent part of the Diocese of Northwest Texas and of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America. The Parish accedes to,
3 recognizes, and adopts the General Constitution and Canons of that Church, and the Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of Northwest Texas and acknowledges the authority of the same.
Before the underlying dispute arose, Good Shepherd amended its Bylaws twice (once in 1994 and
once in 1998), with no material changes made to Article I.
B. Church Property Placed in Trust
As discussed by the Court, in 1979 TEC amended its Canons, adding Canon I.7.4 (often
referred to as the “Dennis Canon”) and I.7.5 for the purpose of placing church property in trust:
Sec. 4. All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and authority of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, this Church and its Constitutions and Canons.
Sec. 5. The several Dioceses may, at their election, further confirm the trust declared under the foregoing Section 4 by appropriate action, but no such action shall be necessary for the existence and validity of the trust.
(Emphasis added).
In 1982, after TEC enacted the Dennis Canon, the Diocese conveyed the relevant property
to Good Shepherd. As the Court notes, the deed itself contained no trust language or other limitation
on the conveyance. Finally, in 2006, Good Shepherd’s members passed several resolutions by
majority vote, with full knowledge of the Dennis Canon to which Good Shepherd had agreed to be
bound. Pursuant to these resolutions, Good Shepherd voted to “withdraw[] from, end its
membership in, and dissolve[] its union with” TEC and the Diocese. It further voted to amend its
4 Bylaws to remove any reference to TEC, as well as to revoke any trust placed on church property for
the benefit of TEC or the Diocese.
II. Analysis of Neutral-Principles Approach
In Jones v. Wolf, the United States Supreme Court recognized as constitutional the neutral-
principles approach to resolving church property disputes. 443 U.S. at 602. While courts remain
prohibited under this approach “from resolving [such] disputes on the basis of religious doctrine or
practice,” they may apply “objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law” so long
as it involves “no consideration of doctrinal matters.” Id. at 602–03. This approach, the Supreme
Court concluded, “promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice.” Id. at 603. Further,
the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy.
Id. The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that in examining any religious documents to discern
the intent of the parties, “a civil court must take care to [do so] in purely secular terms.” Id. at 604.
Thus, if the interpretation of such documents “would require the civil court to resolve a religious
controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body.” Id. The Supreme Court stressed that “the outcome of a church property dispute
is not foreordained” under a neutral-principles approach. Id. at 606. Instead,
[a]t any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can
5 modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.
Id. (emphasis added).
Today, this Court adopts the neutral-principles approach for resolution of disputes involving
religious organizations. See ___ S.W.3d at ___. I fully support this adoption and agree that this
approach is the preferable method of resolving such controversies. However, the neutral-principles
approach only allows courts to become involved in non-ecclesiastical decisions; it does not confer
jurisdiction upon courts to decide matters over which they have no constitutional authority. In my
view, the Court oversteps this boundary and ignores its constitutional mandate.
A. Improper Resolution of Ecclesiastical Issues
In adopting the neutral-principles approach, the Court recognizes that “differences between
ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical issues will not always be distinct” and that “deferring to
decisions of ecclesiastical bodies in matters reserved to them by the First Amendment may, in some
instances, effectively determine the property rights in question.” Id. at ___. Unlike the Court,
however, I believe proper deference with respect to such matters determines the property rights at
issue in this case. When deciding whether a matter invokes constitutional protection, I believe that
we should err on the side of caution, upholding constitutional mandates when in doubt.
The Court divides the questions of Good Shepherd parish’s authority to withdraw from TEC
and Good Shepherd corporation’s authority to withdraw by amending its bylaws and articles of
6 incorporation. Id. at ___. In my view, however, the two inquiries are inextricably linked. The Court
goes on to conclude that, because the parish at issue was incorporated and because there was no
specific TEC or diocesan restriction on the corporation’s authority to amend its bylaws and articles
of incorporation, the validity of Good Shepherd’s withdrawal by amendment of those documents was
not an ecclesiastical question. See id. I am unconvinced that the incorporated status of the parish
removes the issue from the realm of church polity. If Bishop Ohl’s determination that the parish
could not withdraw from TEC is a binding ecclesiastical decision,2 it does not cease to be so because
of the corporate form taken by the parish. Such a determination permits civil courts to conduct an
end-run around the First Amendment’s prohibition against inquiry into and resolution of religious
issues by effectively allowing the lower church entity’s unilateral decision to trump the higher
entity’s authority over matters of church polity.
Notably, the Court recognizes that “what happens to the relationship between a local
congregation that is part of a hierarchical religious organization and the higher organization when
members of the local congregation vote to disassociate is an ecclesiastical matter over which civil
courts generally do not have jurisdiction.” Id. at ___ (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713–14 (1976)). “But what happens to the property is not,” the Court
continues, “unless the congregation’s affairs have been ordered so that ecclesiastical decisions
effectively determine the property issue.” Id. It follows that Bishop Ohl’s determination regarding
the parish’s authority (or, more accurately, lack of authority) to withdraw from TEC is a binding
2 This determination is unrelated to the undisputed right of the individual members of any religious organization to withdraw their affiliation should they choose to do so.
7 ecclesiastical decision, irrespective of the corporate form taken by the parish. In turn, since Good
Shepherd did not validly withdraw from TEC, Good Shepherd remained a constituent thereof and
consequently remained subject to TEC’s and the Diocese’s Constitutions and Canons.
There appears to be no dispute that, as a TEC parish, Good Shepherd could not pick and
choose those portions of the governing documents by which it wished to be bound. And the Dennis
Cannon and its diocesan counterpart expressly state that the church property is held in trust for TEC
and the Diocese. Thus, if Good Shepherd had no authority to withdraw, it had no authority to revoke
its adherence to the Canons or to revoke the trust placed on the property by virtue thereof. Moreover,
the Canons condition Good Shepherd’s authority over the church property on its “remain[ing] a part
of, and subject to, this Church and its Constitutions and Canons.” By purporting to withdraw from
TEC, then, Good Shepherd took the very action that would strip it of its rights in the property. Good
Shepherd may not avoid the consequences of its actions—consequences to which it had freely
agreed—simply by voting to no longer be subject to those consequences.
B. Application of Secular Law
1. Intent of Parties to Create Trust
Even if this dispute could be resolved in a purely secular manner and without interference
with TEC’s ecclesiastical determinations, I would still hold that the Episcopal Leaders met their
summary judgment burden. The Anglican Leaders argue that no valid trust exists on the property
and that, to the extent one did exist, it was revoked upon Good Shepherd’s 2006 amendment of its
Bylaws. I disagree.
8 Under the Texas Trust Code, “[a] trust is created only if the settlor manifests an intention to
create a trust.” TEX . PROP . CODE § 112.002. Further, the intent to create a trust must be expressed
in writing. Id. § 112.004. As discussed above, neither the deed conveying the property at issue to
Good Shepherd nor Good Shepherd’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws reference the creation
of a trust. Courts in other states with similar trust statutes have struggled to determine the issue of
whether the Dennis Canon, or similarly worded provisions in the governing documents of other
hierarchical churches, creates a trust under such circumstances. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 606
(endorsing the means utilized by TEC to create a trust by noting that, as an alternative means of
ensuring retention of the property by the higher entity, “the constitution of the general church can
be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church”).
In Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc.
(Timberridge), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a local church (Timberridge) affiliated with the
hierarchical Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PCUSA) held property in trust for the national church
based in part on an explicit trust provision in PCUSA’s governing Book of Order, as well as on
language in the local church’s charter documents. 719 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 2011). Following a 1982
amendment to the Book of Order by PCUSA’s predecessor to add the property trust provision,3
Timberridge “functioned as a regular member of the national church” until a property dispute arose
in 2007, leading to Timberridge’s withdrawal from PCUSA. Id. at 449–50. In applying the neutral
principles doctrine to the dispute, the court aptly noted:
3 The northern and southern branches of the Presbyterian Church formally reunited as PCUSA in 1983, with the Book of Order retaining the trust provision. 719 S.E.2d at 448.
9 We review all of these materials [deeds, state statutes, and governing documents of the local and national churches], keeping in mind that the outcome of these church property disputes usually turns on the specific facts presented in the record, that the neutral principle factors are interrelated, and that our ultimate goal is to determine “the intentions of the parties” at the local and national level regarding beneficial ownership of the property at issue as expressed “before the dispute erupt[ed]” in a “legally cognizable form.”
Id. at 450 (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 603). The court found persuasive that Timberridge’s Articles
of Incorporation “proclaimed [its] allegiance to the PCUSA Book of Order” containing the trust
provision and noted that “at no time during the more than two decades before this dispute erupted
and the eight years after it was deeded the property at issue did [Timberridge] even seek to amend
its Articles to demonstrate any different intent.” Id. at 455.
By contrast, in From the Heart Church Ministries, Inc. v. African Methodist Episcopal
Zionist Church, the Maryland Court of Appeals held the evidence established that the local
incorporated church “did not, in fact, consent to the trust provisions” in the national church’s Book
of Discipline. 803 A.2d 548, 569 (Md. 2002). Key to the court’s holding was the local church’s
deletion, many years before the property dispute arose, of a requirement in its charter documents to
act in accordance with the Book of Discipline. The court also noted the church’s addition of a
provision in those documents addressing the disposition of church property upon dissolution of the
corporation, as well as the absence of trust language in the deed. This omission was significant, the
court noted, because the Book of Discipline required such language, but the national church had
nevertheless acquiesced in the “deeding irregularity.” Id.
Like the local church in Timberridge, Good Shepherd’s corporate documents “proclaimed
allegiance” to TEC’s and the Diocese’s Constitutions and Canons. 719 S.E.2d at 455. The property
10 trust provision was added to the TEC Canons in 1979, before the church property was conveyed to
Good Shepherd. Further, like the church in Timberridge, and notably in contrast to the church in
From the Heart Church Ministries, “at no time during the more than two decades before this dispute
erupted and the [twenty-four] years after it was deeded the property at issue did [Good Shepherd]
even seek to amend its [corporate documents] to demonstrate any different intent.” Id. In fact, Good
Shepherd amended its Bylaws twice before the underlying dispute arose, leaving untouched the
provision agreeing to be bound by the TEC and Diocesan Canons.4 Moreover, the absence of trust
language from the deed to the property at issue is not a departure from the requirements in the
Canons and thus does not, in and of itself, raise suspicion about Good Shepherd’s intent to hold the
property in trust. See From the Heart Church Ministries, Inc., 803 A.2d at 569.
The Court cites with approval the Missouri Court of Appeals’ opinion in Heartland
Presbytery v. Gashland Presbyterian Church, 364 S.W.3d 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), which further
supports the conclusion that a trust was imposed on the church property in this case. In Heartland
Presbytery, the court held that a local church corporation’s Articles of Agreement, which stated that
the local church was “connected with and ecclesiastically subject to” PCUSA’s predecessor, “[did]
not establish its agreement to be bound by the property provisions of the PCUSA’s Constitution;
instead, it suggests the opposite.” Id. at 585, 587. Noting that “[t]he ‘connected with’ language . . .
cannot alone establish PCUSA’s trust interest,” the court went on to examine the statement that the
local church “would be ‘ecclesiastically subject to’ the denomination.” Id. at 586. The latter
4 Bishop Ohl also testified by affidavit that Good Shepherd participated in the annual Diocese Conventions each year from 1966 through 2006. This includes 1984, the year the Diocese added the property trust provision to its Canons.
11 statement, the court concluded, implied that the local church “would not be subject to the
denomination’s authority in non-ecclesiastical matters.” Id. The Articles also provided that title to
any property acquired “vests, without qualification, in [the local church] itself, in its corporate
capacity,” and that such property “can only be conveyed to others pursuant to specific authorization
of its members . . . and of its Board of Trustees.” Id. at 587. These provisions, the court held, lent
further credence to the conclusion that the local church did not consent to the PCUSA trust
provision. Id.
In this case, Good Shepherd’s corporate documents contained the kind of language that was
conspicuously absent from the Articles of Agreement at issue in Heartland Presbytery. Prior to the
split with TEC and the Diocese, Good Shepherd’s Bylaws stated not only that the church “is a
constituent part of the Diocese of Northwest Texas and of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States of America,” but also that it “accedes to, recognizes, and adopts the General
Constitution and Canons of that Church, and the Constitution and Canons of the Diocese of
Northwest Texas and acknowledges the authority of the same.”5 This is consistent with Good
Shepherd’s promise of “conformity to” TEC Doctrine when it originally applied for mission status
and the declaration in its parish application that it was “conscientiously attached” to that Doctrine.
Thus, unlike in Heartland Presbytery, Good Shepherd’s corporate documents constitute an “effective
5 The local church’s Bylaws in Heartland Presbytery did state that PCUSA’s Constitution was “obligatory upon it and its members” and that the Bylaws “shall be construed only in conformity” with the Constitution. 364 S.W .3d at 587. However, the court held that these provisions conflicted with the local church’s Articles of Agreement and that, under state law, the Articles controlled. Id. Here, there is no conflict between Good Shepherd’s Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws; that is, nothing in the Articles of Incorporation is negated, or even affected, by the statement in the Bylaws that Good Shepherd acceded to TEC’s and the Diocese’s Constitutions and Canons.
12 expression of [Good Shepherd’s] intent to be bound by [TEC’s and the Diocese’s Canons],” which
have included the property trust provisions since 1979 and 1984, respectively.6 Id. at 591.
In sum, under a neutral analysis of the relevant documents, I would hold that the Episcopal
Leaders met their summary judgment burden with respect to the creation of a trust. In light of the
property trust provisions in TEC’s and the Diocese’s Canons, Good Shepherd’s corporate documents
agreeing to be bound by those Canons, Good Shepherd’s periodic amendment of its corporate
documents without altering its allegiance to the Canons, and Good Shepherd’s continued
participation in Diocesan Conventions prior to the dispute, the Episcopal Leaders conclusively
established an expression of intent by Good Shepherd to hold its property in trust for the benefit of
TEC and the Diocese.
2. The Trust Is Expressly Irrevocable
The Court holds that, regardless of whether Good Shepherd agreed to hold the church
property in trust, the trust was revocable under Texas law. ___ S.W.3d at ___. I disagree.
The Court correctly notes that, under Texas law, a trust is revocable unless expressly made
irrevocable. TEX . PROP . CODE § 112.051. However, “[n]o specific words of art are required to
create an irrevocable trust” so long as the instrument “reflect[s] the trustor’s intent to make the trust
irrevocable.” Vela v. GRC Land Holdings, Ltd., 383 S.W.3d 248, 250–51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing McCauley v. Simmer, 336 S.W.2d 872, 881 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Houston 1960, writ dism’d), and Austin Lake Estates Recreation Club, Inc. v. Gilliam, 493
6 This is consistent with the Texas Trust Code, which provides for creation of a trust by “a property owner’s declaration that the owner holds the property as trustee for another person.” T EX . P RO P . C O D E § 112.001(1).
13 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). I would hold that the terms of
the property trust provision in the Dennis Canon, to which Good Shepherd agreed to be bound,
expressly rendered the trust irrevocable upon Good Shepherd’s withdrawal from TEC.
As noted above, the property trust provision in TEC’s Canons (with a substantially similar
provision in the diocesan Canons) states:
All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congregation is located. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and authority of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, this Church and its Constitutions and Canons.
(Emphasis added). This provision clearly limits a parish’s authority over church property by
requiring that the parish be “a part of, and subject to,” TEC. Thus, if a parish withdraws from TEC,
it necessarily loses such authority to the extent it is inconsistent with holding the property in trust
for TEC and the Diocese. While the Dennis Canon does not use the term “irrevocable,” it
nevertheless reflects Good Shepherd’s intent to make the trust irrevocable upon its withdrawal from
TEC and was thus sufficient to create an irrevocable trust under Texas law.
The Dennis Canon’s language distinguishes the property trust provision here from the
national church’s trust provision at issue in From the Heart Church Ministries, which did not
address the situation in which “a local church disaffiliates from the denomination.” 803 A.2d at 571.
Without such language, the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to find that the trust was
irrevocable, concluding that “[c]onsent to holding property in trust during the course of affiliation
does not automatically constitute consent to relinquishing that property once the affiliation
14 terminates.” Id. Here, Good Shepherd did more than consent to holding the property in trust during
the course of its affiliation with TEC; it also consented to its authority over the property being
contingent on that affiliation. As a result, even if Good Shepherd had the authority to disaffiliate
from TEC and the Diocese by proper vote under its Articles and Bylaws, I cannot agree with the
Court that Good Shepherd could revoke the trust and maintain control of the property upon its
withdrawal. See Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 108 (Colo. 1986) (holding that
a local church’s articles of incorporation and bylaws that were similar to Good Shepherd’s, along
with the relevant provisions of TEC’s Canons, “foreclose the possibility of the withdrawal of
property from the parish simply because a majority of the members of the parish decide to end their
association with [TEC]”).
The Supreme Court confirmed in Jones v. Wolf that “before the dispute erupts, the parties can
ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church
property.” 443 U.S. at 606. That is exactly what the parties did in this case. Good Shepherd agreed
to hold the church property in trust for TEC and the Diocese, and any authority it otherwise had over
the property terminated when it withdrew from TEC.
3. Good Shepherd Is Estopped from Revoking the Trust
Alternatively, I believe the Episcopal Leaders prevail under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel.
The Episcopal Leaders did not formally plead quasi-estoppel as an affirmative defense, though they
did allege facts to support it.7 The summary judgment evidence establishes the applicability of the
7 The Anglican Leaders counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment regarding ownership and possession of the church property. In their First Amended Petition, the Episcopal Leaders argued that they “relied on the promises and statements” of Good Shepherd in “provid[ing] financial support” thereto.
15 doctrine and precludes Good Shepherd from claiming that it may revoke the trust in conjunction with
its withdrawal from TEC. “Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another’s
disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken. The doctrine applies when it
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he
acquiesced, or from which he accepted a benefit.” Lopez v. Muñoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22
S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. 2000) (citation omitted).
Prior to the 2006 dispute, Good Shepherd: had promised conformity to TEC Doctrine and
to TEC’s and the Diocese’s Constitutions and Canons; had accepted grants as well as no-interest and
low-interest loans from TEC and the Diocese to assist in building the church; had declared that the
church property was “secured from the danger of alienation . . . from those who profess and practice
the Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship of this [Episcopal] Church”; and had accepted the conveyance
of the property from the Diocese after the property trust provisions were added to TEC’s Canons.
Having made these promises and accepted these benefits, Good Shepherd may not now contend it
is free to disregard these positions because a majority of its members have voted to do so.
III. Conclusion
In denying summary judgment, the Court oversteps its constitutional bounds to resolve
ecclesiastical matters over which it has no authority. Further, the Court ignores language in the
relevant documents clarifying that Good Shepherd’s authority over the church property is contingent
upon its affiliation with TEC and the Diocese. Finally, Good Shepherd is barred from revoking the
trust on the property in conjunction with its withdrawal from TEC. For these reasons, I am
compelled to respectfully express my dissent.
16 _________________________________ Debra H. Lehrmann Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: August 30, 2013