fugitive.
In this appeal, Taylor asserts that the trial court erred by: not finding
that his case was subject to the kidnapping exemption of Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) '509.050; admitting several pieces of evidence contrary to
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 403 and 404(b); admitting text messages
. and video that had not been.properly authenticated; refusing to allow a doctor
to testify about' a mental .health evaluation of Ballard; and refusing to d~sigriate
·a particular juror as the. alternate. We address each of these issues below I and
relate further background as necessary.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Taylor was not entitled to the kidnapping exemption.
· KRS 509.050 states:
A person may not be convicted of... kidnapping when his . criminal ·purpose is the commission of an offense defined outside this chapter and his interference with the victim's liberty occurs immediately· with and incidental to the commission of that offense, unless the interference exceeds that which is ordinarily incident to commission of the offense which is the objective of his crimi:p.al purpose.
When determining the applicability of the kidnapping exemption, "[t]his ~ourt
· employs a three-prong test." Wood v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 500, 515
(Ky. 2005) (citing Griffin v. . Commonwealth, . 576 S.W.2d 514 (Ky.. 1978)). ;
First, the u~derlying ·.criminal purpose · ·must be the commission of a crime defined outside of KRS 509. Second, · 6 the interference with the victim's liberty must have occurred immediately with or incidental to the commission of the underlying intended crime. Third, the interference with the victim's liberty must not exceed that which is ordinarily incident to the commission of the underlying crime ... All three· prongs must be satisfied in order for the exemption to apply.
Id. (internal citations omitted) .. "The~ applicability of the'. .. statute is dete~mined
as a matter of law." Arnold v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Ky. 2006)
(citing Calloway v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 501, 502-03 (Ky . .1977)). This
Court has also held that "[tJhe kidnapping exemption statute is to be strictly
construed and the burden is upon a defendant to show that it should apply."
Arnold, 192 S.W.3d at 326 (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173,
180 (Ky. 2001)). "The trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless there is
an abuse of discretion." Arnold, 192 S.W.3d at 326 (quoting Murphy, 50
S.W.3d at 180).
The Commonwealth has conceded that Taylor met his burden in showirig
that the first and second elements in thfs three-prong tes~ are met. Thus, the
only point of contention between the parties is whether the third element has ·
been met. "Historically, this has been the most important prong of the
exemption test." Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 70, 78 (Ky. 2011)
(internal citations omitted).
"[A] case-by-case analysis is required depending on the specific facts of a
given case" in determining. the applicability of the exemption. Id. at 77 (citing
Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Ky. 1982)). In Wood v. Commonwealth, the defendant began his assault of his victim on the street,
7 while the victim was in a vehicle with a friend. 178 S.W.3d at 505. Wood shot \
the victim and a struggle ensued. Id. Ultimately, the friend.fled to find help.
Id. Wood removed the victim from.the vehicle and put her into his car and
."drove away with her legs hanging out of the back driver's side door and
dragging on the ground." Id. He stopped in a residential yard and, after a
hostage situation with the homeowner, was arrest.ed. Id. Medical evidence
established that th'e victim died en route to this residential yard. 'see id. at
507. This Court held that "[t]l_le injury ultimately resulting in [the victim's]·
death had been inflicted. It was unnecessary to the commission of murder to
pull [the victim] into another vehicle and drive some distance away.", Id. at
515. "The interference with her liberty greatly exceeded what was necessary to
murder her, and at a great cost." Id. Instead of being given an opportunity to
"receive[] medical attention... she expired in.the back seat of Wood's car." Id.
Ballard testified that he and Taylor drove Johnson to the empty lot where
Taylor continued to beat Johnson, and then they drove away from that location
and Johnson gave his last "gurgling" breath.· According to Ballard, he and
Taylor kept Johnson captive after the assault ended, but before Johnson's
death. Even Taylor admits that " . they forced Johnson back into the vehicle two ' ,
separate times before John~on finally su_ccumbed to his injuries.
Like Wood, this restraint was unnecessary to the completion of the
murder and exceeded what was necessary to complete the underlying offense.
: Like iri. Wood, Ballard and Taylor could have left Johnson on the street .or in
the empty lot where he was beaten. But according to both Ballard's and
8 Taylor's· testimony, they put Johnson back into the car and took him away
from the lot. Both men testified that it was after this point that yohnson
ultimately died.
The exemption must be narrowly construed. See Arnold, 192 S.W.3d at
326 (quoting Murphy, 50 S.W.3d at 180). Under these facts, and narrowly
construing the exemption as we must, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to apply the kidnapping exemption.
Taylor also claims error in the trial court providing an ihstruction on .
kidnapping to the jury because the kidnapping exemption applied. Because we
hold that the trial court correctly found that the exemption did npt apply, we
discern no error in the court's instruction on kidnapping.
B. The trial.court did not abuse its discretion under KRE 403 or 404(b).
On appeal, Taylor argues that the cell data and text messages, testimony
about and video of Taylor at Trust Lounge after the murder, evidence of guns,
books, and designer clothing found in Taylor's possession when he was
arrested, and the barrel in which Taylor arid Ballard placed Johnson's body
were admitted in violation of KRE 403 and/or KRE 404(b). We perceive no
reversible error in the admission of this evidence.
Under KRE 401, "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" is relevant.
"This standard is powerfully inclusionary and is met upon a showing of
minimal probativeness." Roe v. Commom'!ealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Ky.
9 2015) (internal citations omitted). However, even though "relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." KRE 403.
KRE 404(b) also limits admission·of "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,
br acts," stating that it "is not adID.issible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in. conformity therewith." However, the rule does allow
admission of the evidence "[i]f offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or acddent." KRE 404(b).. "For slich evidence to be admissible,
however, it must be relevant for .at least one of these . other purposes, . and its
probative value on that issue .must exceed the prejudicial effect of its character-
proving aspects." Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 486 S.W.3d 310, 320 (Ky. 2016) /
·(citing Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994)).
The trial court's decisions in these areas are granted "broad discretion"
- be.en clear abuse and these decisions should only be rtversed "where there has '
. of discretion." Page v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W:3d 416,. 420 (Ky. 2004) (citing
Parti'f! v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1996)). "The test for an
abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Webb v.
·Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Anderson v.
10 Commonwealth, 231 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007) (citing Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Thompson, °Il S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000))~
With the preceding/in mind, we now address each of Taylor's arguments.
1. Cell Data and Text Messages
The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Taylor killed Johnson
to take over Johnson's drug business. ·Detective Joe 'sisson testified for the
Commonwealth for three hours about Taylor's and Ballard's cellphone data and
text messages ... The text messages were, in large part; messages between Taylor
and his customers and were offered to prove Taylor's existing marijuana
dealing business. The Commonwealth argued these messages and cell phone
activity proved: the existence of Taylor's business, providing the motive for
killing Johnson; described the car in which Taylor was apprehended; and,
through messages and calls from Taylor to Johnson after Johnson's death,
·proved Taylor's intent to cover up his crime.
The first determination to be made is whether this evidence is relevant.
"[R]elevance is established by any showing of probativeness, however slight."
Webb, 387 S.W.3d at 325 (quoting Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439,
449 (Ky. 1999)). The evidence is clearly relevant. It ties Taylor.to the getaway
vehicle. It provides the motive for the killing. It establishes how Taylor and . . Johnson knew each other, as well as Ballard's involvement. Thus, the evidence
meets this "slight" showing to pass mu.ster under KRE 401.
The next, and more challenging, determination is whether, under KRE
403, probativeness of the evid~nce outweighed its prejudice. At the outset; we·
11 . must reiterate that KRE 403 "does not offer protection against evidence that is
merely prejudicial in the sense that it is detrimental to a party's case." Webb,
387 S.W.3d at 326 (citing Carterv. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980);
Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 416, 427 (5th Cir. 2006)).
Instead, the evidence must be unduly prejudicial, which occurs when it
"'appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instinct to punish,' or otherwise 'may cause a jury to base its decision on
something other than the established propositions in the case."' Carter, 61 7
F.2d at 972 (quoting 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence P
403(03), at 403-15 to 403-17 (1978)).
Taylor argues first that, "[b]eing forced to listen to three hours of barely
relevant cell phone data and text messages necessarily provoked the jury's
instinct to punish.someone." The brunt of this argument is that being forced to
listen to evidence somehow created ·a sense of ire intense. enough to force the
jury to lash out at and punish Taylor. Under the facts of this case, this Court
is disinclined to succumb to the cynicism of this argument. The evidence may
have been monotonous; however, there is nothing else in the record to prove
that the mere amount of evidence alone created undue prejudice. 3
3 We are also unpersu.aded by Taylor's argument that jurors falling asleep leads to the conclusion of undue prejudice. If anything, we find this shows the evidence did not"arouse [the jury's] sense of horror, provoke[] its instinct to puriish," or otherwise cause it to act contrary to law. See Carter, 617 F.2d at 972 (quoting 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence P 403(03), at 403-15 to 403-17 (1978)).
12 Taylor also argues that the unduly prejudicial impact should be inferred
due to the jury's recommendation of two twenty-two year terms, to be served
consecutively. However, the distinction between the case cited by Taylor to·
support thi::? proposition and his own case is significant. In the case cited by
Taylor, the defendant was sentenced to the maximum allowable penalty. See
·Cargill v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Ky~ 1975). In fact, the Court
specifically stated that "[p]rejudice may be inferred from the fact that Cargill
received the maximum penalty on the charges of robbery, as well as the drug
ch~ge." Id (emphasis added). Here, Taylor was sen~enced to only two years
more than the minimum sentence on each charge. This distinction is
paramount. Thus, we ·are unpersuaded to find prejudice from the jury's
sentence.
Finally, Taylor argues that this particular evidence should have been
excluded under KRE 61 l(a). The Court is similarly unpersuaded by this
method of attack. There is no evidence in the record that the court failed to
"exercise reasonable control" over the presentation of the case, as required by
KRE 611, The judge exercised his discretion in determi_ning . . the probativeriess
of the Commonwealth's evidence) determined this probativeness outweighed
any prejudice, and found that the method of its presentation was appropriate.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
2. Drug Dealing ·
Most of the aforementioned cell phone evidence related to Taylor's drug
dealing. Thus, Taylor also argues that the admissionc.of this evidence violated
13 KRE 404(b). KRE 404(b) states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith .... " However, if provided for a permissible non-character
purp~se, the evidence may b.e admissible. See Dickerson, 486 S.W.3d at 320
(citing Bell, 875 S.W.2d.at 889). Additionally, the probativeness of such -non-
character evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must "exc~ed" its
prejuditia.I value. Dickerson, 486 S.W.3d at 320 (citing Bell, 875 S.W.2d at
889). We note that Taylor's counsel spoke of his drug dealing during opening
statements and Taylor openly discussed his business and use of drugs while
testifying on direct examination. Therefore, he also presented this evidence as
part of his strategy at trial. Whatever strategy may have been utilized, it is
disingenuous for Taylor to now complain that he was prejudiced by evidence of
· his drug dealing when he also used it at length in the presentation of his case.
However, in spite of this flaw, we still hold that the.trial court's admission of
this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
Initially, this Court must find that the drug dealing is evidence of "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" under KRE 404(b). However, we find our prior
decision in White v. Commonwealth, 178 s. W.3d 470 (Ky. 2005) most
instructive in comparison. In White, the defendant plotted with two others to murder the sheriff. Id. at 473-75. Part of his motive was to install a new
sheriff who wouid allow White's drug business. to flourish. S~e id. As such, the
· Commonweal0- introduced "extensive testimony" about White's drug dealing.
14 Id. at 475~ This Court held that the evidence was admissible under the motive
exception of KRE 404(b). Id. at 476.
In response to White's argument· that the presentation of evidence was
too extensive and· cumulative for its offered purpose, the Court stated that
White "was not on trial for a lesser crime ... he had been indicted for a capital
offense." Id. a~ 477 (emphasis original). As such, "it was necessary that the
prosecutor prove that [White]'s motive was correspondingly serious." Id: "Such
cumulative evidence was necessary to establisJ:i that [White] was far more than
a casual seller, thus lending credence to the idea that he would seek to kill ih
order to maintain his business." Id. at 478. This Court also felt that even
though the evidence was "voluminm.~s," "it was not the sort of outrageous cnme
... that would almost inevitably inflame a jury's passion." Id. Testimony \ showed that White sold cocaine, methamphetamine, and. other prescription
drugs. See id. at 477.
Taylor's drug business was the main motive behind Johnson's murder,
evidence of which was far less prejudicial than the evidence regarding White's
business. White sold numerous drugs, possession of most of which would be a
felony. Taylor was selling marijuana, a drug now legal.in some states.
Additionally, as in White, use of this evidence proved ·motive to kill. This
requires an extensive showing as to what would prompt Taylor to violently
attack and kill a man he called a friend. As such, the extensive evidence
showing Taylor's business and reliance upon that business. Finding· it's
prejudicial nature low, and its probativeness high, this evidence was properly
15 admitted under KRE 404(b). We fihd no abuse of discretion in the admission of
cell phone data, text messages, and testimony concerning Taylor's c;Irug
business, under either KRE 403 or 404(b) .. ·
3. Testimony about and video of Taylor at Trust Lounge
As this issue was not fully preserved, Taylor requests a palpable error
.review under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. Under this
standard, "[w]e will reverse.~. only when a 'manifest injustice has resulted from I the error."' Baumia v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.3d 530, 542 (Ky. 2013). "[T]he
required showing is probability of a different result or error so fundamental as
to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law." Id. (quoting
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006)). The "focus is on what
happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and
unambiguous that.it threatens the integrity of the judicial process." Baumia, . ,. 402 S.W.3d at 542 (quoting Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 3)) ..
The Commonwealth presented video surveillance of Taylor at_ Trust
Lounge after the murder occurred, showing him dancing, drinking,· and
interacting with friends while Ballard stands nearby. The Commonwealth used
the video on three separate occasions: during testimony from Trust Lounge's
general manager; during cross-examination of Taylor; and in closing. The ·
entirety of Taylor's d_efense was that Ballard committed the murder and he was
merely an innocent bystander who only took part i_n the cover-up. This defense·
made the video from Trust relevant because it showed Taylor's conduct after
this alleged trauma and the dynamic between Taylor and Ballard. Although
16 this Court would agree _with Taylor that "partying" behavior is not evidence of
guilt, it is evidence that tends to refute Taylor's claim that he was merely
Ballard's victim, and had undergone a severe trauma when he saw his friend
violently attacked and killed. Since the evidence has some tendency to prove·
Taylor's guilt, it is relevant under KRE 40 I. ( .
Furthermore, the evidence was pro~ative because it tended to refute·
Taylor's alternative perpetrator theory. Therefore, this Court cannot say that
there was any undue prejudice from this evidence; nor can we say that any
undue prejudice outweighed the relatively high probative value of the evidence.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion, and we do not find palpable error
in the admission of this evidence.
Finally, Taylor argues that the Commol?-wealth submitted this evidence
solely to prove his bad character in_violation of KRE 404(b). However, the ·
evidence presented of Taylor's behaviOr at Trust after the murder falls out~ide
the purview of KRE 404(b). Dancing, drinking, and socializing at a nightclub is
not inherently criminal nor inherently indicative of bad character. Thus, it
cannot be considered evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or aets." Any undue
prejudice certainly did not outweigh the probative value.
4. Guns, Books, and Designer Clothing
Taylor next contends that admission of photographs showing several
items in his possession at the time of his arrest was an abuse of discretion.
The relevant items are: two books - The Prince by Machiavelli; The Smuggler's
Ghost, when marijuana turned a_Florida Teen into a millionaire fugitive, a true
17 ·story; designer clothing, and handguns. These items were found in Taylor's
. possession when he was arrested two miles from the Mexico border. Taylor
does not dispute that he was fleeing to Mexico.. The Commonwealth argued
that this flight showed Taylor's guilt.
Evidence of "flight is _always some evidence of a sense of guilt." Rodriguez
v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 215, 218-19 (Ky. 2003) (quoting Hord v._
Commonwealth, 13 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Ky. 1928) (other citations omitted)) •. The
·collection of items with Taylor show-ed his in_tent to create a riew life of crime in
Mexico as an attempt to flee any consequences from his crime. As such, it . . shows evidence of guilt and is relevant.
However, Taylor has failed to show the inherent prejudicial nature of
these items. Taylor argues the admission was "pure character assassination"
but it is beyond this Court how possession of designer clothing, books, and
even handguns can be so unduly prejudicial. As such, we cannot say that the ·
prejudice outweighs the probative value.
Taylor also implies the admission of this evidence contravenes KRE
404(b). This Court is also unwilling to characterize the possession of these
items as "[e]viderice ·of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" under KRE 404(b)
(emphasis added), as Taylor urges. Possession of~ book, designer clothing,
and a gun is not inherently criminal. We are not persuaded to extend KRE
404(b)'s reach to these items.
18 5. The 55 Gallon Barrel . . Taylor concedes that this issue is also unpreserved and subject to
palpable error review. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced th
which had been used to hide and dispose of Johnson's body after his murder.
Taylor argues that admission of this evidence was unnecessary as
photographs, videos, and testimony provided a description of the barrel and
explanation of its use. However, the test for admission is not whether the
evidence was necessary but whether it was relevant.
The barrel is relevant to the Commonwealth's case, especially since
Taylor was also being ·prosecuted for Tampering with Physical Evidence. The
barrel is probative of.Taylor an4 Ballard's attempt to conceal the body and hide
the evidence of their crime. It is akin to a murder weapon which is relevant to
the case, even if there are photographs and testimonial descriptions of it.
"[T]he prosecution is permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its
own.choosing, and ... the defendant may not ,stipulate away parts of the case
that he does not want the jury to see." Page, 149 S:W.3d at 420. The barrel is
probative of Taylor's planning of the crime and the concealment of any
evidence. A_s such, we cannot see that any undue prejudice would outweigh
this probativeness. This is not like our -precedents involving grotesque
photographs or autopsy videos and details. ~his was a barrel that had
previously been used to dispose of a bqdy. Taylor argues that there may have
been a stench from the ·barrel or the _barrel may have been in front of the jury
for an extended period of time. There is no evidence that the barrel was
19 .grotesque or altered in any way to enhance its prejudicial nature. Taylor's
arguments are pure speculation .. We cannot hold that the trialjudge abused
his discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to present this evidence.
C. The text messages a~d video evidence were properly authenticated.
·Taylor alleges that the text messages from Taylor's and Ballard's cell
phones and surveillance videos from three separate locations were not properly
authenticated~ We begin our analysis by noting th.at questions of ·
authentication are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. · Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 1~4 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
KRE 901 (a) requires "authentication or identification as a condition . . . precedent to admissibility" which "is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter iri question is what its proponent claims." This
burden."is slight, which requires on~y a prima facie·showing of authenticity to ·
the trial court." Johnson, 134 S.W._3d at 566 (citing United-States v~ Reilly, 33.
F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994)).
l. Cell Phone Message~
Det. Sisson testified that he had.training in computer forensics, and
specific training in cell phone technology. He testified he obtained the contents
of Taylor's cell phone through the use of a program called Cellbrite. Det.
Sisson testified· that Cellbrite pulls information from a cell phone in a readable
format for investigators. He testified that the report was a fair and accurate
depiction of the download created. This is sufficient for authentication
purposes to prove that the item in question is what it is purported to be: a
20 generated report, showing the contents of Taylor's ceff phone. It is important to
note that the report itself was introduced without objection.
Taylor argues briefly that these messages included hearsay. He is
·correct. However, this issue is.not properly preserved. Although defense
counsel objected to these messages as hearsay during trial, the judge failed to
make a specific ruling on the hearsay objection. He overruled the objection, ' '
finding that th~ evidence w~s relevant and a proper foundation had been laid,
but he failed to make a ruling on hearsay. Defense counsel did not raise the
hearsay issue again. "[I]f an objection is made, the party making the objectfon
·must insist that the trial court rule on the objection, or else it is waived." Bell
v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1971) (citing Simmons v.
Commonwealth, 269 S.W. 732 (Ky. 1925) and Harris v. Commonwealth, 342
S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1961)). This issue was, therefore, waived, as defense counsel
failed to request a ruling on the hearsay objection.
Even if the issue had· been properly preserved, the error in admitting this ' ' . J;iearsay was harmless. "A non-constitutional evidentiary error may be deemed
harmless, the United States Supreme Court has explained, if the reviewirig
court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error." Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89
(Ky. 2009) (citing Kotteakos v~ United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)). The cell
phone record did contain hearsay evidence of Taylor's drug dealing. However,
Taylor's defense raised this fact during opening statement and Taylor testified
at length about his drug dealing. !he evidence against Taylor was plentiful: an 21 eye witness account the jury deemed credible artd corroborating vid
surveillance. Thus,.we deem any error in admitting .the cell phone records to
be harmless.
We also hold that the surveillance videos were sufficiently authenticated
to meet the Commonwealth's burden. The Commonwealth introduced three
separate videos: surveillance video from Spare Parts; video from 148 Jefferson
· Street, showing a view of Taylor's garage; and surveillance from Trust Lounge
after Johnson's murder.
Spare Parts. Sergeant David Richardson testified that he personally
downloaded the Spare Parts surveillance video from the business's system and
· reviewed said video. An employee of the business confirmed that he assisted in
the retrieval of this footage.
148 Jefferson Street. Sgt. Richardson also testified that he personally
downloaded the video from 148 Jefferson Street, which showed·Taylor's garage.
The owner of the property testified as to the surveillance system, cameras, and /
Sgt. Richardson's approved retrieval of the footage. ,
Trust Lounge. Eric Ostrander, general manager of Trust Lounge,
testified as to the existence of his surveillance system, where the cameras were
located,. and that the admitted video was a fair and accurate depiction of the
nightclub.
This testimony is· sufficient to establish the Commonwealth's prii.na facie
showing that the. evidence is what it is purported to be. The defense did not
22 question the actual authenticity of this video. Without more, we cannot say
that the judge's decision was an abuse of discretion. ·
, D~ The trial court's exclusion of Ballard's KCPC evaluation was harmless error.
Taylor attempted to call Dr. James Anderson from K~ntucky Correctional
. Psychiatric Center (KCPC) to. testify about Ballard's KCPC evaluation and his
exi:)erience with Ballard. Most of the relevant evidence involved Dr. Anderson's
·psychiatric diagnoses: malingering and feigning symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder. The co·mmonwealth objected, and the trial judge sustained the
objection, finding that th,e evidence was irrelevant as the mental health records
did not go to Ballard's memory or ability to recall, and Ballard already admitted
that he was a.liar. 4 We hold that this evidence should have been admitted, but
the error was harmless.
· "The Due Process . Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees . a
criminal defendarit tJ:ie opportunity to present a full defense, and that . . guarantee includes the right to introduce evidence that an alternate perpetrator
committed the offense." Gray v. Comm~nwealth, 480 S.W.3~l 253, 266 (Ky. ·
. 2016) (citing Harris v: Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Ky. 2004)). Taylor
chose to. employ the aaltperp theory that Ballard had killed Johnson and
wanted to elicit Dr. Anderson's testimony to prove that Ballard was feigning his
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant also Jailed to overcome the 4
psychotherapist-patient privilege in KRE 507(b). The foundation for this argument is · unclear in the record but we· note that, if Ballard waived his ·privilege for the purpose of a KCPC evaluation, this privilege would no longer apply. The Commonwealth cannot deny the privilege in assessing competency and criminal responsibility and then claiin the privilege on behalf of witnesses it wants to portray as credible. 23 trauma after the murder, in order to show that Ballard was the perpetrator . . rather than Taylor.
For aaltperp evidence to be admitted, "all KRE 403 requires is evidence of
some logical, qualifying information to enhance the proffered evidence beyond
speculative, farfetched theories that may potentially confuse the issues or
mislead the jury." Id. The Commonwealth did not object to Taylor's other
aaltperp evidence, including several jailhouse. informants who testified that
Ballard had confessed to Johnson's murder. Both Taylor and the
Commonwealth agree that only two people were present at the tj.me of .
Johnson's death: Taylor and Ballard. As only those two men knew what really
happened that night and each rnari testified. that the other had killed Johnso:r:i; .
.Taylor's theory was "more than speculation or exculpatory name-dropping." Id.
·Under the broad nature of KRE 401 and 403, as we outlined in
determining the admissibility of the.Commonwealth's evidence, Taylor clearly
met his burden for admission of this evidence. But, the judge excluded this
·evidence based on its inability to question Ballard's memory or ability to recall.
Dr. Anderson's testimony . did tend to undermine Ballard's· credibility . generally.
But it also went directly to Ballard's guilt, state of mind, and feigning of
trauma, thereby lending credence to Taylor's aaltperp theory that B~lard killed
Johnson. The gist of Taylor's aaltperp theory was that if Ballard was feigning . trauma after .the experience, he was not truly traumatized and was lying to
conceal his participation in the crime. Therefore, here, the evidence's value
went to Taylor's aaltperp theory and the decision to exclude was "unsupported
24 by sound legal principles." See Webb, 387 S.W.3d at 324 (internal citations
omitted).
However, we also hold that this error was harmless. "Exclusion of
evidence that an 'aaltperp' had both the motive and the opportunity to commit
the act for which the accused is charged deprives the accused of the Due
Process right to present a defense." Blair v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 801,
810 (Ky. 2004) (citing Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 07-08 (Ky.
2003). ~Harmless error analysis applied to a constitutional error ... involves
considering the improper evidence in the context of the entire trial and asking
. whether there is a [1reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction. [1" Staples v. Commonwealth, 454
S.W.3d 803, 826-27 (Ky. 2014) (citing Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d
76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386.U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). "A
properly preserved constitutional error is reversible, in other words, unless it
was 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. m Staples, 454 S. W.3d at 827 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).
In this case, the excluded evidence was minimal. Taylor presented vast.
evidence of his aaltperp theory: several jailhouse informants who testified of
Ballard's inculpatory statements arid confessions; Taylor's own testimony of
what he stated transpired that evening; and cross-examination of Ballard,
confessing to his violent history and talent for lying. In light of the. weight of
this evidence, Dr. Anderson's testimony added little, if any, value to Taylor's
. aaltperp theory. As such, there is no reasonable possibility that the admissioh
25 of this evidence would have led to a different verdict, and the error was
harmless.
E. The trial court did not abuse its disc·retion in refusing to choose a particular juror as an alternate .
. Defense counsel received.juror qualification forms three days before trial
and had the oppo:r:tunity to fully examine potential jurors during voir dire.
After several days of trial, defense counsel told the Court they had discovered
that juror 3251 was married to the public relations officer for the Lexington
Fayette Urban County Government, information that the juror disclosed on his
jury sheet. Taylor now argues that this juror should have been chosen as the
alternate and dismissed, although he has made no specific allegations that this
juror lied or deliberately withheld information duririg voir dire.
"The rule is well settled that a challenge to a juror for cause must be
made before the trial." Pelfrey v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Ky.
1992) (citing Galliaer v. Southern Harlan Coal Co., ·57 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1933)).·
"All .challenges must be made before the juror is sworn. No prospective juror
may be challenged after being accepted unless the court for good cause permits
it." RCr 9.36 (emphasi~ added). "[T]he granting of such challenge is
permissive. What constitutes 'good cause' and whether the court will permit
such challenge are matters within the discretion of the trial court." Rowe v.
Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1965) (quoting Waggoner v.
Commonwealth, 72 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. 1934)).
26 ·We have upheld a trial court's discretion in deliberately choosing an
alternate juror . when circumstances arise that may impugn the integrity of the ~
juror in question. See Nunley v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Ky. 2_013).
Although we also acknowledged that "[t]he trial court should err on the side of
caution by striking the doubtful juror," see Nun.ley, 393 S.W.3d at 14, we
similarly must analyze. a judge's. decision not to deliberately choose an alternate
under the same abuse of discre.tion standard. Both parties had the juror's
infor'1Ilation before voir dire; there is no allegation the juror perjured himself or
intentionally misled the jury during voir dire; and Taylor has . ·not alleged . any
specific bias. While we continue to appreciate judges' erring on the side of
caution and dismissing jurors for cause when there are questions about a
juror's ability to serve, we cannot say th_e judge's decision not to dismiss for
cause was an abuse of discretion. The jury had been impaneled; several days -
.of trial had ensued; Taylor did not object to this juror during voir dire; and
Taylor has failed to articulate any spec.ific prejudice that would have resulted in
the juror's dismissal for cause. It is up to the court to determine whether good
cause has been shown to allow a for-cause challenge after the jury was
impaneled. The judge here decided there was not, and deem.ed it unnecessary
to designate the juror.as the alternate. We cannot say this was an abuse of
discretion.
27 III. CONCLUSION .
Any errors that occurred at trial were harmless. The evidence against
Taylor was ample .. We see no reversible error her~. For the foregoing reasons,
we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court.
All sitting. Minton, C~J.; Hughes, Keller, VanMeter, Venters and Wright,
JJ., concur. Cunningham, J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Susan Jackson Balliet Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Emily Lucas Assistant Attorney General