NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2414-18T4
ROBERT KOEHLER and SUSAN KOEHLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Respondents,
v.
MICHAEL SMITH, ROB'S COLLISION, DEWBERRY ENGINEERS, INC., and HNTB CORPORATION,
Defendants,
and
CREAMER SANZARI, a Joint Venture,
Defendant-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant.
Argued telephonically September 16, 2020 – Decided October 1, 2020
Before Judges Whipple and Rose. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-4693-15.
Edward P. Capozzi argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Brach Eichler, LLC, attorneys; Edward P. Capozzi, Jeremy Hylton and Kristofer Petrie, on the briefs).
Thomas M. Licata argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Malapero Prisco Klauber & Licata, LLP, attorneys; Melanie Rowan Quinn, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
In this automobile accident case, plaintiff Robert Koehler 1 appeals the
Law Division's summary judgment dismissal of his personal injury complaint
against defendant Creamer Sanzari, A Joint Venture. The crux of the issues
raised on appeal is whether defendant – a New Jersey Department of
Transportation (DOT) contractor performing ongoing work on the highway
beneath an overpass that was not marked with a low clearance sign – bears
liability for plaintiff's accident caused when a truck struck the overpass.
Plaintiff maintains the motion judge erroneously determined defendant was
entitled to traffic sign immunity under section 4-6 of the Tort Claims Act (TCA),
1 In our opinion we refer to Robert Koehler as plaintiff, although we recognize Susan Koehler, his wife, also has filed a derivative claim for loss of consortium.
A-2414-18T4 2 N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3, and defendant was not entitled to derivative
immunity because it had an independent duty to address the low-clearance sign.
Defendant cross-appeals, claiming the judge erroneously concluded defendant
was not entitled to design plan immunity under section 4-5 of the TCA. Having
considered the parties' arguments in light of the record and applicable legal
standards, we affirm the judge's order granting summary judgment to defendant.
Accordingly, we need not reach the issues raised in defendant's cross-appeal.
I.
We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Templo
Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189,
199 (2016). Employing the same standard the trial court uses, ibid., we review
the record to determine whether there are material factual disputes and, if not,
whether the undisputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff
nonetheless entitle defendant to judgment as a matter of law, see Brill v.
Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R.
4:46-2(c).
The facts are essentially undisputed. The accident occurred on March 12,
2014 on Route 3 in Rutherford near the Ridge Road overpass, which was located
in a construction zone. Traffic was flowing normally, when the boom of a
A-2414-18T4 3 bucket truck – that was in tow – struck the overpass, flew off, hit the roof of
plaintiff's car and entered the sunroof, causing plaintiff's accident. 2
Pursuant to its contract with the DOT, defendant was the general
contractor for a multi-year road-improvement project on Route 3, which
included the Ridge Road overpass. The engineering plans and specifications for
the overpass involved removing the concrete encasement from the bottom of the
beams and widening the roadway beneath the overpass. The DOT hired
Dewberry Engineers, Inc., and HNTB Corporation as design engineers on the
project to widen the roadway, add acceleration and deceleration lanes, and
perform work on seven bridges over a span of several years.3
The contract required an on-site traffic control coordinator, whose
responsibilities included traffic control operations on the construction site for
changing construction conditions, and the setup and removal of temporary
2 The tow truck was driven by Michael Smith and owned by Rob's Collision. Having settled their claims with plaintiff, both defendants were dismissed from the litigation in January 2018 and are not parties to this appeal. 3 Following their separate settlements with plaintiff, defendants Dewberry and HNTB were dismissed from the litigation in May 2018; they are not parties to this appeal.
A-2414-18T4 4 traffic signs and markers. The DOT and its engineer were responsible for
deciding which lanes would close when work was performed on the project.
Built approximately forty years ago, the vertical clearance of the Ridge
Road overpass was thirteen feet, nine inches. Since 1986, overpasses and
bridges in New Jersey with clearances of fewer than fourteen feet, six inches are
required by statute to "have the maximum clearance marked or posted thereon,"
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-1(a), and warning signs, indicating the maximum clearance,
"posted at the last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge or overpass," N.J.S.A.
27:5G-1(b). No such marking or sign warned drivers of the low-vertical
clearance for the Ridge Road overpass.
The design plan for the project, drafted by the DOT Bureau of Structural
Engineering, clearly indicated a minimal vertical clearance of thirteen feet, nine
inches for the Ridge Road overpass, but did not propose the placement of
signage. Nor did the project involve changes to the long-standing height or
clearance of the overpass. Six months before plaintiff's accident, a similar
accident had occurred at the same overpass, when the boom of a fully-extended
forklift, towed on a flatbed truck, struck the overpass.
When deposed, defendant's project superintendent, Sean Desmet,
indicated he was unaware of the required height for the Ridge Road overpass
A-2414-18T4 5 and bridge; he acknowledged there were no clearance markings on the overpass
to warn drivers of the clearance. But, Desmet said he knew the maximum height
of a legal truck load was thirteen feet, six inches. He stated defendant "didn't
do anything other than what was detailed in [its] plans and specs," and he did
not believe defendant was required to do anything to ensure vehicles did not
strike the overpass. The plans only indicated the overpass clearance in one spot
– the right shoulder – and that clearance was thirteen feet, nine inches. After
plaintiff's accident, DOT placed clearance signage on all four lanes of the Ridge
Road overpass. At that point, Desmet learned there were different clearances in
various areas of the overpass.
Desmet asserted that because he was not a traffic or design engineer, he
was not authorized to erect a sign himself. Nor was anyone in defendant's crew
authorized to set up temporary signage. Desmet only was responsible fo r
building what was designed, and if an engineer instructed him to place a sign on
something, he would do so. Desmet testified there were no signs on any of the
other bridges within the project limit.
According to plaintiff's engineering expert, Richard M. Balgowan, P.E.,
the design engineer is responsible for developing the temporary traffic pl ans
based on the federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).
A-2414-18T4 6 Balgowan acknowledged a contractor reviewing plans during the bid process
would not undertake the same engineering analysis as the design engineer.
Instead, the contractor only would analyze a plan for constructability; the DOT
or its engineering consultant would undertake design. According to Balgowan,
"the contractors, specifically [are] looking at constructability issues, things
missing from the plans, things that should be added to the plans." Regarding
temporary traffic plans, Balgowan stated HNTB prepared the traffic control
plans and was "responsible for putting together the temporary traffic control
plans, making sure that the proper signage was used, those types of thing s."
Balgowan acknowledged the design engineers should have addressed the
low clearance of the overpass but opined that because defendant was on site
daily, it should have brought the clearance issue to the engineer's attention.
Balgowan nonetheless conceded the design engineer bore the primary
responsibility for ensuring the plans and specifications were correct. Because
the project's plans noted there was a thirteen-feet, nine-inch clearance, anyone
reviewing or developing the plans for moving traffic should "do something to
address the inadequate vertical underclearance."
Balgowan opined the DOT and its design engineer, who "made the entry
'[thirteen] feet, nine inches' in the plans" were, therefore, aware of the Ridge
A-2414-18T4 7 Road overpass's low clearance. Balgowan conceded that discussions regarding
the vertical clearance of the bridge commenced in 2004, and the DOT decided
not to install a low-clearance warning sign "for several years." Nonetheless,
Balgowan asserted if a contractor were uncomfortable with the manner in which
the plan was established, the contractor could address signage on its own.
Referring to the issue as a "gray area," Balgowan suggested it "behooves [the
contractor], the right thing to do, [is to] consult with the [r]esident [e]ngineer on
the job, [and] say, 'Here's what I see, here's what I would like to do.'" Balgowan
believed the contractor was authorized "to attach a sign to a bridge. That's
something [it] could do. [The contractor] would absolutely talk to the State
about getting approval to do so."
However, Balgowan later acknowledged: "The only thing I would
question [would be whether] the contractor ha[d] the authority to put a sign
directly on a bridge? And I don't know that answer." Balgowan added that he
would not himself do so without seeking formal approval. Balgowan did not
know whether the DOT's failure to erect a low-clearance sign, despite its
awareness that the bridge was too low, was intentional or an oversight.
Balgowan also did not know whether the design engineer considered
placing a warning sign at the exit before the overpass, or whether such a sign
A-2414-18T4 8 was intentionally omitted from the temporary traffic plans. He conceded that
the design engineer's plans mentioned concrete was missing from previous
vehicular strikes, and a permanent low-clearance sign should have been erected
well before any work on the project began. Balgowan also agreed that a low-
clearance sign was not included in the plans.
At the close of discovery, summary judgment motions were cross-filed
and the judge considered oral argument on January 4, 2019 before granting
defendant's motion, thereby dismissing plaintiff's complaint and all crossclaims.
In a cogent statement of reasons accompanying a January 9, 2019 order, the
motion judge squarely addressed the parties' contentions and the legal principles
raised, concluding defendant: (1) failed to demonstrate design or plan immunity
applied as a matter of law under N.J.S.A. 59:4-64; (2) was entitled to traffic sign
immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-55; (3) and owed plaintiff no independent duty to
address the low-vertical clearance.
4 N.J.S.A. 59:4-6 provides immunity "for an injury caused by the plan or design of public property . . . where such plan or design has been approved in advance of the construction" by a public entity or public employee. 5 Under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable . . . for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices." A-2414-18T4 9 Initially, the motion judge recognized "[a]s the general contractor for the
project, [defendant wa]s entitled to derivative immunity for any immunity that
would attach to the public entity." The judge also noted derivative immunity is
an affirmative defense which must be proven by defendant. With those
principles in view, the judge found defendant "failed to carry its burden that the
inclusion or non-inclusion of low[-]clearance signs to warn traffic was
considered or addressed in any fashion in the design and plans." Finding a
material issue of fact therefore existed, the judge rejected defendant's argument
that it was entitled to design and plan immunity.
The motion judge reached a different conclusion regarding defendant's
claim of traffic sign immunity. In doing so, the judge noted the TCA's
"[i]mmunity is only granted for failure to place ordinary signs." Analyzing our
decisions in Smith v. State, Department of Transportation, 247 N.J. Super. 62
(App. Div. 1991), and Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Department, 148
N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1977), the judge rejected plaintiff's contention that
the low clearance of the Ridge Road overpass constituted an emergency
condition that would otherwise warrant an emergency warning sign under
A-2414-18T4 10 N.J.S.A. 59:4-4.6 In reaching his decision, the judge dismissed plaintiff's
argument that the previous bridge strike "transformed this case into one where
a sudden emergency was created," thereby imposing a duty on defendant "to
place temporary emergency warning signs notifying [drivers] of low clearance."
Quoting our decision in Smith, the judge instead observed:
[I]t would be incongruous indeed to hold that there is immunity for failure to provide ordinary traffic signals under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 but by simply labeling an ordinary, continuing and long[-]standing traffic condition "an emergency," liability may be created for failing to provide "emergency signals, signs, markings or other devices." An "emergency" means a sudden and unexpected condition, one that is extraordinary.
[247 N.J. Super. at 71-72 (citations omitted).]
Finding "[t]he vertical clearance [had remained] unchanged for many years," the
judge concluded the condition "was not . . . sudden and unexpected" and as such,
it did not constitute an "emergency" as defined by case law.
6 N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 imposes liability on a public entity:
for injury proximately caused by its failure to provide emergency signals, signs, markings or other devices if such devices were necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care. A-2414-18T4 11 Finally, the motion judge rejected plaintiff's reliance on our Supreme
Court's decision in Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority,
104 N.J. 80 (1986), to support his argument that defendant had an independent
duty to address the low-vertical clearance in light of the previous bridge strike.
Instead, the judge quoted the principles espoused in Vanchieri, which
underscore contractor immunity for a public entity's specifications over which
the contractor has no control: "It would be fundamentally unfair to hold a
contractor liable in that instance for injury caused by defective plans, at least in
the absence of a blatant, obvious danger that the contractor should have brought
to the attention of the public entity." Id. at 86.
Finding it was "undisputed that the DOT was aware of the vertical
clearance height as well as the earlier bridge strike" and dismissing plaintiff's
contention that the role of defendant's traffic control supervisor included the
establishment of a temporary traffic pattern to prevent accidents at the Ridge
Road overpass, the judge determined defendant owed plaintiff no independent
duty. In reaching his conclusion, the judge noted the DOT had "express
knowledge" of the long-standing condition, which it chose not to address.
Accordingly, the condition was not a temporary hazardous condition that might
otherwise require action on the part of defendant. This appeal followed.
A-2414-18T4 12 II.
On appeal, plaintiff reprises his arguments that defendant was
independently negligent and not entitled to traffic sign immunity. Plaintiff now
claims the judge's rejection of plan or design immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-6
was inconsistent with his determination that defendant was not independently
negligent. We have considered plaintiff's contentions in light of our de novo
review of the record and applicable legal principles, and conclude they lack
sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the sound reasons expressed by the
motion judge, adding the following comments.
A.
In his first point on appeal, plaintiff claims a genuine issue of fact
precluded summary judgment on defendant's independent negligence because
defendant failed to retain a competing expert. Accordingly, plaintiff claimed
Balgowan's opinions "were completely unchallenged evidentiarily." Those
opinions included defendant's failures to: "install and enforce temporary traffic
control and safety measures"; "install appropriate advance warning signs and
appropriate low[-]bridge clearance signs"; "comply with the DOT's plans and
specifications"; and "comply with N.J.S.A. . . . 29:5G-1." Plaintiff again asserts
A-2414-18T4 13 the contract explicitly required the designation of a traffic control coordinator,
who was responsible for implementing and maintaining all traffic operation s on
defendant's behalf. Plaintiff claims those operations included immediately
identifying and correcting traffic control deficiencies and providing traffic
control devices under the MUTCD.
But, plaintiff's contentions ignore Balgowan's deposition testimony,
acknowledging, for example: it was the design engineer's primary responsibility
to ascertain that the project's plans and specifications are correct; the issue
concerning the contractor's responsibility to attach a sign to the bridge was a
"gray area," thereby questioning whether the contractor was authorized to affix
a low-clearance sign to the bridge; and the requisite signs should have been
addressed before the project began. Further, there is no dispute that the traffic
control patterns were designed by the DOT and its engineers, and defendant
carried out those patterns according to the plans and specifications.
Moreover, the contract setting forth the duties of temporary traffic control
relates to temporary changes in traffic patterns caused by construction; not
permanent and pre-established traffic conditions, such as the overpass height at
issue and the lack of signage. Although the plans provided for the removal of
concrete from the bridge, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that
A-2414-18T4 14 removal involved adjustments to the bridge's height or the overpass's cl earance.
Notably, the plans document the Ridge Road overpass's clearance as thirteen
feet, nine inches, but do not indicate that height fails to meet the statutory
requirements or is otherwise non-standard. Further, Balgowan acknowledged
the milling and paving performed by defendant underneath the bridge would not
have changed the clearance.
In sum, because defendant had no duty to affix signage to the Ridge Road
overpass or address the traffic flow on Route 3, the judge properly granted
summary judgment regardless of whether defendant enjoyed traffic sign
immunity under the TCA.
B.
Nonetheless, we reject plaintiff's contention that the motion judge's
interpretation of "emergency" was "limited" and inapplicable here, where the
condition was long-standing. Plaintiff claims the judge failed to consider the
condition was not "reasonably apparent to a careful and prudent driver."
Plaintiff's argument misapprehends the judge's decision.
Generally, a public entity may be held liable for its failure to pro vide
emergency signals when the dangerous condition is temporary. See Rochinsky
v. State, Dep't of Transp., 110 N.J. 399, 416 (1988) (stating the duty to warn
A-2414-18T4 15 under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 in the context of a snowstorm "concerns only
extraordinary conditions that are qualitatively different from those conditions
that would be 'reasonably apparent to' or 'anticipated by' a careful motorist
driving in a snowstorm," such as a stalled snowplow in traffic or the creation of
an artificial snowbank making a highway impassable); Meta v. Twp. of Cherry
Hill, 152 N.J. Super. 228, 233-34 (App. Div. 1977) (finding emergency signals
and signs were warranted for icy conditions when the public entity was aware
of the condition several hours before the plaintiff's accident).
Emergency situations have not been found where – as the motion judge
found here – under the plain meaning of "emergency," there was no indication
of "a sudden or unexpected occurrence or condition" imposing a duty on the
public entity, nor an emergent situation that held a high degree of risk for the
public. See Spin Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 136 N.J. Super. 520, 523-25 (Law
Div. 1975). We agree with the judge that the Ridge Road overpass's lack of
clearance signage is not the type of sudden and unanticipated situation that
would impose liability on a public entity, and as such, the judge correctly
determined defendant was entitled to traffic sign immunity.
A-2414-18T4 16 C.
Lastly, plaintiff claims the motion judge's decision that defendant was not
entitled to plan or design immunity – although correct – conflicts with the
judge's determination that defendant was not independently negligent. Plaintiff
recognizes the record was devoid of any evidence that low-clearance signs were
contemplated in the plans. Plaintiff claims that because the design plans were
incorporated in the contract, the judge's decisions are inconsistent.
As stated, immunity under the TCA is an affirmative defense. The motion
judge determined defendant did not meet its burden to demonstrate the low-
clearance sign was contemplated in the plans and a discretionary decision was
made to omit signage, which would have entitled defendant to plan or design
immunity. Demonstrating defendant was liable under an independent
negligence theory, however, is plaintiff's burden. Again, the record does not
contain any competent evidence that defendant was responsible to erect signage
on the Ridge Road overpass or otherwise warn the public the bridge did not meet
the statutory minimum clearance. Because both theories of liability required
different burdens of proof, the motion judge's rulings were not in discord.
Affirmed.
A-2414-18T4 17