Robert Joseph Norman

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 18, 2020
Docket19-61286
StatusUnknown

This text of Robert Joseph Norman (Robert Joseph Norman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Joseph Norman, (Ohio 2020).

Opinion

The court incorporates by reference in this paragraph and adopts as the findings and orders of this court the document set forth below. This document was signed electronically at the time and date indicated, which may be materially different from its entry on the record.

i | | 2 ye LA. ' □□□ ay ‘5 Russ Kendig er United States Bankruptcy Judge Dated: 03:16 PM February 18, 2020

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE: ) CHAPTER 7 ) ROBERT JOSEPH NORMAN, ) CASE NO. 19-61286 ) Debtor. ) JUDGE RUSS KENDIG ) ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION ) (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) In a motion filed on January 7, 2020, Debtor seeks contempt sanctions against creditors Patricia Heath (“Heath”), Scott Swearingen (“Swearingen” )and Alan and Loretta Coogan (“Coogans’”’) (collectively “Creditors”’) for violating the automatic stay. Creditors deny any violation. The court held a non-evidentiary hearing on February 3, 2020. The court has subject matter jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the general order of reference issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. General Order 2012-7. This is a statutorily core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O). The court has authority to enter final orders in this matter. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409, venue in this court is proper. The following constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under Bankruptcy Rule 7052. This opinion is not intended for publication or citation. The availability of this opinion, in electronic or printed form, is not the result of a direct submission by the court.

FACTS

Debtor owns Templar Companies, LLC dba Professional Funeral Services (“Templar”). When he filed bankruptcy on July 14, 2019, he identified his interest in the business in his schedules and in the Statement of Financial Affairs.

Heath, Swearingen and Coogans are listed as unsecured creditors on Schedule F. Heath and Swearingen are owed $5,845.00 and $10,000.00 respectively for “services performed.” Coogans are owed $18,000.00 for a personal loan to Templar. Creditors were served with the Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case on June 20, 2019 by first class mail.

When he filed his bankruptcy case, a lawsuit was pending against him in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas. Coogans and Heath are plaintiffs. Debtor and Templar are defendants.1 On October 9, 2019, the court conducted a damages hearing. The court awarded the plaintiffs “damages against Defendant Templar Companies, LLC.” Although it appears Debtor participated in the hearing, no damages were assessed against him individually, only against Templar.

On October 4, 2019, Swearingen filed a civil complaint against Templar in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Although the only defendant listed in the complaint is Templar, at least one allegation directly involves Debtor. The third claim states “[b]etween June 1, 2019 and June 15, 2019, Defendant utilized Plaintiff Scott Swearingen’s services, while knowingly starting the process of filing personal bankruptcy. Defendant defrauded plaintiff out of wages while still using plaintiff’s services.”

Heath and Swearingen, doing business as S & H Funeral Services LLC, drafted a letter announcing the opening of their business. It references fraud and unpaid wages. With regard to Debtor specifically, the letter disclaims that either Heath or Swearingen have a non-compete agreement or employment contract with either Debtor or Templar.

DISCUSSION

I. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)

When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, section 362 of the bankruptcy code prevents creditors from taking a variety of actions against the debtor and property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Prohibited actions include “commencement or continuation” of legal proceedings against the debtor or to recover claims against the debtor under § 362(a)(1); acts to obtain or exercise control over property of the estate under § 362(a)(3); and acts to “collect, assess, or recover” prepetition claims under § 362(a)(6). Pursuant to § 362(k)(1), “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” To be entitled to damages, the injured party must prove, by a preponderance of the

1 There may be other plaintiffs and/or defendants but these are known from the copy of the order provided. 2 evidence, “(1) the actions taken were in violation of the automatic stay; (2) the violation was willful; and (3) the violation caused actual damages.” Collett v. Lee Oil Co. (In re Collett), 2014 WL 2111309, *4 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

A. The postpetition damages hearing in state court did not violate the stay.

Debtor contends that the damages hearing conducted by the state court after he filed bankruptcy violated the stay. The court is unconvinced.

Generally, the stay does not apply to entities other than the debtor. Wilson v. D&N Masonry, Inc., 2013 WL 12131221 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (unreported) (citing Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 1993); Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 263 F.3d 299, 314-15 (6th Cir. 2001)). In expounding on this general principle, the Sixth Circuit found nothing in legislative history indicating the protection is intended for anyone but debtor and noted that where Congress wanted to extend the stay to non-debtors, such as chapter 13 co-debtors, it explicitly did so. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301; Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983).

The general rule is not irreproachable. The Sixth Circuit suggested in Patton that “unusual circumstances,” such “as when the debtor and the non-bankrupt party are closely related for the stay contributes to the debtor’s reorganization,” may provide a basis for application to non-debtor entities. Patton, 8 F.3d at 349 (citations omitted). For the stay to extend beyond debtor, Sixth Circuit case law suggests that a bankruptcy court must affirmatively act to issue an injunction. In re Johnson, 548 B.R. 770, 788 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2016) (citing Patton, 8 F.3d at 349) (other citations omitted)). This was not done in the present case. The court therefore finds that the stay applied only to Debtor, not Templar.

Upon review of the decision issued by the state court, it appears very carefully tailored to Templar specifically. Debtor failed to convince the court that Creditors continued the action against him individually. Since the stay did not apply to Templar, and relief was direct only at Templar, the court cannot find a violation of the stay occurred.

B. Creditors actions against Templar are not actions involving estate property that violate the automatic stay.

Debtor argues that Templar’s property is property of the state and any act to obtain Templar’s property violates the stay. The court disagrees.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Robert Joseph Norman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-joseph-norman-ohnb-2020.