Robert Jamtaas v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Ninth Circuit

Robert Jamtaas v. Carolyn W. Colvin

606 F. App'x 363

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 2, 2015

Docket13-35490

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 606 F. App'x 363 (Robert Jamtaas v. Carolyn W. Colvin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Robert Jamtaas v. Carolyn W. Colvin, 606 F. App'x 363 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Robert Jamtaas (Jamtaas) appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of his application for supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. We affirm.

1.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for weighing the opinions of the various medical providers. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir.2012). Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Wingate’s assessment of functional limitations that were based on her diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.2005). Jamtaas did not testify at his administrative hearing to symptoms of PTSD, and no other doctor diagnosed him with PTSD. Thus, the ALJ’s duty to develop the record was not triggered. See Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc., Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930-31 (9th Cir.2014).

2. The ALJ also provided specific, clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting Jam-taas’ testimony about the severity of his symptoms. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2014). These reasons included Jamtaas’ own inconsistent statements, his daily activities, and his prior work history. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc., Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir.2009).

3. The ALJ provided germane reasons for rejecting the statement of Jamtaas’ father to the extent that it was inconsistent with the overall evidence. See Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir.2014).

4. Because the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of the medical evidence, Jam-taas’ testimony, and the lay witness evidence, he did not err in his residual functional capacity determination, which was supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.2005).

5. The ALJ properly relied on the testimony from the vocational expert because *364 it was based on a hypothetical which contained the limitations that the ALJ found were supported by the evidence. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1166.

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Robert Jamtaas (Jamtaas) appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of his application for supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. We affirm.

1.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for weighing the opinions of the various medical providers. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir.2012). Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Wingate’s assessment of functional limitations that were based on her diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.2005). Jamtaas did not testify at his administrative hearing to symptoms of PTSD, and no other doctor diagnosed him with PTSD. Thus, the ALJ’s duty to develop the record was not triggered. See Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc., Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930-31 (9th Cir.2014).

2. The ALJ also provided specific, clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting Jam-taas’ testimony about the severity of his symptoms. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2014). These reasons included Jamtaas’ own inconsistent statements, his daily activities, and his prior work history. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc., Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir.2009).

3. The ALJ provided germane reasons for rejecting the statement of Jamtaas’ father to the extent that it was inconsistent with the overall evidence. See Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir.2014).

4. Because the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of the medical evidence, Jam-taas’ testimony, and the lay witness evidence, he did not err in his residual functional capacity determination, which was supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.2005).

5. The ALJ properly relied on the testimony from the vocational expert because *364 it was based on a hypothetical which contained the limitations that the ALJ found were supported by the evidence. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1166.

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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606 F. App'x 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-jamtaas-v-carolyn-w-colvin-ca9-2015.

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