NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3279-21
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ONE NJ NEPTUNE 230 MANAGEMENT LLC, and CHRIS RUSSELL,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
JUNIOR M. MATHEO,
Defendant. __________________________
Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided December 22, 2023
Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. DC-008989- 21.
Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Shane P. Simon argued the cause for respondents (Saul Ewing, LLP, attorneys; Shane P. Simon, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from a February 16, 2022 order, which
granted summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice his claims against
defendant One NJ Neptune 230 Management, LLC (NJ Neptune). We affirm.
We discern the relevant facts from the record. On July 9, 2021, NJ
Neptune issued its employee, co-defendant Junior M. Matheo, a $1,125.43
payroll check from its JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) account. The same day,
Matheo deposited the check into his PNC Bank account through a mobile
electronic deposit. Matheo then indorsed1 the check to Cash N Carry LLC, a
check-cashing business, receiving a second payment. Four days later, Cash N
Carry presented the check for payment, but Chase dishonored payment as a
duplicate presentment.
On July 23, 2021, NJ Neptune issued Matheo a second payroll check for
$838.06 from its Chase account, which he electronically deposited into his PNC
1 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-204 defines "indorsement" as "a signature, other than that of a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an instrument for the purpose of negotiating the instrument, restricting payment of the instrument, or incurring indorser's liability on the instrument." A-3279-21 2 account. Matheo indorsed the check to Cash N Carry, again receiving a second
payment. Chase denied payment to Cash N Carry as a duplicate presentment.
Cash N Carry assigned the denied checks to Triffin.
In September, Triffin filed an action in the Special Civil Part seeking
recovery of the dishonored check amounts, fees, and costs under N.J.S.A.
12A:3-414(b), obligation of drawer. Triffin attached copies of both dishonored
and returned checks. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted in lieu of an answer under Rule
4:6-2(e), arguing they did not owe any funds because the checks had been paid.
Defendants attached the certification of Michelle Reitan, the Vice President of
Shared Services for Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation, an affiliate of
NJ Neptune, and copies of the cashed electronically-deposited checks. Triffin
opposed the motion.
Reitan certified she had "firsthand knowledge of the facts and
circumstances . . . having reviewed [the] records maintained in [NJ Neptune]'s
ordinary course of business." Further, she attested that both payroll checks were
deposited through "mobile deposit application[s]" and paid by Chase to PNC
Bank. Thereafter, Chase dishonored the checks Cash N Carry presented for
payment because they had been "previously honored."
A-3279-21 3 On February 16, 2022, after hearing argument and issuing an oral
decision, the motion judge entered an order granting summary judgment and
dismissing Triffin's claims against defendants NJ Neptune and managing
member Chris Russell. The judge converted the motion to "one for summary
judgment," based on the submission of "the checks and the documents" outside
of Triffin's complaint. After providing plaintiff "every reasonable inference,"
the judge found summary judgment was warranted because "the checks
appended to the plaintiff's complaint each contained [i]ndorsements" after they
had been previously "electronically deposited." Relying on Triffin v. SHS
Group, LLC, 446 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 191
(2022), the judge found NJ Neptune established the "previously paid defense"
under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c) because the un-indorsed checks were
electronically deposited first. The judge relied on the unrefuted copies of the
electronically-deposited cashed checks, dishonored checks, and Reitan's
certification finding that no material "issues of fact" were in dispute. The judge
reasoned no "reasonable fact finder could find . . . [Triffin was] entitled to . . .
payment on the dishonored check[s]" and "no further discovery would lead to
any other conclusion." Triffin thereafter voluntarily dismissed claims against
defendants Russell and Matheo.
A-3279-21 4 On appeal, Triffin argues the judge erred in granting summary judgment
because: Neptune failed to demonstrate through admissible evidence, pursuant
to N.J.R.E. 1001 or the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check Clearing
Act), 12 U.S.C. § 5001-04, that the checks were "previously paid"; the produced
dishonored checks did not meet the required definition of an accepted check
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); and the Supremacy Clause mandates that 12
U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding in SHS Group.
We review a motion judge's grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch
v. Cream-O-Land, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We apply the same standard as the
motion judge and "consider whether the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are
sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in
favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.
520, 540 (1995). "We therefore must first determine whether, giving the non-
moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the movant has
demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Walker v.
Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Atl. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 397 N.J. Super. 224, 230-31 (App. Div. 2006)). A
dispute of material fact is "genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion
A-3279-21 5 at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all
legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require
submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys.,
230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).
A motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment
where the "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court . . . and all parties [are] given reasonable opportunity . . . to present all
material pertinent to such a motion." R. 4:6-2(e). Where "the motion was based
upon evidence, including certifications, outside of the pleadings," the court
applies the summary judgment standard. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3279-21
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ONE NJ NEPTUNE 230 MANAGEMENT LLC, and CHRIS RUSSELL,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
JUNIOR M. MATHEO,
Defendant. __________________________
Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided December 22, 2023
Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. DC-008989- 21.
Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Shane P. Simon argued the cause for respondents (Saul Ewing, LLP, attorneys; Shane P. Simon, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from a February 16, 2022 order, which
granted summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice his claims against
defendant One NJ Neptune 230 Management, LLC (NJ Neptune). We affirm.
We discern the relevant facts from the record. On July 9, 2021, NJ
Neptune issued its employee, co-defendant Junior M. Matheo, a $1,125.43
payroll check from its JPMorgan Chase Bank (Chase) account. The same day,
Matheo deposited the check into his PNC Bank account through a mobile
electronic deposit. Matheo then indorsed1 the check to Cash N Carry LLC, a
check-cashing business, receiving a second payment. Four days later, Cash N
Carry presented the check for payment, but Chase dishonored payment as a
duplicate presentment.
On July 23, 2021, NJ Neptune issued Matheo a second payroll check for
$838.06 from its Chase account, which he electronically deposited into his PNC
1 N.J.S.A. 12A:3-204 defines "indorsement" as "a signature, other than that of a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an instrument for the purpose of negotiating the instrument, restricting payment of the instrument, or incurring indorser's liability on the instrument." A-3279-21 2 account. Matheo indorsed the check to Cash N Carry, again receiving a second
payment. Chase denied payment to Cash N Carry as a duplicate presentment.
Cash N Carry assigned the denied checks to Triffin.
In September, Triffin filed an action in the Special Civil Part seeking
recovery of the dishonored check amounts, fees, and costs under N.J.S.A.
12A:3-414(b), obligation of drawer. Triffin attached copies of both dishonored
and returned checks. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted in lieu of an answer under Rule
4:6-2(e), arguing they did not owe any funds because the checks had been paid.
Defendants attached the certification of Michelle Reitan, the Vice President of
Shared Services for Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation, an affiliate of
NJ Neptune, and copies of the cashed electronically-deposited checks. Triffin
opposed the motion.
Reitan certified she had "firsthand knowledge of the facts and
circumstances . . . having reviewed [the] records maintained in [NJ Neptune]'s
ordinary course of business." Further, she attested that both payroll checks were
deposited through "mobile deposit application[s]" and paid by Chase to PNC
Bank. Thereafter, Chase dishonored the checks Cash N Carry presented for
payment because they had been "previously honored."
A-3279-21 3 On February 16, 2022, after hearing argument and issuing an oral
decision, the motion judge entered an order granting summary judgment and
dismissing Triffin's claims against defendants NJ Neptune and managing
member Chris Russell. The judge converted the motion to "one for summary
judgment," based on the submission of "the checks and the documents" outside
of Triffin's complaint. After providing plaintiff "every reasonable inference,"
the judge found summary judgment was warranted because "the checks
appended to the plaintiff's complaint each contained [i]ndorsements" after they
had been previously "electronically deposited." Relying on Triffin v. SHS
Group, LLC, 446 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 191
(2022), the judge found NJ Neptune established the "previously paid defense"
under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c) because the un-indorsed checks were
electronically deposited first. The judge relied on the unrefuted copies of the
electronically-deposited cashed checks, dishonored checks, and Reitan's
certification finding that no material "issues of fact" were in dispute. The judge
reasoned no "reasonable fact finder could find . . . [Triffin was] entitled to . . .
payment on the dishonored check[s]" and "no further discovery would lead to
any other conclusion." Triffin thereafter voluntarily dismissed claims against
defendants Russell and Matheo.
A-3279-21 4 On appeal, Triffin argues the judge erred in granting summary judgment
because: Neptune failed to demonstrate through admissible evidence, pursuant
to N.J.R.E. 1001 or the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check Clearing
Act), 12 U.S.C. § 5001-04, that the checks were "previously paid"; the produced
dishonored checks did not meet the required definition of an accepted check
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); and the Supremacy Clause mandates that 12
U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding in SHS Group.
We review a motion judge's grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch
v. Cream-O-Land, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We apply the same standard as the
motion judge and "consider whether the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are
sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in
favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.
520, 540 (1995). "We therefore must first determine whether, giving the non-
moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the movant has
demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Walker v.
Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Atl. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 397 N.J. Super. 224, 230-31 (App. Div. 2006)). A
dispute of material fact is "genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion
A-3279-21 5 at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all
legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require
submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys.,
230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).
A motion to dismiss may be converted to a motion for summary judgment
where the "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court . . . and all parties [are] given reasonable opportunity . . . to present all
material pertinent to such a motion." R. 4:6-2(e). Where "the motion was based
upon evidence, including certifications, outside of the pleadings," the court
applies the summary judgment standard. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010).
Under New Jersey's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3
governs negotiable instruments, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to -605, and Article 4
governs bank deposits and collections, N.J.S.A. 12A:4-101 to -504. N.J.S.A.
12A:3-414(b) provides, "If an unaccepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is
obligated to pay the draft according to its terms at the time it was issued . . . .
The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft or to an indorser
who paid the draft under [N.J.S.A.] 12A:3-415." However, "[i]f a draft is
accepted by a bank, the drawer is discharged, regardless of when or by whom
A-3279-21 6 acceptance was obtained." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c); see also SHS Group, 466
N.J. Super. at 467 ("Previous payment of a draft is a defense to enforcement.").
Triffin's argument that summary judgment was erroneously granted
because NJ Neptune did not produce "legally admissible evidence" as required
under N.J.R.E. 1002 or the Check Clearing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5003, to
demonstrate it "previously paid the two dishonored checks," is without merit.
The judge appropriately considered the copies of the checks submitted. Triffin
failed to demonstrate a "genuine question" of "authenticity" regarding the
duplicate copies of the electronically deposited checks. See N.J.R.E. 1003.
Under N.J.R.E. 1001(d) a "duplicate" is defined as: "a counterpart, other than
an original, produced by the same impression as the original . . . or by means of
photography." The judge also permissively relied on Reitan's certification,
which she attested was on personal knowledge of banking records held in the
normal course of business and, based on her review, the checks were deposited
through "mobile deposit applications" and paid by Chase to PNC Bank .
Further, under the Check Clearing Act, we observe that Congress provided
the Act's purpose was to: "facilitate check truncation by authorizing substitute
checks"; "foster innovation in the check collection system without mandating
receipt of checks in electronic form"; and "improve the overall efficiency of the
A-3279-21 7 Nation's payment system." 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b). Triffin's argument that 12
U.S.C. § 5003(b) requires a "compliant copy" of a cashed check to state "[t]his
is a legal copy of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the
original check" to be admissible is without merit. The legal equivalence of a
substitute check codified under the statute does not require an original check nor
preclude admissibility of a copy of an honored check to establish a previous
payment defense. Triffin's argument that the Check Clearing Act was "enacted"
to provide "an objective mechanical test" to determine "whether a check [w]as
paid" is unsupported by a plain reading of the stated legislative purpose.
Concluding 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) is inapplicable, we need not further
address Triffin's additional argument that 12 U.S.C. § 5003 preempts the holding
in SHS Group, 446 N.J. Super. at 470, which elucidated that a previous payment
defense under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), may be established through the
production of a copy of defendant's check which "referenc[es] the electronic"
deposit.
In summary, based on our de novo review of the record, we are satisfied
the judge correctly granted summary judgment determining no material issues
of fact disputed NJ Neptune was relieved from payment, under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-
A-3279-21 8 414(c), as the checks were honored by Chase to PNC upon Matheo's mobile
electronic deposit.
Triffin's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3279-21 9